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”There should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty nor
again excessive wealth, for both are productive of great evil.” (Plato)
Inequality and fairness have always been at the heart of any political concept aiming at
the well-being of the people. The idea of equality is as old as democracy itself, and when
selecting an inspiring quotation to start this dissertation with, I had the choice between
statements by political thinkers from Ancient Greece’s Plato to the father of modern
India’s democracy, Mahatma Gandhi, to German philosopher Karl Marx. In the end, I
picked Plato’s words because they capture many aspects which are still highly relevant
to the debate on inequality - used here in the sense of monetary inequality, comprising
everything from wage to income to wealth - in economics today.
The mentioning of both extreme poverty and excessive wealth relates to how inequality
can stem from different parts of the income distribution. Poverty and inequality are
distinct concepts and fields of research, but poverty in practice always implies inequality,
and many of the arguments brought forward against inequality pertain to the people at the
bottom of the income distribution. Most of these arguments have to do with equality of
opportunity and touch upon other concepts closely related to, but different from inequality,
such as social mobility. More recently, there has been a renewed interest in the top of the
income distribution with the publication of Thomas Piketty’s widely received ”Capital
in the Twenty-First Century” in 2014, which has also reached the popular debate and
sparked interest in the topic of inequality as a whole. While there is a general consensus
that (absolute) poverty has decreased substantially over the last few decades, Piketty
argues that inequality has been rising steadily since over the second half of the 21th
century in the industrialized countries. This is due to developments at the top end of the
wealth distribution, where incomes have become worrisomely high and continue to rise at
an increasing rate if no counteracting measures are taken. While these arguments have not
remained uncontested (see, e.g., critiques by Stiglitz1 and numerous newspaper articles),
he still makes the same point that Plato made some 2500 years earlier: that excessive
inequality will have adverse consequences. More specifically, too-high inequality will lead
to an imbalance of power between the rich and the rest of society, thereby eroding the
1http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-great-divide/?_r=1, accessed on April 17,
2016
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fundamentals of democracy. This may lead to social unrest, and ultimately also hurt the
material well-being of society as a whole, by hampering economic growth.
There are also reasons to believe that inequality is not a bad thing and can indeed
lead to an increase, rather than reduction, in overall wealth. Philosopher Thomas Steven
Molnar, capturing the essence of the US-American conservative view stated that ”passion
for equality blinds the utopian to the fact that society, as a whole, is based on inequality of
men in two respects: the inventor, the innovator, the exceptional man creates something
new and insures continuous progress; the others emulate his work or merely improve their
own lot by benefiting from his creativity. Now, to deny to this exceptional man the extra
compensation [...] is to extirpate his inventiveness.” (Molnar 1972: 153). The effort certain
people put into their work is what leads to the creation of an ever-increasing amount of
material goods and resources in the first place, which also entitles them to ”have a bigger
piece” of the same. Moreover, knowing that they will get a bigger piece as a result of their
hard work is exactly what motivates them to exert more effort in the first place.
Which view is ”more right” in terms of the effect on a society’s overall and long-term
material well-being is ultimately an empirical question, and one to which this thesis aims
to contribute.
Something that is implicit in the above discussion is the focus on inequality within
countries. That is, judgments about the extent of inequality rely on comparisons of in-
dividuals from the same country. This is not to say that global inequality does not mat-
ter. With the ever-increasing access to, and availability of information through the rapid
progress in communication technology, people everywhere become more and more aware of
the living conditions of individuals in other countries, and comparisons are no longer made
only with people in their own country. There is also a broad consensus that inequality
between countries is still much larger than inequality within countries, with estimations
of the contribution of between-country inequality to overall global inequality ranging from
55% to 90% (Anand and Segal 2008). The single most important determinant of a person’s
material welfare continues to be his or her birthplace (World Development Report 2009).
The question of why some countries are richer than others can, of course, also be related
to within-country inequality in the long run. If inequality within countries has repercus-
sions on economic growth, it will thereby also affect future inequality between countries.
Nevertheless, so long as policies are implemented at the level of the nation state, it is more
relevant to know what the causes and consequences of inequality are within countries.
What are the factors which cause inequality to rise or fall within a country over time,
and what are the implications of this higher or lower inequality for a country’s economic
prosperity? While it would be presumptuous to seek for universal answers to these ques-
tions within the purview of these 150 or so pages, this dissertation tries to provide partial
explanations by focusing on specific aspects. Restricting my attention to one of the ar-
guably most relevant consequences of inequality in terms of its long-run impact on welfare,
I delve into the still unresolved debate on whether inequality is conducive to economic
growth. I then go deeper into the issue of measurement of inequality, concentrating on a
measure of wage inequality for one of the main sectors of the economy, the manufacturing
industry. The measurement debate is not a trivial one: both causes and consequences of
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
inequality cannot be explored without going into the details of inequality measures, and
the availability of appropriate data across countries and over time is a prerequisite for
empirical analyses on the topic. In fact, one of the reasons why there is no consensus as
to whether inequality between countries has been increasing or decreasing over the last
50 years is the variety of not only measures but also measurement concepts that are used
in different studies. These diverse measures are sensitive to distinct parts of the income
distribution and hence can change rank orderings of countries, or of changes in inequality
over time (Anand and Segal 2008). Similarly, one of the reasons why the literature is still
inconclusive about the impact of inequality on economic growth is the lack of comparabil-
ity due to the use of different data sources, as well as deficiencies in the underlying data
sources themselves. Finally, I empirically look into one of the potential factors causing
inequality, namely trade, and restrict my attention to one element of inequality, namely
the distribution of wage incomes.
What remains to be said is that this dissertation does not entail any normative judg-
ment regarding inequality, and whether it is desirable or not for reasons other than the
ones highlighted above and in the three essays that follow. While all of the arguments
mentioned thus far are concerned with the question of whether inequality is instrumental
in increasing the overall material well-being of societies, there are of course also intrinsic
reasons to value equality. The existence of inequality aversion has become a generally
accepted fact in economics (see, e.g., Engelmann and Strobel 2004). There is also strong
evidence from observational as well as experimental data that people’s inequality aversion
only refers to outcomes perceived as unfair, that is, inequality which arises due to factors
beyond individual control (e.g., Cojocaru 2011, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Neurobi-
ological findings suggest that people react differently to inequalities perceived as unfair
(Cappelen et al. 2014), and there is even evidence from an experiment with monkeys
which finds that the animals refuse to cooperate with their human experimenter when
they receive unequal rewards for performed tasks (Brosnan and De Waal 2003). The mere
existence of unfair inequality is thereby associated with a direct loss in welfare.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: essay one starts by empiri-
cally investigating into one of arguably most important consequences of income inequality,
economic growth. Essay two continues the debate on inequality data and measurement
already touched upon in essay one while focusing on a very specific measure of wage in-
equality. Finally, despite the fact that the debate on the effects of inequality on economic
growth remains unresolved, it is important to know which factors cause, or reinforce to it
(and which ones do not). Essay three analyses one of the more frequently cited reasons in
the public debate for rising (wage) inequality, namely trade.
Essay 1 is joint work with Stephan Klasen and revisits the inequality-growth relation-
ship, which, despite a dizzying amount of theoretical and empirical studies on the topic,
remains unresolved. Using an enhanced panel data set with improved inequality data
and special attention to the role of transition countries, we replicate some of the most
important contributions. We base our analysis on the specification of Forbes (2000), but
also address the functional form concerns raised by Banerjee and Duflo (2003). The essay
arrives at three main findings: First, similar to Forbes, we find a significant positive as-
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sociation between inequality and subsequent economic growth in the full sample, but this
is entirely driven by transition (post-Soviet) countries. Second, this positive relationship
in transition countries is not robust to the inclusion of separate time effects. Lastly, it
therefore appears that this association is not causal but rather driven by the particular
dynamics of the transition. Our finding is consistent with the claim that the relationship
between inequality and growth emerges due to the particular timing of inequality and
growth dynamics in transition countries. In particular, the rise in inequality in the 1990s
coincided with a sharp output collapse, leading us to find an association between the large
increase in inequality in the early 1990s and a growth recovery in the late 1990s. In sum,
once the transition country dynamics are accounted for, we find no robust, systematic
relationship between inequality and subsequent growth, neither for levels nor for changes
in inequality. These results hold for different lag structures as well as in the medium-
rather than the short term, and the empirical patterns observed are robust to the use of
different data sets on inequality.
Essay 2 builds in part on the measurement debate already touched upon in essay
1. It introduces a newly constructed Theil index of between-sectoral manufacturing wage
inequality and empirically tests whether the measure can serve as a basis for more general
statements about the evolution of broader concepts of inequality, as argued by the authors
of the very similar University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) index. Building on prior
work of the UTIP, several concerns regarding the treatment of the raw data as well as
important questions of internal and external validity are addressed. The index is based on
sector-level data from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics for manufacturing, and I provide
a detailed account of how the unbalanced raw data were treated in response to the lack of
documentation for the UTIP measure. The newly computed index has the advantage of
being consistently measured across countries and years, which makes it a valuable resource
for empirical studies focusing on changes in the manufacturing structure within countries
over long periods of time, such as the analysis conducted in essay 3. However, its narrow
scope also restricts the applicability of the index for other, broader uses. I argue that
the latter point is one of the main drawbacks of the index and present evidence that the
generalizability from between-sectoral manufacturing wage inequality to overall income
inequality is severely limited. This applies not only to the extent to which the index
allows conjectures about the overall level of income inequality in a society, there is reason
to also question the ”internal” ability of the index to accurately reflect developments in
manufacturing wage inequality. I therefore do not recommend using the index as a basis
for inference about the development of broader concepts of wage- or income equality.
Essay 3 empirically tests whether trade has caused changes in wage inequality in de-
veloping countries, drawing on the measure of wage inequality constructed in essay 2. It
builds on the empirical observation that since the expansion of world trade in the 1980s,
measures of inequality have risen not only in developed countries, but also throughout
the developing world. This stylized fact is contrary to the predictions of classical trade
theory that in countries with high endowments of unskilled labor, their wages should rise
relative to those of skilled labor. The essay tests the effects of trade on wage inequality
in a differentiated panel framework where countries are classified according to their rel-
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ative human capital endowments, constituting also the relevant comparative advantage
in trade. Employing a newly constructed measure of technological change, an important
source of omitted variable bias, not yet addressed in the literature, is removed. With the
inclusion of this measure, several effects otherwise attributed to trade disappear, under-
scoring the importance of controlling for technological change. Technology transfer as well
as technological change is found to take place particularly in industries and trade flows
classified as medium-technology intensive. Evidence is also found for pure ”trade”-effects,
supporting the Heckscher-Ohlin predictions of the effects of trade on wage inequality once




between Inequality and Growth
2.1 Introduction
The possible trade-off between inequality and growth has been investigated theoretically
and empirically for decades. In the mid-1990s, the empirical debate was significantly
enhanced by the availability of a much broader set of data on inequality across the world.
Initially, the workhorse dataset was created by Deininger and Squire (DS1996) and used
in a study by Deininger and Squire (1998) to show that, in a cross-section of countries,
initial inequality (particularly of assets but, in some specifications, also of income) was
associated with subsequent lower growth.
Ensuing debates focused on the one hand on weaknesses in the data, where Atkinson
and Brandolini (2001) showed that the comparability and consistency of the (DS1996)
data set was open to question. Since then, the World Income and Inequality Database
(WIID) was created which significantly enhanced not only the coverage but also the trans-
parency of the inequality data used. Many studies on inequality have since relied on this
dataset, where some authors used regression-based adjustment methods to address in-
consistency issues (e.g., Gruen and Klasen 2008, 2012; Easterly 2007). Nevertheless, the
dataset remains heterogeneous in terms of the underlying monetary concept (covering not
only different types of income (net, gross, wage incomes) but also consumption and ex-
penditure), the measurement unit (household vs. individual), and the type of equivalence
scale used for adjusting household-level data, amongst other dimensions. As pointed out
by Atkinson and Brandolini (2009), it is often not sufficient to account for these differ-
ences using dummy variables for each category underlying the data that are being used
in a regression, as has been frequently done in the literature. Doing so implicitly assumes
that the differences between the types of unit remain constant over time, which has been
Acknowledgements: This essay is joint work with Stephan Klasen. We are grateful to Sebastian
Vollmer, Axel Dreher, and the participants of the 2016 Development Economics and Policy Conference, the
2015 AEL Doctoral Research Seminar, the RTG Globalization and Development workshops, the 11th ISI
conference on Economic Growth and Development, and the 2015 GlaD conference for valuable comments
and suggestions.
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shown to not be generally true.1 More recently, Solt (2016) has, based on the WIID, used
imputation techniques to also attempt to address data gaps and consistency issues in his
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Although this approach has
also been criticized (Jenkins 2015), we will rely on these data in our analysis, but also
show the robustness of our results to using the WIID data.
A second focus of the debate was the empirical specification of the inequality-growth
relationship. In particular, Forbes (2000) moved from the cross-sectional setting used by
Deininger and Squire (1998) to a panel setting for two reasons. First, she wanted to address
unobserved heterogeneity through fixed effects (and endogeneity through the use of GMM-
type methods). Second, a fixed effects specification which exploits the within-variation is
also the more policy-relevant question, as policy-makers are interested in whether changes
in inequality in a country will promote or hurt subsequent growth. This approach came
at the cost of using rather short panel periods of only five years. Essentially, this time
span implies examining the short-term impact of changes in inequality on growth. While
interesting, it is not so closely related to the theoretical literature which generally focused
on longer-term impacts of inequality on growth (e.g., Galor and Zeira 1993; Alesina and
Rodrik 1994. Forbes found that rising inequality is associated with higher subsequent
growth, although the result is not significant when 10 year periods are used.
The paper by Forbes attracted a lot of debate and commentary. Apart from the
abovementioned data issues (her analysis was based on the DS dataset), there was the
concern that the use of fixed effects takes out most of the variation in the dataset and
that the little within variation might be heavily affected by measurement error (Knowles
2005). Second, there was concern about the functional form. In particular, Banerjee and
Duflo (2003) argued that the data are more consistent with the claim that any change
in inequality (whether positive or negative) is associated with lower subsequent growth,
which is, of course, a rather different interpretation. There have been further debates
on this issue (some of which we address below), but the question how inequality affects
growth in a panel setting remains open.
There are three further reasons to revisit this debate again. First, we now have an
additional 15 years that can be used to study whether the relationship holds in a longer
panel. Second, there have been further improvements in coverage and consistency of
inequality data so that one can examine this relationship with an improved data set on
inequality. And third, it is important to consider to what extent the relationships found
by Forbes (2000) relate to the unique experiences of transition countries. This relates to
a separate literature that has pointed out that transition countries experienced a large
negative output shock at the start of the transition period in the early 1990s from which
they recovered in the late 1990s and early 2000s. More importantly, this initial output
shock was associated with a large increase in inequality. In fact, as shown by Ivaschenko
(2003) and Klasen and Gruen (2001), the size of the output shock in transition countries
was positively correlated with the size of the increase in inequality up until the mid-1990s.
The changes in inequality in transition countries in the 1990s and 2000s were among
1See, e.g., the examples provided in Atkinson and Brandolinie (2009) on the increasing difference
between pre- and post-tax income.
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the largest to be found anywhere in the world so that this unique experience, causing a
concurrent increase in inequality as well as a collapse and subsequent recovery in economic
growth, could potentially be driving the results.
In this paper, we therefore revisit the inequality-growth relationship using an enhanced
panel data set with improved inequality data and special attention to the role of transition
countries. We base our analysis on the specification of Forbes (2000), but also consider
other specifications (including those of Banerjee and Duflo 2003). We find that, when
using her specification and the full sample, higher inequality is still significantly associated
with higher subsequent growth. But we also find that this finding is entirely driven
by the experience of transition countries and is not present in the remaining country
sample. It also appears that while increases in inequality are associated with higher
growth in transition countries, very rapid and very large increases are associated with
reduced growth. However, once we introduce separate time effects for transition countries,
these associations disappear as well. We corroborate the finding that there is no robust
relationship between inequality and growth in the overall sample with a new instrumental
variable strategy introduced by Nunn and Qian (2014) in the literature on aid and growth.
We also do not find evidence that the Banerjee and Duflo (2003) specification is superior
and cannot confirm symmetry in the relationship of changes in inequality with economic
growth.
These results point to three conclusions. First, there is no systematic empirical re-
lationship between initial inequality and growth across the world, except in transition
countries. Second, our finding is consistent with the claim that the relationship we find
for transition countries is due to the particular timing of inequality and growth dynamics
during and after the transition. In particular, the rise in inequality in the 1990s coincided
with a sharp output collapse, leading us to find an association between the large increase
in inequality in the early 1990 and a growth recovery in the late 1990s. Given that this
relationship disappears once separate time effects are introduced for transition countries,
it could mean that this association is not causal but rather driven by the particular dy-
namics of the transition. Instrumenting for inequality, we corroborate the interpretation
that there is no systematic relationship between inequality and growth in the transition
countries either, and find that the coefficient turns negative, but remains insignificant
throughout all tested specifications. Lastly, if the findings for the transition countries are
not entirely driven by the temporal dynamics of the transition process, our results suggest
that the very low inequality in transition countries at the start of the transition process
might have been a barrier to higher growth, but rapid increases apparently were detri-
mental also there. However, as our instrument is, by construction, not able to pick up the
transition experience, we cannot definitely rule out that part of the growth acceleration
in the late 1990s originated from the increase in inequality during the transition.
2.2 Literature Review
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between inequality
and growth. Because this paper estimates a reduced-form relationship between inequality
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and growth and does not explicitly test any particular channel through which inequality
might affect economic growth, we will not discuss the theoretical literature in detail, but
rather give a broad overview of different types of arguments and direct the interested
reader to excellent summary papers of the respective field. Following Voitchovsky (2009),
theoretical papers can be broadly divided into four types of arguments relating to different
parts and aspects of the income distribution.
The first group of papers relates to the circumstances of the poor. One of the arguments
most frequently brought forward for why inequality can be bad for growth is that of
missed investment opportunities for those at the bottom end of the distribution. Credit
market imperfections are the basis for the idea that because the poor are subject to
credit constraints, this leads to foregone investment opportunities in physical and human
capital, and hence foregone economic growth (e.g., Birdsall 2008, Ghatak and Jiang 2002,
Deininger and Squire 1998, Galor and Zeira 1993). Other arguments relating to the bottom
end of the income distribution pertain to vicious cycles of poverty and crime (e.g., Chiu
and Madden 1998, Josten 2003, and poverty and fertility (e.g., Kremer and Chen 1999).
A second group of arguments, focusing on the size and circumstances of the middle
class, argues that domestic demand is a crucial factor determining economic growth, and
is typically associated with a (relatively) equal income distribution with few poor (e.g.,
Foellmi and Zweimüller 2006, Murphy et al. 1989). For a more detailed survey of the
demand-side type of arguments, see Erhart (2009). A second well-know channel of how
inequality and growth are linked through the circumstances of the middle class is the
median voter theorem and related political economy arguments, postulating a negative
relationship between inequality and growth Arguably, the higher the inequality in a society,
the larger is the gap between mean income and the income of the median voter and the
higher his preference for redistribution through taxation, which can reduce incentives and
thereby dampen economic growth (e.g., Bertola 1993, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Perotti
1993). An overview of earlier literature on inequality and public spending can be found
in Osberg et al. 2004.
Focusing on the upper part of the income distribution, there are a number of arguments
pertaining to the concentration of wealth. One of the most frequently used arguments in
favor of having a more unequal distribution of wealth is that the rich can provide the
savings necessary for making large investments. This goes back to a model by Kaldor
(1955). On the other hand, an unequal distribution of income with high ”top” inequality
can also be detrimental to growth when it is easier for the elite to capture institutions
and extract resources from the economy or to move their capital abroad (see, e.g.,Glaeser
et al. 2003.
Finally, the overall distance between individuals in a society also matters for inequality.
How far individuals or groups in a society are from each other in economic terms can have
important repercussions on growth via the formation of social capital and trust. If very
large, the distance between individuals can also have explicit negative consequences for
growth via social unrest and the socio-political polarization of society (see, e.g., Keefer
and Knack 2002, Easterly 2001).
In sum, while there are arguments in both directions, most of the more recent work
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favors inequality hurting long-term growth. However, the type and extent of inequality
matters. Ferreira et al. (2014), for example, distinguishes between ”good” inequality,
which rewards effort and leads to better performance (analogous to the ”incentive” argu-
ment), and ”bad” inequality, which wastes human potential (analogous to inequality of
opportunity). Besides these conceptual differences, the time frame considered also matters
for theoretical predictions of how inequality should affect growth.
In terms of empirical evidence from reduced-form estimations of the effect of inequal-
ity on economic growth, we will focus on only the most important contributions given the
vast number of empirical studies on the topic. The following overview is based on Neves
and Silva (2014). Overall, the evidence on the empirical impact of inequality on growth is
mixed and remains controversial. However, a pattern emerges with regards to the results
obtained using different empirical specifications. Generally, cross-sectional studies (Alesina
and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994, Clarke 1995, Perotti 1996, and Deininger and
Squire 1998 tend to find a negative relationship between inequality and growth, whereas
panel analyses yield mostly positive or insignificant results. But Knowles (2005) argues
that most evidence on the growth and inequality relationship in cross-sectional studies is
derived from inequality data which are not fully comparable. Once the heterogeneity in
the underlying income concepts is accounted for, he concludes that there is no remaining
relationship between income inequality and growth, but that inequality in expenditure
is still negatively correlated with growth. The only cross-sectional study explicitly ad-
dressing the endogeneity problem is Easterly (2007), who instruments inequality with a
country’s ”wheat-sugar ratio”, which is a function of the fraction of land suitable for grow-
ing wheat over the fraction of land suitable for growing sugar cane. The idea is based on
the hypothesis by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) that agricultural endowments predict a
country’s institutional environment. More specifically, growing sugar cane is more prone
to large-scale farming involving slave labor, which leads to higher inequality and extractive
institutions, whereas wheat production involves family farming and is associated with the
emergence of a middle-class and less inequality. Instead of growth rates,(Easterly, 2007)
then shows that higher inequality is associated with lower income levels, as well as worse
institutions, and lower education. Most of the cross-sectional results should be viewed
with caution because they may contain substantial omitted variable bias, given that any
unmeasured factors which are associated with both inequality and growth can be wrongly
attributed as an effect of inequality on growth.
Although panel data are not able to perfectly resolve this issue, the possibility of
introducing fixed effects allows the removal of at least the time-invariant portion of the
omitted variable bias, which is also the main explanation for the divergence in findings
between cross-sectional and panel studies. Moreover, it is also more useful from a policy
perspective to know what happens to growth if inequality changes within a country, which
can be estimated only if the data also contain a time-series dimension. However, apart
from the abovementioned data problems which continue to persist in many of the panel
data studies using the DS1996 or the WIID data, as well as any remaining concerns about
omitted variable bias and endogeneity, panel studies do suffer from another shortcoming:
since many of the theoretical effects are likely to have an impact over long periods of time,
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short-run panels that consider 5 or 10 year periods might be too short to pick up these
effects. Nevertheless, we limit the discussion to panel data studies in the following, also
because they are more relevant for the empirical set-up of this paper.
The most important study in the context of this paper is Forbes (2000), which we
also use as the basis for our own empirical set-up. She finds a small, but positive and
significant impact of inequality on subsequent economic growth using 5-year averaged
growth rates and the DS1996 dataset. Her sample consists of 45 low- and high-income
countries during 1975-95. The application of a difference GMM estimator to deal with
the upward bias arising from her dynamic panel structure has, however, been shown to be
problematic. Roodman 2009 demonstrates that Forbes’ results become insignificant once
the econometric issue of overidentification is being addressed, which is something we can
confirm in our data as well.
Another widely cited study, Barro 2000 finds, for a samples of 40 to 70 countries
and 10-year time periods, that higher inequality leads to lower growth in poor countries
and higher growth in rich countries, but there is little overall relationship between income
inequality and growth. He refrains from using fixed effects in his preferred specification and
points to the exacerbation of measurement error with this approach, but his results from
a three-stage least-squares estimation do hold qualitatively in a fixed effects specification,
although the latter is only able to capture the contemporaneous relationship between
inequality and growth.
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) criticize the functional form assumptions made in previous
studies and argue that the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes
in inequality. They further show how this non-linearity can explain the different findings
in previous studies. However, their paper has little to say on the fundamental question of
whether inequality is bad for growth. Nevertheless, we test their main empirical specifi-
cations on our data as well and find no evidence to support superiority of their empirical
(non-linear) set-up over ours.
Deininger and Olinto (2000) focus on asset instead of income inequality in their panel
of 60 countries, and find a negative and significant relationship with subsequent growth
rates. In addition, they confirm the positive relationship with income inequality as found
in previous studies, which continues to hold even when asset inequality is retained in the
model.
Ezcurra (2007) looks at annual regional growth across the European Union over the
1993-2002 period and concludes that higher inequality is associated with lower growth,
thereby contradicting Barro (2000) wo found that inequality is positively related to growth
in rich countries - although the differing results of the two studies could also be due to
the different time frames they consider. In sum, results from reduced-form panel studies
are heterogeneous and despite the continuous improvement of the inequality data since
DS1996, data issues as well as concerns about functional form and appropriate estimation
techniques keep being raised in the literature.
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2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Our estimations are based on a sample of 122 countries over the 1961-2012 period, with a
total of 712 observations for the level, and 577 observations for the difference specifications
(115 countries). This is much larger data set both in its cross-country as well as its time
dimension than those that have been used in the literature. The IV estimates rely on
a smaller sample of 92 countries, which does not, however, affect the point estimates of
inequality.2 Unless indicated otherwise, estimations are using 5-year averages of growth
as the dependent variable and the beginning-of-period Gini, lagged by one period, as the
variable of interest. That is, the first time period is 1961-1965 and the last one is 2011-
2012,3 yielding a total of 12 time periods. Except for the GDP data,4 which is taken from
the Penn World Tables (PWT), Version 8.0 (Feenstra et al. 2015),5 all control variables
are as in Forbes (2000): the price level of investment (also from the PWT) is included,
which she uses as a proxy for market distortions, and average years of secondary schooling
for the population aged over 25 (taken from the Barro and Lee database, Version 2.0) is
added separately for males and females.
To add a causal interpretation to our findings, we use an instrumental variable (IV)
estimation employing a recently introduced technique (Nunn and Qian, 2014) which allows
us to use Easterly’s (2007) wheat-sugar ratio as an instrument for inequality in a panel
set-up. We are thereby able to address endogeneity concerns more convincingly with the
simultaneous use of both fixed effects and IV-estimation. The idea of the instrument is
that the interaction between a cross-sectional variable, varying only between countries,
and a time-varying variable, which is the same across all countries, is valid if the level
of the respective variable is controlled for. This is generally taken care of for the cross-
sectional variable by using a fixed effects estimator, and for the time-varying variable by
including year dummies. As mentioned, we use Easterly’s (2007) wheat-sugar ratio as
the cross-sectional variable and interact it with the oil price, which introduces variation
in inequality over time. A higher oil price arguably leads to higher inequality numbers
because higher oil prices have a disproportionately larger adverse effect on the poor, who
spend a larger share of their budget on staple food items and transport, the prices of both
of which increase with the oil price (empirical evidence on the oil price-poverty-inequality
link stems mostly from country case studies; see, e.g., Naranpanawa and Bandara (2012)
for Sri Lanka, or Essama-Nssah et al. (2007) for South Africa). The estimator then com-
pares the difference in growth in years following a high oil price to years following a low oil
price in countries that have a high wheat-to-sugar ratio (low inequality) to countries that
have a high wheat-to-sugar ratio (high inequality). The identifying assumption is that the
2We are able to reproduce table 2.2 using only the subsample used also in the IV. Results are shown in
appendix table 2.A.1.
32011-12 is the only period with less than five years. More recent data was not available at the time of
writing.
4Forbes used Gross National Income data from the WDI.
5In choosing the accounting concept underlying the GDP data for growth rates and levels, we follow
the recommendations of the PWT and use the (real) output-based growth rates derived from the national
accounts as the dependent variable and the expenditure-based current-price level of GDP as the initial
level to capture convergence effects.
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effect of the oil price on growth will not (systematically) differ between countries with a
high and a low wheat-to-sugar ratio through channels other than inequality. More intu-
itively, the resulting estimator is similar to a difference-in-differences approach, but with
a continuous treatment variable (inequality). The sugar-wheat ratio is correlated with in-
equality levels (corresponding to the pre-treatment differences in an important observable
variable), whereas the oil price is correlated with inequality differences (corresponding to a
common time effect in the variable of interest). Through the country fixed effects and the
year fixed effects, we also take out the difference of the ”baseline” growth rate between
countries with high inequality levels and low inequality levels and the time trend they
have in common (changes in growth). Remaining changes in growth, taking the baseline
differences in inequality levels as well as in growth, and common trends in inequality as
well as growth into account, are then attributable to changes in inequality if the exclusion
restriction is valid - that is, if changes in the oil price do not systematically affect growth
differently in countries with high and countries with low sugar-wheat ratios in a way that
is correlated with a country’s sugar-wheat ratio after controlling for a number of other
potential influencing factors.
Our main measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient of net income, is taken from the
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2016). One of the main
advantages of the SWIID is that the data are strongly balanced, i.e., all missings in the
final dataset stem from other control variables. The SWIID is based on the World Income
Inequality Database (WIID) (UNU-WIDER 2015) and standardizes the rather heteroge-
neous and unbalanced database by drawing on several other data sources and multiply
imputing values to make the resulting data comparable across countries and over time.
The final dataset contains 100 imputations for each data point, allowing the researcher
to explicitly account for the uncertainty associated with imputing values by using multi-
ple imputation (mi) estimation. Unless indicated otherwise, estimations employ the ”mi:
estimate” command as provided by Stata, which yields a single coefficient estimate and
its corresponding corrected standard error applying Rubin’s rule (Rubin 2004). As op-
posed to the regression results which exploit all of the 100 imputations, the descriptive
statistics and graphs are based on the mean value of the Gini across the 100 imputations.
In addition to the overall sample, descriptives are reported separately for transition- and
non-transition countries. Our classification of transition countries is based on Gruen and
Klasen (2012) and includes 22 post-Communist countries, of which the following 15 are
part of our sample: Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kyr-
gyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and
Ukraine. Table 2.1 contains descriptive statistics for all variables used in the model.
As one can see, most variables do not display major differences between transition- and
non-transition countries, notable exceptions being schooling of both males and females,
and, very importantly, inequality. The average Gini coefficient in transition countries is a
full 8.5 Gini points lower than in non-transition countries, substantiating our belief that
the inequality-growth relationship in transition countries is inherently different from that
in the rest of the world - or at least the part covered by our sample.
6The Price Level of investment (PI) is defined as the PPP over GDP divided by the exchange rate
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Total sample (712 obs.) mean sd min max
Gini 38.09 10.52 15.8 75.71
GDP per capita growth 0.023 0.032 -0.199 0.112
Price level of investment6 0.65 0.45 0.07 5.93
Initial GDP per capita (in 2005 PPP USD) 11533.3 11414.4 272.8 76523.6
Schooling (female) 2.22 1.56 0.02 6.89
Schooling (male) 2.6 1.52 0.15 7.25
Only transition countries (71 obs.)
Gini 30.51 6.01 18.87 44.7
GDP per capita growth 0.02 0.054 -0.154 0.112
Price level of investment 0.58 0.21 0.21 1.01
Initial GDP per capita (in 2005 PPP USD) 10936.2 5899.3 1974.7 24519.5
Schooling (female) 3.68 1.15 0.99 6.47
Schooling (male) 3.89 1.03 1.46 6.62
Sample without transition countries (641 obs.)
Gini 38.98 10.59 15.8 75.71
GDP per capita growth 0.023 0.028 -0.199 0.109
Price level of investment 0.66 0.47 0.07 5.93
Initial GDP per capita (in 2005 PPP USD) 11595.3 11842 272.8 76523.6
Schooling (female) 2.078 1.52 0.02 6.89
Schooling (male) 2.46 1.5 0.15 7.25
All estimations employ country fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity
and remove a potential source of (time-invariant) omitted variable bias. While some
concerns have been raised in the literature that this approach exacerbates measurement
error and removes a large part of the variation in inequality (e.g., Knowles 2005), the use
of the more consistent SWIID data, which combine information from different datasets
and thereby minimize measurement error, as well as an increase of the within-country
variation in inequality in the past 15 years,7 lead us to believe that these drawbacks no
longer justify not using a within estimator. Because of the use of growth rates as the
dependent variable and the initial GDP per capita level variable as a control, the fixed
effects specifications suffer from Nickell bias, entailing an upward bias on our variable of
interest (Nickell 1981). All significant estimates are therefore furthermore subjected to a
difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991).
The estimator eliminates the bias by using deeper lags of the independent variables as
instruments, which are by construction uncorrelated with the error term. Orthogonalizing
the instruments mitigates the unbalancedness of the dataset. Using the full instrument set
would lead to the problem of too many instruments, which in this case exceeds the number
of cross-sections (122) and renders the Hansen test of overidentification invalid. In all our
multiplied by 100.
7The within-country variation of net income inequality has increased from 14% of the overall variation
in the 1960-1996 sample to 18% of the overall variation in the sample going until 2012. While this may still
seem rather small, within-country variation of market inequality has increased from 24 to 32%, implying
that some of the observed lack of within-variation is the result of successful redistribution.
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reported GMM estimates, the instrument set has therefore been restricted in different
ways.8 Because the multiple imputation command does not produce test statistics for
the relevant GMM misspecification tests (AR1, AR2, and overidentification tests), they
have been conducted individually for each of the 100 imputations. We then report the
share of incorrectly specified regressions, along with the mean value of each test statistic.
The multiply imputed regressions are considered well specified if less than 5% of the
individual regressions are misspecified. In line with Forbes (2000), we use the difference
GMM estimator. A system GMM (Blundell and Bond 1998) is sometimes suggested in
the literature because the use of the level equation implies that the estimator is less
prone to measurement error. However, although the system GMM estimator does yield
similar estimates, the results are less clear, and, more importantly, the misspecification
tests indicate problems in all but a few cases. System GMM is therefore retained as a
robustness check, but the preferred estimator is a (two-step) difference GMM. Standard
errors are robust in all estimations as per Windmeijer’s (2005) correction procedure.
2.4 Results and Discussion
Table 2.2 displays the first set of results. The first column corresponds to Forbes’ (2000)
basic specification. Like Forbes, we find a positive coefficient on the inequality variable,
although the coefficient is substantially smaller than hers, and, as found by Roodman
(2009), this effect does not hold with a non-biased GMM estimator. Appendix table
2.A.2 displays the results for different instrument restrictions, none of which are well
specified. Moreover, although the coefficient is now closer to Forbes’ estimate of 0.0013, it
loses significance in most specifications. Once we include a transition country dummy in
column 2 and interact it with the inequality measure, the results become much clearer. The
coefficient on the interaction is now substantially larger and highly significant. Moreover,
the effect persists in the GMM specification, as shown in column 3. This time, we are
also able to find a well-specified regression, which further underpins our belief that the
inequality-growth relationship during the transition is inherently different from that in
the rest of the sample and that it is incorrect to estimate a common slope parameter
for the two processes. Notably, as the transition countries pick up the positive effect
of inequality on growth, the non-interacted inequality variable shrinks substantially and
turns insignificant. That is, we do not find any effect of inequality on growth in the
remaining (non-transition) countries and our findings lead us to conclude that the small
positive impact found in the full sample is not robust and is furthermore driven by a small
group of transition countries. According to the fixed effects estimate, which is the lowest
of our point estimates for the impact of inequality on growth in transition countries, a ten
point increase in a country’s Gini coefficient - which is roughly equal to the total increase
in inequality in transition countries between 1985 and today - would lead to a 4 percent
increase in average annual growth over the next five years. However, this result is to be
8Instruments have been restricted to a maximum of 2 lags, and collapsed in some cases. The restrictions
imposed on the individual GMM regressions are reported in the respective table notes. Our results do not
depend on the type of instrument restriction used and we report the ones which perform best in terms of
the share of misspecified regressions (which is explained just below).
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taken with caution. The processes occurring in the 1990s in transition countries after the
breakdown of the Soviet Union - political and economic liberalization, the introduction
of market economies and opening up of markets to (non-Soviet) external trade - were
exogenous events with effects on both inequality and growth.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the average correlation across all transition countries between
inequality and growth as it occurs in the estimation, that is, with the Gini coefficient
lagged by one period. A striking image emerges with a sharp increase in both growth
and lagged inequality between 1995 and 2000, raising concern that this period might be
driving the effect in transition countries. Moreover, it appears as if it is precisely the 5-
year lag structure used in our estimations which causes this correlation. Nevertheless, one
should be cautious in interpreting the graph since it merely displays the averages across
all transition countries, and developments within single countries do not necessarily show
the same correlation as depicted here. Indeed, when consulting the individual correlations
in each country (as shown in appendix figure 2.A.1), the picture is less clear. An outlier
analysis 9 does not yield any clear results pertaining to the issue, either - no single country-
year observation is driving the positive impact of inequality on growth in the transition
countries.
In order to capture the events occurring in the 1990s which might be driving the ob-
served correlation between inequality and growth at least partially, we introduce separate
time effects for the group of transition countries. Indeed, once the separate period dum-
mies are introduced, the positive impact of inequality on growth disappears also for the
transition countries, and remains very small and insignificant for the remaining sample
(column 4 of table 2.3). Finally, we re-estimate the model of column 1 (corresponding to
Forbes’ basic specification) in column 5, and introduce separate year dummies for tran-
sition countries without including an interaction between the inequality measure and the
transition country dummy. The mere introduction of a separate time effect for the tran-
sition countries slashes the positive coefficient of inequality by more than half and wipes
out the previously found significant positive effect of inequality on growth. In sum, we
cannot confirm that higher inequality enhances economic growth in our sample of coun-
tries outside the transition period, at least not in terms of higher levels - as opposed to
increases or decreases - of inequality.
Building on Banerjee and Duflo (2003), who focus on the relationship between changes
in inequality and growth, we also test Forbes’ specification in differences instead of levels
of inequality.10 Neither in the full sample, nor using a transition country interaction -
with and without separate time effects - do we find any significant impact of changes in
inequality and growth.11
9Instruments have been restricted to a maximum of 2 lags, and collapsed in some cases. The restrictions
imposed on the individual GMM regressions are reported in the respective table notes. Our results do not
depend on the type of instrument restriction used and we report the ones which perform best in terms of
the share of misspecified regressions (which is explained just below).
10Note that only the inequality measure has been differenced and the specification does not correspond
to a model in differences.
11Results available upon request.
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Table 2.2: Baseline specifications in levels, FE results






















Gini(t-1) 0.000472* 0.000140 -0.000103 0.000149 0.000169





GDP(t-1) -0.0513*** -0.0469*** -0.0652*** -0.0420*** -0.0423***
(0.00895) (0.00897) (0.0139) (0.00890) (0.00881)
PI(t-1) -0.00834 -0.00766 -0.00322 -0.00902 -0.00906
(0.00515) (0.00527) (0.0104) (0.00579) (0.00579)
Schooling m(t-1) 2.03e-05 0.00260 0.00107 -0.00205 -0.00207
(0.00852) (0.00894) (0.0175) (0.00775) (0.00775)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.00308 -0.000914 0.000752 0.00155 0.00161
(0.00922) (0.00979) (0.0168) (0.00952) (0.00949)
Constant 0.415*** 0.382*** 0.360*** 0.362***
(0.0694) (0.0714) (0.0698) (0.0689)





Observations 712 712 590 712 712
# of countries 122 122 116 122 122
Trans-Year FE NO NO NO YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments in the GMM
estimator (column 3) have been orthogonalized and restricted to lags 3 and 4. p-values are reported for
the GMM misspecification tests (AR1, AR2, Hansen test). The system GMM estimate can be found in
columns 1-3 of appendix table 2.A.2
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We then introduce both levels and differences simultaneously as shown in table 2.3.
In column 1, when both levels and differences are included in the estimation, the positive
coefficient of the level of inequality is confirmed, but inequality increases are associated
with lower growth. Introducing the transition country interaction in column 2, it becomes
clear that these effects are, again, driven by the transition countries. This would, at first
glance, suggest that higher inequality levels in transition countries are associated with
higher growth, but sharp increases lead to lower growth. However, like in the previous
set of regressions, when we proceed to introduce transition-year effects, they eradicate the
significance of the coefficients on the transition country-inequality interactions both for
levels and differences.12
In order to add a causal interpretation to our main findings from table 2.2, we employ
an IV strategy using the interaction of the wheat-sugar ratio and the oil price as described
above. We use a one-period lag of the oil price to instrument for inequality,13 and repeat
the specifications from columns 1, 2, and 4. The second stage results are presented in the
top panel of table 2.4, and the first stage is displayed in the bottom panel, along with
12However, the coefficients are not reduced as much as in the equation containing only the levels. When
only the time dummies, but not the interaction for transition countries are introduced in column 4, the level
effects for the whole sample are significant at the 10% level - however, when this effect is tested in a GMM
framework, both the inequality level and change variables lose significance and decrease in size, in line
with the direction of Nickell bias. It appears as if, once the effect of changes in inequality is accounted for
separately, higher inequality levels are associated with higher subsequent growth in transition economies.
Although the coefficient is insignificant, it drives up the size of the effect in the overall sample and, if
no separate time dummies are introduced, may lead to interpretations of a substantive inequality-growth
relationship in these countries.
13There are two reasons for doing so: Firstly, the oil price cannot be expected to have an immediate
impact on inequality given that it needs to work its way through the economy and even if it affects
production immediately - which is not always plausible - it will not affect prices, e.g. for food, right
away. Second, on statistical grounds, the first lag turns out to be the stronger instrument, although the
contemporaneous oil price is also valid and delivers very similar estimates (results available upon request).
When both the contemporaneous variable and the first-period lag are included as instruments, only the
lagged oil price turns out to be significant. We therefore decided to drop the contemporaneous variable
from the instrument set.
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Table 2.3: Baseline specification, augmented with differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.:
GDP growth
FE FE FE FE diff. GMM
Gini(t-1) 0.000947** 0.000518 0.000532 0.000577* 0.000377





∆ Gini(t-1) -0.000653** -0.000370 -0.000365 -0.000442* -0.000204





Observations 577 577 577 577 577
#of countries 115 115 115 115 115
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES
Trans-Year FE NO NO NO YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instruments in the GMM
estimator (column 7) have been restricted to lag 3, resulting in a total of 97 instruments. Misspecification
tests (p-values) of the GMM are: AR1: 0.0058, AR2: 0.3473, Hansen test: 0.3473, misspecified: 0%.
The system GMM estimate can be found in columns 4-6 of appendix table 2.A.3
weak-instrument tests. Our instruments turn out to be valid and are clearly above the
cut-off value in the first two specifications, and still provide reasonable estimates in the
third one.14
Inequality is not only insignificant, but the coefficient has now turned negative, and
remains so across all four specifications. This result is in line with the GMM finding from
table 2.3, and indicates that there exists some form of endogeneity introducing a spurious
positive correlation between inequality and growth in the OLS estimates. What is more,
the instrument appears to work even with the transition country interaction. Although
separately instrumenting for transition countries takes out a good deal of variation from
the instrument given that they all are Eastern European and Central Asian countries and
have positive wheat-sugar ratios, the IV still appears to deliver reasonable estimates. Since
the IV is biased towards the OLS estimate in the presence of weak instruments, concern
with weak instruments does not threaten the validity of our conclusions from column 3. If
anything, the true parameter estimates might be even further from the positive association
found in the OLS/FE specifications.
Naturally, the instrument does not pick up the changes in inequality caused by the
transition and, even with the introduction of separate transition-period dummies in column
2, remains to be a strong instrument for inequality. Overall, these results substantiate our
belief that the positive association between inequality and growth is non-causal, although
14This is the F-statistic for the single-instrument case (columns 1 and 2) and the maximum bias in
percent according to the Kleibergen-Paap test statistics, which is appropriate when several instruments
and robust standard errors are used (column 3). Our instrument turns out to be strong as per the cut-off
value of 10 for the first-stage F-statistics, and while the coefficient in column 3 may be biased up to 10%
towards the OLS estimate, this does not cause a problem for the results here given that the inequality
variables are insignificant and very different from the OLS/FE results.
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Table 2.4: Baseline specifications, IV results
(1) (2) (3)









GDP(t-1) -0.0503*** -0.0415*** -0.0649***
(-0,0118) (-0,00922) (-0,0176)
PI(t-1) -0,00321 -0,0055 -0,0051
(-0,00594) (-0,0056) (-0,0058)
Schooling m(t-1) -0,00851 -0,00443 -0,0129
(-0,00865) (-0,00654) (-0,0106)
Schooling f(t-1) 0,0076 0,000866 0,0165
(-0,00911) (-0,00718) -(0,0123)
Observations 566 566 566
# of countries 92 92 92
Year FE YES YES YES
Transition-Year FE NO YES NO
FIRST STAGE
GDP(t-1) 2.505* 3.554*** 2.477*
(-1,318) (-1,268) (-1,327)
PI(t-1) 0,774 0,824 0,782
(-0,701) (-0,683) (-0,703)
Schooling m(t-1) -2.709* -2,092 -2.664*
(-1,401) (-1,386) (-1,383)
Schooling f(t-1) 1,499 0,535 1,464
(-1,546) (-1,534) (-1,53)




R2 0,127 0,192 0,127
Weak instruments: F-stat 14,2 11,79
Kleibergen-Paap max. bias 10%
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Note that estimation is
not based on multiple imputation because the combination of mi:estimate with xtivreg2 is currently
not yet implemented in Stata. We use the average Gini across the 100 imputations instead. The point
estimate using the average estimate across the 100 imputed data sets yields a coefficient of -0.00224,
which is very close to the one estimated above.
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we cannot definitely rule out that the increase from excessively low inequality levels during
the transition did contribute to the subsequent high growth rates in the transition countries
as well.
One should keep in mind, however, that even after the transition, inequality in tran-
sition countries is still rather low compared to non-transition countries: the maximum
inequality value found among the transition countries is still only around half a standard
deviation above the non-transition country mean. Our tentative reading of the results
on the transition countries thus far could be that the higher inequality levels in these
countries after the transition might therefore rather represent ”normal” inequality levels,
and the previous, excessively low inequality numbers could reflect the fact that inequality
was kept at ”artificially” low levels due to the income compression during the socialist
system. The breakdown of the Soviet Union led to a well-documented (see, e.g., Aristei
and Perugini 2012) large drop in output with a recovery over the 1990s, and the transition
to a market economy was associated with unprecedented increases in inequality. Although
we do not specifically test for this, our reading of the literature on the topic is that the
two developments in inequality and growth are more likely to have been unrelated events.
That is, both are caused by the transition, but one is not causing the other, although the
possibility cannot be definitely ruled out on the basis of our estimations.
2.5 Robustness Tests
As a check on functional form, we test Banerjee and Duflo’s proposition that changes
in inequality may just be measurement error, and because measurement error is larger
in times of economic distress, this would cause a negative relationship between changes
in inequality and growth. Despite the fact that their argument would entail a contem-
poraneous relationship between inequality changes and growth and we are estimating a
lagged one, we run a number of different specifications to see whether we find a symmetric
effect of changes in inequality on growth. If positive and negative changes in inequality
are symmetrically offsetting each other, this would also explain why we do not find any
effect in the difference equations. In order to generally account for functional form issues
brought up by Banerjee and Duflo, we also test the level equation for such effects. In a
first step, we are simply including a quadratic term in both the level and the difference
specifications. Table 2.5 displays the results.
The only significant result is that of the difference specification with the transition
country interaction (column 2). An F-test of joint significance indicates that the effect is
significant at the 1% level. At a value of 141.7, the maximum is located far from even the
highest of the transition country Gini coefficients of 48.5, and even further from the mean
of 29 Gini points. The result would hence indicate that the sample values are located on
the upward-sloped part of the curve, meaning that positive changes in inequality enhance
growth, but at a decreasing rate. However, when subjected to a difference GMM, none of
the quadratic terms were jointly significant (as shown in table 2.A.3). We therefore reject
the proposition of a quadratic effect of inequality on growth for transition countries as
well as non-transition countries, and in both levels and differences.
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Table 2.5: Quadratic FE specifications in differences

















Observations 712 712 577 577
#of countries 122 122 115 115
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES






F-test of quadratic terms 0,2363 0.0393*** 0,4941
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The p-value is reported
for the F-test. The turning point of the quadratic effect is only calculated for the transition countries, i.e.,
from the coefficients Transition*l.Gini and Transition*l.Gini2 (and their respective values in differences.
The F-test of quadratic terms test contains all constituent terms of the interactions, i.e., L.Gini, L.Gini2,
Transition*l.Gini and Transition*l.Gini2
Piecewise linear regressions
As another test of the functional form concerns, we run a set of piecewise linear re-
gressions. They are based on inequality changes, and employ different margins of change
ranging from 3 to 20% change in inequality, as indicated in the top row. Differential
slopes are estimated for negative, zero (within the aforementioned margin), and positive
changes. This is similar to Banerjee and Duflo’s (2003) piecewise linear approach, but
instead of using the model in differences, we are basing the inequality change brackets on
the changes in levels of inequality since no evidence for any kind of relationship between
inequality and growth was found in the differenced specification in the first step of our
analysis (appendix table 2.A.5).15 The FE estimates (table 2.6, columns 1-4) show that
growing inequality is related to lower subsequent growth.
15The relationship is estimated with and without including the level variable of the Gini into the model,
but results are almost identical between the two specifications (this is true for all versions of the piecewise
linear specification, including the subsequent versions using subsamples and interactions ) and we therefore




























Table 2.6: Piecewise linear regressions of inequality changes, FE and GMM results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var.: FE FE FE FE GMM GMM GMM GMM
GDP growth 3 5 10 20 3 5 10 20
Neg. change -0,000217 -0,000114 5,41E-05 0,000513 0,00111 0,00113 0,00131 0,00194
(0.000283) (0.000323) (0.000443) (0.000858) (0.000788) (0.000813) (0.000922) (0.00131)
No change 0.00100* 0,000367 2,92E-05 -0,000126 -0,000221 -8,09E-05 -0,000106 3,92E-05
(0.000509) (0.000337) (0.000200) (0.000142) (0.00128) (0.000712) (0.000416) (0.000331)
Pos. change -0.000995*** -0.00103*** -0.00116*** -0.00141*** -0.00164*** -0.00172*** -0.00197*** -0.00264***
(0.000213) (0.000225) (0.000254) (0.000319) (0.000535) (0.000585) (0.000600) (0.000949)
# of Instr. 93 93 93 93
AR1 0,0012974 0,0015662 0,0015634 0,0031463
AR2 0,9706342 0,9785592 0,9778599 0,9689
Hansen test 0,436301 0,4110748 0,3200502 0,266292
% misspcfd. 0 0 0 0
Observations 614 614 614 614 497 497 497 497
# of countries 115 115 115 115 110 110 110 110
Control vars. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.Instruments in the difference GMM have been restricted to lags 3 and 4. The results with
the restricted instead of the collapsed instrument set are reported here due to problems with the misspecification test for the 10%-change specification (column 7). Using
collapsed instruments, the results are very similar for the positive changes, but negative changes are also significant (results available upon request). Numbers in the third
row represent the knots for defining the ”no change”-bracket, i.e., changes between + /−3 (5, 10, 20) percent are coded as ”no change”, and changes above (below) the
knot as increases (decreases).
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This relationship is confirmed in both the difference- and the system GMM estimations.
The association is stronger, but less robust for larger changes in inequality. No robust re-
lationship is found for negative inequality changes, but the coefficients are mostly positive,
especially for the larger changes, and are significant in some of the GMM specifications.
When the same estimation is repeated with a subsample excluding transition countries,
the coefficients on the positive change variable retain their negative sign, but become
insignificant. The results can be found in appendix table 2.A.7.16
Finally, the specification using the full sample is repeated, but with interactions be-
tween the inequality change variables and a transition country dummy (table2.7). Al-
though some of the positive coefficients are insignificant in the GMM estimations, the
results clearly show that the negative and significant effect of positive inequality changes
on growth stems from the transition countries only. In line with the results using only
the subsample of non-transition countries, the coefficient on the positive change variable
remains negative, but it is very small and far from significant. Again, once the transition
country dynamics are accounted for separately (columns 5-8), no significant impact of in-
equality is found for the remaining sample. The results of the piecewise linear regressions
indicate that when a separate slope is estimated only for those countries showing positive
inequality changes, higher inequality increases are actually associated with lower growth
rates. This finding directly contradicts the proposition put forward by Banerjee and Duflo
(2003) that changes in inequality could just be measurement error, which would imply a
symmetric effect of both positive and negative inequality changes being associated with
lower growth. However, the positive effect is, again, driven by the group of transition
countries and is not robust to transition-year effects.



























Table 2.7: Piecewise linear regressions of inequality changes with transition country interaction, FE results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var.: GDP growth 3 5 10 20 3 5 10 20
Decrease -0,000365 -0,000274 -0,000166 0,00022 -0,000351 -0,000249 -0,000136 0,000218
(0.000276) (0.000318) (0.000442) (0.000820) (0.000273) (0.000314) (0.000434) (0.000814)
Decrease*trans 0,00112 0,00122 0,00121 0,00167 -7,35E-05 -0,000431 -0,000775 -0.00629**
(0.00136) (0.00150) (0.00201) (0.00307) (0.000999) (0.00111) (0.00180) (0.00296)
No change 0,000317 -1,34E-05 -0,000128 -0,000143 0,000162 -0,000127 -0,000196 -0,000188
(0.000458) (0.000309) (0.000189) (0.000136) (0.000457) (0.000309) (0.000188) (0.000135)
No change*trans -4,33E-05 -0,000101 -6,30E-05 -0,000596 0,000737 0,00094 0,000725 0,000662
(0.00161) (0.00109) (0.000752) (0.000672) (0.00137) (0.000879) (0.000615) (0.000426)
Increase -0,000151 -0,000133) -0,000132) -0,000188) -0,000149) -0,000126) -0,000118) -0,000165)
(0.000223) (0.000240) (0.000294) (0.000416) (0.000220) (0.000238) (0.000294) (0.000414)
Increase*trans -0.00141*** -0.00144*** -0.00150*** -0.00134** -0,000172 -0,000219 -0,000292 -0,000272
(0.000379) (0.000391) (0.000448) (0.000582) (0.000380) (0.000388) (0.000429) (0.000541)
Observations 614 614 614 614 497 497 497 497
# of countries 115 115 115 115 110 110 110 110
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trans-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Instruments in the difference GMM have been collapsed. Numbers in the second row represent
the knots for defining the ”no change”-bracket, i.e., changes between +/−3 (5, 10, 20) percent are coded as ”no change”, and changes above (below) as increases (decreases).
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Alternative time spans and lag structures
We also test our main specification for robustness to the choice of the lag structure as
well as the time span chosen. Forbes (2000) also included 10 year averages in her analysis
and found in what she called an ”informal test” that the positive relationship between
inequality and growth diminished over time, but noted that because of the limited degrees
of freedom, these results were to be interpreted with caution. Now that we have four new
time periods available for estimation, we are repeating the exercise to see whether there are
different dynamics for ten- as opposed to five-year periods, and to test whether these effects
are equally sensitive to how transition countries are accounted for in the estimation. As
shown in table 2.8, the results using ten-year averages do not only qualitatively resemble
the 5-year ones, but also the magnitude of the effects is rather similar. This is in stark
contrast to Forbes’ results, where the 10−year coefficient on inequality was only little
over one third of the 5−year one. We can also confirm that the same caveats pertaining
to the 5-year results are present in the 10-year averaged data as well: the inclusion of
transition countries diminishes the positive impact of inequality on growth and renders
the coefficient insignificant. Transition countries appear to have a positive relationship
between inequality and growth, but once the transition-year effects are included as well
(columns 3 and 4), there is no significant association between inequality and growth in
neither the transition countries nor the remaining sample.
Table 2.8: 10−year averages











Gini(t-1) 0.000377* 0,000253 0,000247 0,000268
(-0,000225) (-0,000218) (-0,000216) (-0,000212)
Gini(t-1)*trans 0.00255*** 0,000883
(-0,000818) (-0,000817)
Observations 296 296 296 296
# of countries 118 118 118 118
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Trans-Year FE NO NO YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
A second concern pertaining to timing is the lag structure. The graphical depiction of
the inequality and growth variables in transition countries raises concerns that it is merely
the choice of a one period lag which generates the correlation between the two variables.
We therefore re-run the basic specification of table 2.2, once with a contemporary time
structure and once with a two period lag. The contemporaneous specification, shown in
the first panel of table 2.9, does not yield any significant results - if anything, there appears
to be a negative contemporaneous correlation between inequality and growth in transition
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countries, but the effect is not robust to the inclusion of the transition-year effects (column
3). The coefficient on the remaining sample is very small and insignificant throughout. In
sum, there seems to be no systematic contemporaneous relationship between inequality
and growth, either. More results emerge with the two period lagged Gini coefficient,
displayed in the second panel of table 2.9. The estimates are similar to those obtained
for the one period lag (including the changes occurring when transition countries and
transition-year effects are introduced) but are larger and more significant. Importantly,
the coefficient for the overall sample remains positive and significant throughout the fixed
effects specifications (columns 4-8).17 However, when subjected to a GMM,18 it loses
significance as well. We are therefore confident that our results are neither contingent on
the choice of a particular lag structure, nor on the use of 5-year averages rather than a
longer time span.
17We have ruled out that this is simply a sample composition effect. Results using a constant sample
from the two period lag specification are available upon request.
18Note that the GMM is not based on a multiple imputation estimation due to problems with keeping
the sample constant when deeper lags are involved. The corresponding FE estimate (replicating column
7), along with further GMM specifications using other restrictions on the lags can be found in appendix
table 2.A.9. Because the non-mi FE estimate is slightly larger and more significant than the one using
proper mi estimation, the corresponding GMM estimate is a rather optimistic estimate of the impact of



























Table 2.9: Alternative lag structures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





















L.Gini -5,66E-05 0,000104 4,29E-05 0.000793*** 0.000518** 0.000515** 0.000560** 0,0000169
(0.000305) (0.000301) (0.000290) (0.000278) (0.000256) (0.000251) (0.000245) (0.000785)
L.Gini*trans -0.00441* -0,00145 0.00269*** 0,0012
(0.00226) (0.00188) (0.000854) (0.00119)
Observations 721 721 721 625 625 625 625 506
# of countries 122 122 122 119 119 119 119 114
Control vars. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trans-Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Instruments in the difference GMM have been collapsed. Numbers in the second row refer to
the lag length of the inequality variable.
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Alternative inequality data
Although there are some clear advantages to using Solt’s 2016 SWIID data, some
researchers have expressed concern over the choice of the imputation procedure, and the
validity of the resulting data (Jenkins 2015). We therefore repeat our analysis with the
WIID data, a previous version of which Forbes’ 2000 analysis was also based on. Due
to the heterogeneity of the underlying data, most authors use some sort of adjustment
to make the Gini coefficients contained in the dataset more comparable (such as adding
the average difference of 6.6 Gini points between the expenditure and income based Gini
coefficients onto the expenditure one). We use a more sophisticated, regression-based
adjustment procedure, based on Gruen and Klasen (2012).19 Again, as shown in table
2.10, the results are similar to what we have obtained in our basic specifications in table
2.2: the positive and significant coefficient of inequality is driven by the transition countries
and vanishes when the transition-year effects are introduced in the estimation (columns 3
and 4), although the coefficient on the interaction just misses significance in column 2.
Table 2.10: WIID (adjusted) Ginis, FE results
Dep. var.: GDP growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini(t-1) 0.000688** 0,000352 0,000415 0,000322
(-0,000339) (-0,000353) (-0,000345) (-0,000328)
Gini(t-1)*trans 0,002 -0,000944
(-0,00129) (-0,00106)
Observations 562 562 562 562
R2 0,326 0,34 0,483 0,481
# of countries 118 118 118 118
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Trans-Year FE NO NO YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Further IV robustness checks
To account for the possibility that the exclusion restriction of the IV might be violated
due to the differential production structure of agriculture in economies with high and low
wheat-sugar ratios (e.g., wheat producing countries might rely more on machinery and
hence could be more dependent on fuel as an input factor and also be hit more adversely
by increases in the oil price in terms of economic growth), we include a number of control
variables capturing countries’ agricultural production structure: the size of land under
19The adjustment procedure regresses the full sample of Gini coefficients on the different income defini-
tions and reference units used in the dataset to remove the effect of the differential concepts underlying
the data, which are added or subtracted from the reported Gini to achieve at a measure equivalent to that
based on gross income per person. Because the resulting dataset contains duplicate observations whenever
more than one income concept was available in the original data, we report another version of table 2.9 in
the appendix (table 2.A.10), where the duplicates where switched. The results are very similar between
the two versions.
CHAPTER 2. INEQUALITY AND GROWTH 30
cereal production, the use of machinery in agriculture, and total agricultural land (all
from the WDI). As shown in table 2.11, none of these variables threaten the validity of
our IV. If anything, controlling for the share of land under cereal production leads to a
more precise estimate of the inequality coefficient. Note that the change in the sign of the
coefficient when agricultural machinery is included is entirely attributable to the smaller
sample: running the IV without the variable on the same sample (column 4) yields virtu-
ally the same coefficient estimate. We also interact the variables with our instrument to
model more explicitly that the instrument might affect countries with different agricultural
endowments differently. The results (presented in appendix table 2.A.12) do not indicate
that this is the case, with the coefficients on the inequality variable again remaining virtu-
ally unchanged. As another check on the robustness of the IV, we have included separate
time trends for the OPEC countries to account for the fact that the effect of a higher oil
price might affect inequality differently in these countries. While the idea for using the
oil price as a correlate of inequality was mainly through the adverse effect of a higher oil
price on the poor, it might actually affect inequality through the other end of the distribu-
tion in oil producing countries and could thereby have a differential impact on growth in
these countries. Including separate time trends for the OPEC countries (results shown in
appendix table 2.A.11) does not affect the IV estimates much and merely leads to slightly
lower (but still valid) F-statistics in the first stage, which is in line with the reasoning of
a different transmission mechanism of the oil price on inequality in OPEC countries. We
have also tested the impact of separately including a time trend for each continent. Apart
from the ”Europe and Central Asia” dummy (again, capturing the transition economies),
none of these have a major impact on the estimates.20
Table 2.11: Robustness of the IV result to further control variables
Dep. var.: GDP growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini(t-1) -0,00213 0,000553 0,000572 -0.00294*





Land under cereal production -2.83e-09*
(-1,66E-09)
Observations 563 327 327 563
# of countries 92 75 75 92
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Transition-Year FE NO NO NO NO
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
20Results available upon request
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have revisited the inequality-growth relationship using an enhanced
panel data set with improved inequality data and special attention to the role of transition
countries. We based our analysis on the specification of Forbes (2000), but also addressed
the functional form concerns raised by Banerjee and Duflo (2003). Using the SWIID
data, which provide an improved and substantially longer panel dataset, we can avoid
several of the data concerns brought up by the literature, such as consistency over time
and between countries, and a low within-country variation. We also take into account the
unique experience of transition countries, which suffered a large negative output shock at
the start of the transition period in the early 1990s from which they slowly recovered in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. This was coincidental with large increases in inequality,
which had been kept at low levels during the Communist rule.
Using robust dynamic panel estimation and multiple imputation estimation, we find
no robust, systematic relationship between inequality and subsequent growth, neither for
levels nor for changes in inequality. While higher inequality appears to be significantly
associated with higher subsequent growth when Forbes’ and Banerjee and Duflo’s basic
specifications are used, we find that this effect is entirely driven by the experience of
transition countries and is not present in the remaining country sample. Once we introduce
separate time effects for the transition countries, these associations disappear for this
group of countries as well. These results hold for different lag structures as well as for the
medium- rather than the short term, and the empirical patterns observed emerge not only
in the SWIID, but also the WIID data.
Our results point to two conclusions. First, there does not appear to be a trade-off
between inequality and growth. Second, because the positive impact of inequality on
growth in transition countries is not robust to the inclusion of separate time effects, it
appears to be driven by other events. Our findings are hence consistent with the claim
that the relationship is due to the particular timing of inequality and growth dynamics
in transition countries. In particular, the rise in inequality in the 1990s coincided with
a sharp output collapse, leading us to find an association between the large increase in
inequality in the early 1990 and a growth recovery in the late 1990s.
Results from an IV estimation confirm our interpretation of the positive association
between inequality and growth found in the FE specifications as non-causal, both within
as well as outside of the transition countries. Given that our instrument does not pick
up the transition experience itself, we cannot, however, infer from our IV estimates that
the observed positive association between inequality and growth during and after the
transition is entirely spurious. However, while we may not be able to definitely rule out
a causal link between the increase in inequality and the subsequent growth spell on the
basis of our estimations, research on the dynamics of the transition (see, e.g., Aristei and
Perugini 2012, and the references in Sukiassyan 2007) suggests that the breakdown of
the Soviet regime and the economic transition to a capitalist system triggered both the
increase in inequality as well as the slump and subsequent recovery in growth, rather than
one causing the other.
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Table 2.A.1: Reproduction of table 2.2 using the IV sample












Gini(t-1) 0.000802** 0.000318 0.000331 0.000379
(-0.000327) (-0.000259) (-0.000252) (-0.000249)
Transition*Gini(t-1) 0.00463*** 0.00112
(-0.00175) (-0.00168)
GDP(t-1) -0.0537*** -0.0464*** -0.0404*** -0.0412***
(-0.0107) (-0.00945) (-0.00847) (-0.00841)
PI(t-1) -0.00663 -0.00579 -0.00711 -0.00717
(-0.0049) (-0.00499) (-0.00546) (-0.00547)
Schooling m(t-1) 0.00342 0.00697 0.0012 0.00111
(-0.00763) (-0.00799) (-0.00621) (-0.00625)
Schooling f(t-1) -0.0027 -0.00857 -0.00479 -0.00456
(-0.00822) (-0.00847) (-0.00762) (-0.00761)
Constant 0.429*** 0.376*** 0.346*** 0.353***
(-0.0808) (-0.0746) (-0.0658) (-0.0648)
Observations 587 587 587 587
# of countries 92 92 92 92
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Transition-Year FE NO NO YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.2: GMM results, level specification
Dep. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP growth restricted collapsed col. & res. ort. & res. ort. & col.
Gini(t-1) 0.00163 0.00161* 0.00178 0.00169* 0.00214
(-0.00158) (-0.000957) (-0.00504) (-0.000901) (-0.00141)
PI(t-1) -0.036 -0.028 -0.0459 -0.0158 -0.0505**
(-0.0262) (-0.0181) (-0.0798) (-0.0174) (-0.0243)
GDP(t-1) -0.131*** -0.111*** -0.208*** -0.0928*** -0.127***
(-0.0237) (-0.021) (-0.0447) (-0.0181) (-0.0192)
Schooling m(t-1) -0.0308 -0.0402 0.0133 -0.00455 -0.0282
(-0.03) (-0.0288) (-0.123) (-0.0203) (-0.0305)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.0257 0.0392* 0.0334 0.0202 0.04
(-0.0306) (-0.0207) (-0.0777) (-0.0198) (-0.0337)
# of instruments 74 44 19 74 44
AR1 0.0198631 0.13865757 0.8283414 0.00442597 0.0572844
AR2 0.65305763 0.71841735 0.8001032 0.64667875 0.650463
Hansen test 0.05399719 0.00620502 0.3936974 0.1044502 0.0204975
% misspecified 100 100 100 49 100
Observations 566 566 566 590 590
# of countries 115 115 115 116 116
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




























Table 2.A.3: System GMM results of the basic specifications














Instrument restriction: res. ort. & col. ort. & res restricted ort. & col. ort. & res.
Gini(t-1) 0.000449 0.0007 0.000429 -0.000387 -0.000374 -0.000303
(0.000391) (0.000828) (0.000331) (0.000309) (0.000425) (0.000436)
Transition*Gini(t-1) 0.00241*** 0.00181* 0.00191
(0.000686) (0.00110) (0.00132)
∆ Gini(t-1) 9.66E-05 0.000121 4.03E-05 0.000486 -0.000558 -0.000674
(0.000274) (0.000418) (0.000220) (0.000469) (0.000486) (0.000565)
Transition* ∆ Gini(t-1) -0.00154 -0.000125 0.000449
(0.00158) (0.00198) (0.00260)
GDP(t-1) 0.00423 0.00423 0.00228 0.00184 0.00215 0.0072
(0.00306) (0.00306) (0.00215) (0.00354) (0.00522) (0.00637)
PI(t-1) -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0102 -0.0156* -0.0154 -0.0209
(0.00736) (0.00736) (0.00709) (0.00902) (0.0132) (0.0155)
Schooling m(t-1) 0.000969 0.000969 0.00322 -0.00922 -0.00801 -0.00904
(0.00664) (0.00664) (0.00570) (0.00705) (0.00779) (0.00594)
Schooling f(t-1) -0.00182 -0.00182 -0.00267 0.0059 0.00599 0.00422
(0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00537) (0.00676) (0.00776) (0.00673)
Constant -0.0122 -0.0122 0.00145 0.0606* 0.0486 0.0135
(0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0292) (0.0353) (0.0482) (0.0549)
Observations 712 712 712 577 577 577
# of countries 122 122 122 115 115 115
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
# of instruments 113 89 59
Hansen Test 0.896 0.592 0.943
AR(1) 0.0113 0.0128 0.0169
AR(2) 0.173 0.164 0.476
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instrument restrictions are: res=lags restricted to 3 & 4,
col=collapsed, ort=orthogonalized. For the specifications in columns 1-3, the misspecfication tests have not been computed because none of the variables of interest are
significant. Results for further alternative instrument restrictions are similar (available upon request). Also note that the results in columns 4-6 do not rely on multiple
imputation estimation due to problems with varying omitted terms in the interactions. Instead, the data are averaged across the 100 imputations before instead of after
the estimation. While this may affect the resulting point estimate of the coefficient, it is highly unlikely that it is qualitatively different. The ”true” standard errors are



























Table 2.A.4: GMM results, quadratic level specification
Dep. var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP growth res col colres ortres ortcol ortcolres
Gini(t-1) 0.000389 -0.00695 0.00943 0.000494 -0.00501 0.00859
(0.00483) (0.00717) (0.0275) (0.00372) (0.00686) (0.0226)
Gini(t-1)2 -3.92E-06 7.09E-05 -8.83E-05 -3.17E-06 5.43E-05 -5.97E-05
(5.09e-05) (7.79e-05) (0.000289) (4.25e-05) (7.67e-05) (0.000252)
Transition*Gini(t-1) 0.00785 0.0281 0.0291 0.00985 0.0195 0.0265
(0.0170) (0.0196) (0.0452) (0.0179) (0.0237) (0.0373)
Transition*Gini(t-1)2 -6.49E-05 -0.000308 -0.000473 -8.32E-05 -0.000185 -0.000522
(0.000268) (0.000304) (0.000603) (0.000289) (0.000371) (0.000575)
GDP(t-1) -0.0922*** -0.0760*** -0.187** -0.0770*** -0.0855*** -0.188**
(0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0763) (0.0169) (0.0200) (0.0841)
PI(t-1) -0.0117 -0.0138 -0.0112 -0.00691 -0.0134 -0.0527
(0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0609) (0.0114) (0.0196) (0.0566)
Schooling m(t-1) -0.0131 -0.024 0.0594 0.00379 -0.0174 -0.00192
(0.0320) (0.0275) (0.0876) (0.0187) (0.0253) (0.0688)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.0178 0.0138 -0.00509 0.00335 0.0161 0.0297
(0.0242) (0.0267) (0.0544) (0.0168) (0.0256) (0.0482)
F-test of quadratic
terms (p-value)
0.4456 0.1237 0.7727 0.2439 0.2759 0.673
Observations 566 566 566 590 590 590
# of countries 115 115 115 116 116 116
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The second row indicates the type of instrument restriction imposed
on the GMM (res=lags restricted to 3&4, col=collapsed, ort=orthogonalized).
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Table 2.A.5: Basic specification in differences
(1) (2)
Dep. var.: GDP growth differences
differences with transition
country dummies








Schooling m(t-1) -0.00774 -0.00756
(-0.0105) (-0.0104)





# of countries 115 115
Year FE YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.6: Splines with level Gini, FE results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
”change” definition brackets (in percent):
Dep. var.: GDP growth 3 5 10 20
GDP(t-1) -0.0505*** -0.0505*** -0.0501*** -0.0495***
(0.00958) (0.00967) (0.00977) (0.00986)
PI(t-1) -0.00805 -0.00812 -0.00806 -0.00775
(0.00897) (0.00901) (0.00911) (0.00878)
Schooling m(t-1) -0.00332 -0.00297 -0.00274 -0.00226
(0.00851) (0.00850) (0.00844) (0.00834)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.00635 0.00608 0.00575 0.00514
(0.00945) (0.00951) (0.00954) (0.00943)
Gini net(t-1) -0.000158 -0.000137 -8.68E-05 -2.66E-05
(0.000322) (0.000321) (0.000320) (0.000330)
Negative change -0.000278 -0.000171 1.05E-05 0.000495
(0.000302) (0.000343) (0.000469) (0.000938)
No change 0.00100* 0.000358 1.59E-05 -0.000132
(0.000508) (0.000340) (0.000211) (0.000158)
Positive change -0.00103*** -0.00105*** -0.00117*** -0.00142***
(0.000227) (0.000238) (0.000264) (0.000326)
Constant 0.436*** 0.436*** 0.432*** 0.436***
(0.0736) (0.0745) (0.0762) (0.0808)
Observations 614 614 614 614
# of countries 115 115 115 115
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Numbers in the third row represent the knots for defining the ”no change”-bracket, i.e., changes between
+/-3(5, 10, 20) percent are coded as ”no change”, and changes above (below) as increases (decreases).
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Table 2.A.7: Splines, FE results with sample excluding transition countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
”change” definition brackets (in percent):
Dep. var.: GDP growth 3 5 10 20
GDP(t-1) -0.0466*** -0.0468*** -0.0470*** -0.0470***
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0104)
PI(t-1) -0.00893 -0.00903 -0.00913 -0.00908
(0.00964) (0.00959) (0.00959) (0.00961)
Schooling m(t-1) -0.00948 -0.00979 -0.0101 -0.0102
(0.00802) (0.00801) (0.00806) (0.00785)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.0093 0.00974 0.0101 0.0103
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0103)
Negative change -0.000341 -0.000238 -0.000121 0.000238
(0.000272) (0.000313) (0.000433) (0.000806)
No change 0.000154 -0.000134 -0.0002 -0.000188
(0.000452) (0.000306) (0.000188) (0.000134)
Positive change -0.000154 -0.000129 -0.000119 -0.00017
(0.000219) (0.000237) (0.000291) (0.000410)
Constant 0.399*** 0.402*** 0.405*** 0.413***
(0.0842) (0.0848) (0.0864) (0.0888)
Observations 549 549 549 549
# of countries 100 100 100 100
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.A.8: 10-year averages, levels and differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)





















Gini(t-1) 0.000309 0.000369 0.000336 0.000306
(0.000422) (0.000471) (0.000472) (0.000461)
Transition*Gini(t-1) 0.000224 -0.00335
(0.00194) (0.00258)
∆Gini(t-1) -2.26E-05 -0.000179 -0.000152 -0.000102
(0.000253) (0.000294) (0.000302) (0.000282)
Transition*∆Gini(t-1) 0.000702 0.00186
(0.000679) (0.00119)
GDP(t-1) -0.0181** -0.0191** -0.0153* -0.0145*
(0.00891) (0.00887) (0.00901) (0.00859)
PI(t-1) -0.0397*** -0.0391*** -0.0361** -0.0358**
(0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0149)
Schooling m(t-1) -0.00511 -0.00496 -0.00602 -0.00568
(0.00786) (0.00886) (0.00927) (0.00912)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.003 0.00345 0.00452 0.00399
(0.00875) (0.00978) (0.0103) (0.0100)
Constant 0.185** 0.189** 0.160** 0.147**
(0.0756) (0.0751) (0.0755) (0.0726)
Observations 183 183 183 183
# of countries 91 91 91 91
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Trans-Year FE NO NO YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.9: Two-year lag FE and alternative GMM specifications














Gini(t-1) 0.000686** 1.69E-05 0.000892 0.000102 -0.000485 -0.000171
(0.000267) (0.000785) (0.000785) (0.000482) (0.000474) (0.000346)
GDP(t-1) -0.0489*** -0.1000*** -0.0633*** 0.00777 -0.00127 -0.0017
(0.00998) (0.0159) (0.0147) (0.00547) (0.00445) (0.00344)
PI(t-1) -0.0142** -0.0344*** -0.0306** -0.0181 -0.00928 -0.00663
(0.00565) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0136) (0.00819) (0.00772)
Schooling m(t-1) -0.00597 -0.0535** -0.0166 -0.0108 -0.00672 -0.00246
(0.00849) (0.0225) (0.0195) (0.0110) (0.00726) (0.00971)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.00737 0.0410* 0.015 0.00824 0.00663 0.00339
(0.0108) (0.0214) (0.0222) (0.0109) (0.00728) (0.00942)
Constant 0.412*** -0.0106 0.075 0.0602*
(0.0788) (0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0337)
Observations 625 481 506 625 625 625
R2 0.438
# of countries 119 113 114 119 119 119
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trans-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
# instruments 89 97 69 103 111
Hansen Test 0.417 0.136 0.145 0.147 0.223
Sargan Test 1.27E-05 1.39E-06 0 0 0
AR(1) 0.0207 0.00492 0.014 0.00845 0.00751
AR(2) 0.925 0.25 0.201 0.324 0.292
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.10: WIID Ginis (adjusted), Version 2, FE results
Dep. var.: GDP growth (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini(t-1) 0.000813** 0.000456 0.0005 0.000368
(0.000370) (0.000399) (0.000386) (0.000365)
Transition*Gini(t-1) 0.00197 -0.00126
(0.00126) (0.00105)
GDP(t-1) -0.0512*** -0.0500*** -0.0410*** -0.0411***
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0110)
PI(t-1) -0.00801 -0.00783 -0.00952 -0.00951
(0.00578) (0.00604) (0.00730) (0.00737)
Schooling m(t-1) 0.00704 0.00874 0.00333 0.00369
(0.0109) (0.0116) (0.00989) (0.01000)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.00144 -0.000856 0.000225 -2.30E-06
(0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0117)
Constant 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.342*** 0.345***
(0.0846) (0.0865) (0.0873) (0.0878)
Observations 562 562 562 562
R2 0.33 0.344 0.485 0.481
# of countries 118 118 118 118
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Trans-Year FE NO NO YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.11: IV with OPEC-year effects
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: GDP growth cereal production agr. land agr. machinery
Gini(t-1) -0.00344 -0.00502 0.00135
(-0.00279) (-0.00371) (-0.00334)
GDP(t-1) -0.0438*** -0.0402*** -0.0683***
(-0.0137) (-0.0151) (-0.0125)
PI(t-1) -0.00511 -0.00351 -0.0260**
(-0.00589) (-0.00662) (-0.0124)
Schooling m(t-1) -0.00869 -0.0129 0.022
(-0.0118) (-0.0138) (-0.02)














Observations 584 584 346
# of countries 92 92 75
Year FE YES YES YES
Transition-Year FE NO NO NO
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.12: IV with transition countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: GDP growth basic trans-year transinteract
transinteract
& trans-year
Gini(t-1) -0.00222 -0.000594 -0.000558 -0.000886
(-0.00152) (-0.00148) (-0.00176) (-0.00162)
Transition*Gini(t-1) -0.0073 0.00417
(-0.00593) (-0.0035)
GDP(t-1) -0.0489*** -0.0413*** -0.0652*** -0.0378***
(-0.0127) (-0.0102) (-0.0188) (-0.0115)
PI(t-1) -0.00363 -0.00588 -0.00578 -0.00548
(-0.00603) (-0.00567) (-0.00579) (-0.00584)
Schooling m(t-1) -0.00604 -0.00237 -0.0106 -0.00222
(-0.00808) (-0.00614) (-0.00972) (-0.00621)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.00469 -0.00137 0.014 -0.00221
(-0.00842) (-0.00661) (-0.0116) (-0.00684)
Observations 566 566 566 566
# of countries 92 92 92 92
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Transition-Year FE NO YES NO YES
OPEC-Year FE YES YES YES YES
FIRST STAGE
GDP(t-1) 3.196** 4.286*** 3.165** 4.331***
(-1.385) (-1.323) (-1.392) (-1.324)
PI(t-1) 0.7 0.752 0.71 0.783
(-0.705) (-0.69) (-0.706) (-0.692)
Schooling m(t-1) -2.258* -1.603 -2.207 -1.594
(-1.366) (-1.376) (-1.347) (-1.377)
Schooling f(t-1) 0.962 -0.0476 0.922 -0.0733
(-1.537) (-1.544) (-1.521) (-1.546)
SWratio*instr(t-2) 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.281*** 0.278***
(-0.0856) (-0.0931) (-0.0948) (-0.0951)
Transition*instr(t-2) 0.0517 0.369
(-0.154) (-0.277)
Observations 566 566 566 566
R2 0.16 0.228 0.16 0.228
# of countries 92 92 92 92
Weak instruments: F-stat 11.8 9.64
Kleibergen-Paap max. bias 15% 15%
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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This paper introduces a newly constructed measure of wage inequality. A Theil index is
computed for manufacturing sectors across a large number of countries and a time period
of up to 48 years. The index itself is very similar to the one developed in Galbraith et al.
(1999) and Conceição and Galbraith (2000). As part of the University of Texas Inequality
Project (UTIP), they constructed a Theil index based on the same data source employed
here, resulting in the UTIP-UNIDO measure of wage inequality. Building on the work of
the UTIP, several concerns regarding the treatment of the raw data as well as questions
of internal and external validity which have remained open up to this point are addressed
in this paper on the basis of the newly constructed index.
The index is based on sectoral data from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics at the 2-digit
level of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, Rev 3), which is a fairly
crude level of aggregation. One of the main reasons why this dataset is attractive for
the construction of an inequality measure is its broad time and country coverage. If the
resulting, narrowly defined index of wage inequality is able to mirror overall changes in
income inequality, as argued by Galbraith and Kum (2005), it can be applied in many
additional contexts than just for analyses of wage inequality (or manufacturing wage in-
equality, for that matter). Importantly, it could serve as a proxy for developments in
overall income inequality in empirical applications focusing on changes over time, such as
the fixed effects model typically employed in country-level macro panel regressions. This
paper tests whether the broad generalizability and applicability claimed for the UTIP in-
dex also holds for the Theil index constructed here, which is shown to be fairly similar to
the UTIP-UNIDO index for many of the countries covered by both measures. A detailed
comparison of the new index with the one developed by the UTIP is provided and I try
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Stephan Klasen, Axel Dreher, and Sebastian Schneider
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to explain observed differences between the two measures. Building on prior work by Gal-
braith and Kum (2005), and Galbraith et al. (2015), the ”external” validity of the index,
that is, the extent to which the Theil index is representative of overall income inequality, is
then examined. The new index is subjected to a number of comparisons with measures of
income inequality to check whether it can predict developments in overall inequality. Un-
fortunately, the results do not lend much support to this idea. The estimates suggest that
the association between the Theil index of manufacturing and income inequality is neither
very stable, nor strong enough to postulate an economically meaningful link between the
two concepts.
Doubts arise not only for the ”external validity” of the index, but also concerning its
”internal” capability to accurately reflect developments in manufacturing wage inequality.
Because the index relies on sector-level data on wages and employment which are ag-
gregated at the 2-digit level of industrial classification, it only measures between-sectoral
wage inequality and cannot give an account of inequality within sectors. Since the Theil
index is decomposable into inequality between and within units, the availability of less
aggregated data for subsectors at the 3- and 4-digit level allows the calculation of part
of the within-component for a smaller subsample of countries and years. Despite the fact
that inequality within the most detailed sectoral classification available still remains unac-
counted for - which, given an average number of almost 22,000 employees in the smallest
unit of record, is likely to be substantial - I find within-sectoral inequality to make up
at least 40% of overall manufacturing wage inequality. While it is obvious that manufac-
turing wage inequality at a single point in time is vastly underestimated, (Conceição and
Galbraith, 2000) argue that the between-sectoral index is still able to trace changes in
within-sectoral inequality over time. However, despite the unbalancedness of the 3- and 4-
digit level data, I find indication that in around 13% of cases, a Theil index relying on the
between-sectoral component of manufacturing wages conveys an incorrect image of overall
changes in manufacturing wage inequality. Given that the ”true” extent of within-sectoral
inequality is likely to be considerably larger because inequality between individuals within
subsectors still remains unaccounted for in the more detailed data, this number provides
a lower bound to the true discrepancy between between-sectoral and overall changes in
manufacturing wage inequality.
Before moving into the analysis of the final index, the paper provides a thorough de-
scription of the challenges inherent in the raw data for creating a consistent measure of
inequality over time, and the strategies employed to deal with them. The main prob-
lem with exploiting the UNIDO industrial statistics for inequality measurement is the
unbalancedness of the sectoral data. For computing an index of wage inequality, data on
employees and wages are used, and in order to obtain meaningful and comparable values
over time, both variables have to be present in every year in all of the sectors included in
the measure. To arrive at any useful measure of inequality, some modifications of the raw
data are therefore unavoidable. In the initial documentation of the UTIP-UNIDO index, it
is not apparent how this was handled in the construction of the measure. In the meantime,
documentation has improved slightly with the recent release of the accompanying paper
(Galbraith et al. 2014) to the update of the index in 2013. But, as the authors themselves
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state, ”These issues were handled on a case-by-case basis, using judgement and common
sense to arrive at a set of ”final revised values”.” (Galbraith et al. 2014: 2). I received
the information from the authors that, apart from differences in the imputation of missing
values, deviations between my newly computed index and the most recent version of the
UTIP measure stem from the fact that the UTIP has harmonized their index to match
up with its previous versions (no longer available on the UTIP webpage). However, it is
not clear how large the adjustment has been in specific cases, and which countries and/or
years are affected. In a direct comparison of the index computed in this paper with that
provided by the UTIP, I find several countries covered by their index for which the version
of the UNIDO industrial statistics which this paper is based on does not provide data.
It is therefore clear that the inequality series for entire countries is based on a different
version of the data.
Ultimately, for achieving balancedness of the sectoral data, the choice lies between
dropping sectors with poor data coverage or the imputation of the missing values. I use
both strategies in this paper, and which one I choose for a particular case depends on
the number of missings as well as the number of years which would be lost due to the
inclusion of a sector with limited time coverage. Testing the robustness of the measure to
the discretionary - and somewhat arbitrary - decision of whether and when to impute a
value, and/or to drop a sector, is not straightforward. While the UTIP data are an obvious
benchmark, I also employ a few other strategies of testing the index’ robustness ”inter-
nally,” as described in section 3.2.3 below. The imputation methods used are described
in section 3.2.4, and appendix 3.B contains a more detailed version with examples from
the raw data to illustrate some of the cases typically encountered. As a rule of thumb, no
sector is included in the final measure which contains more than 50% imputed data points.
The imputation of data points on the raw data is regarded as relatively unproblematic
since it relies on ”internal” data sources originating from the UNIDO industrial statistics
only. Furthermore, because imputation is performed at the sectoral level, the impact of
each single imputation on the final index is very small given that the UNIDO data include
up to 23 manufacturing sectors per country. While there is no way of knowing exactly the
impact of imputing on the final measure, a variable is retained which contains the num-
ber of imputed data points in the underlying sectors in every year. Including it into the
comparison of the Theil index to other inequality measures at least enables a judgement
of whether or not it makes a difference if the index relies on imputed data.
The effect of the dropping of sectors on the accuracy of the resulting ”long” inequality
measure, both in terms of inequality levels and changes over time, can be assessed more
easily. For those years in which data for dropped sectors are available, the Theil index
is computed with and without these sectors and the resulting values are compared. As
shown in section 3.2.3, the impact of the dropped sectors is very limited in most cases.
Whenever the deviation between the two numbers is larger than 10%, an alternative version
of the Theil index is computed which comprises more sectors and therefore provides more
accurate numbers for inequality levels. However, the resulting ”short” index covers fewer
years and therefore compromises the original advantage of the index, which was to provide
an account of the developments in wage inequality over long periods of time. Therefore,
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whenever the ”long” version accurately traces developments over time, despite providing
unreliable numbers for inequality levels, a recommendation is made to retain the version
for dynamic analyses of inequality - that is, empirical applications which focus on changes
of inequality over time. This results in a preferred version of the index with an average time
coverage of 28.5 years, which I label the ”dynamic” version and on which the remainder
of the paper is based.
Section 3.2 is dedicated to the construction of the index and the associated preparation
and treatment of the raw data: the index and its mathematical properties are introduced in
part 3.2.1. Part 3.2.2 is concerned with the sectors used for the construction of the index.
General information and descriptives are provided in part 3.2.3, along with information
on the properties of the dropped and retained sectors, and an analysis of the effect of
dropping sectors on the accuracy of the final measure. Part 3.2.4 deals with the sectors
entering the measure and describes the imputation methods used for attaining balanced
data. Section 3.3 provides some basic descriptives and information on the index in part
3.3.1 and makes a comparison to the UTIP index in part 3.3.2. Section 3.4 focuses on the
role of within-sectoral inequality and section 3.5 relates the index to measures of income
inequality. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Constructing a Theil Index of Inter-Industry Wage In-
equality
3.2.1 The Theil index
To compute the Theil index of inter-industry wage inequality, I make use of the data on
total wages and employment that are provided at the sector level for a maximum of 23
manufacturing sectors, as per the ISIC 2-digit sectoral classification. The between-sector








with S denoting the different sectors, s=1, ..., S. ys represents a sector’s wage share,
defined as a sector’s wage bill divided by the sum of wages of all industries, while ns
represents the ”population” (=employment) share of sector s, defined as the sector’s em-
ployment over total employees (Theil 1967). This original representation of the index in
shares1 is not as common, yet it is insightful because it makes it easy to illustrate several
properties of the index.2 First, the sector’s wage share can be interpreted as the weight
with which each sector enters the measure. Second, if the ratio of the wage share and
the population share are equal, taking their logarithm yields zero, which implies that the
sector does not enter the measure. Consequently, if all income shares and population
shares are equal, the between-group Theil takes its lower bound value of zero, indicating
1As opposed to the representation in averages, which is mathematically equivalent.
2For a more detailed discussion of the properties of the Theil index, consult Conceição and Ferreira
(2000).
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a perfectly equal distribution of income between sectors. Although the contribution of
a sector to the measure will be negative whenever the population share is larger than
the income share, multiplying the log value with the income share ensures that positive
values have a larger weight in the final measure. This is because for every unit that has
a smaller income- than population share, there must be at least one for which the op-
posite is true. Because positive values by construction result from income shares larger
than population shares, the positive values will automatically be multiplied with a larger
number than the negative ones. T’ can therefore never be negative. The measure has
no upper bound, which makes intuitive interpretation of a single number difficult, but
comparing numbers based on the same underlying units - in this case, industrial sectors
- is straightforward. Although the index is sensitive to the numer of underlying sectors
S, it can be easily normalized by dividing the value by its theoretical maximum, log S.
A variant of the generalized entropy class of indequality measures, the index furthermore
has the adavantage of being perfectly decomposable into an infinite number of fractals,
each representing within-unit inequality at a lower (i.e., more disaggregate) level. Since
UNIDO also provides data at more detailed levels of sectoral aggregation (3- and 4-digit
level) for some years, the use of the Theil index enables a judgement of at least part of
the extent of within-sectoral inequality as compared to between-sectoral inequality. The




















ys3d represents the share of each 3-digit sector’s wage in their respective 2-digit sector,
and ys4d is the share of each 4-digit sector’s wage in their respective 3-digit sector. Equiv-
alently, ns3d and ns4d are the corresponding employment shares. A detailed discussion of
the within-sectoral decomposition and its limitations can be found in section 3.4. Before
moving to a discussion and analysis of the between-sectoral component of the index, the
next sections describe the procedures used for achieving balanced versions of the underly-
ing raw data, which is a prerequisite for obtaining values of the Theil index that can be
meaningfully compared over time.
3.2.2 Between-sectoral inequality
The main challenge in exploiting the UNIDO industrial statistics for inequality measures
is unbalancedness, both between sectors and over time. In order to obtain meaningful
and comparable values over time, the same sectors should be included in the inequality
measure every year in a given country. Hence, if data for one sector is missing in only
one out of the 48 years, this means that either that year needs to be dropped, or the
sector must be excluded from the index in all of the remaining 47 years. This poses
great challenges given the highly unbalanced nature of the raw data. The problem is
exacerbated with the inclusion of lags in empirical applications, which is typically done
in macroeconomic regressions with inequality as the dependent variable due to the high
degree of inertia in the measure. Already a one-year gap leads to the loss of at least
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2 data points in the estimation sample, and data for single years (i.e., with missings in
both the previous and subsequent year) drop out altogether. ection In order to obtain a
workable index which can be readily used in empirical analyses, some imputation as well
as interpolation is therefore indispensable. The choice between imputing missing values
and dropping sectors is effectively a trade-off between two objectives. On the one hand,
one wants to maximize time coverage - in particular, to fill short gaps within longer spells
of data. On the other hand, the loss of information arising from the dropping of sectors
should be minimized in order to ensure accuracy of the resulting inequality statistics.
It should be mentioned that the assumption is that missings in the underlying data
are random across sectors. There are no patterns in the raw data suggesting otherwise,
and the fact that in most instances, data is missing only in a few sectors and often in
only one dimension - wages or employees - supports this view. Whether this is also true
for entire years of missing data is not as clear. Because the UNIDO industrial statistics
rely on surveys from establishments, the fact that no data was compiled in a certain
year might have reasons which could also affect the economy as a whole, including the
manufacturing industry.3 However, there is no reason to expect that industrial sectors
are affected asymmetrically and that inequality in those years in which data is missing is
very different from that in the preceding and subsequent years. The following paragraph
provides a brief overview of the sectors covered in the UNIDO Industrial Statistics, shows
the impact of dropping sectors on the inequality index, and offers a solution on how to
treat those cases where large differences arise between indices with and without dropped
sectors. Section 3.2.4 will then focus on the retained sectors and describe how missing
values have been dealt with.
3.2.3 Dropping sectors
Although there is a trade-off between time- and sectoral coverage - with the former im-
plying a loss of accuracy in the resulting inequality measure’s ability to capture between-
sectoral wage inequality - it is much less severe than one might initially expect. It turns
out that in most instances, those sectors which are not well covered by the data are also
the ones which are of lower economic significance for a country, and hence are also rela-
tively small. Because the Theil index weighs the logged discrepancy between wage and
employment shares by each sector’s wage share, this means that the smaller sectors are
also relatively less important in determining the final value of the index. Hence, omitting
these sectors often changes the index very little. Before moving to a systematic analysis
of the effects of dropping sectors, table 3.1 provides an overview of the 23 manufacturing
sectors covered by the data and provides information about their average size (as measured
by the wage share), the discrepancy between the wage- and employment shares, and the
total number of times each sector has been included and excluded for the ”long” version
of the index, which aims at maximizing time coverage.4
3While the documentation of the Industrial Statistics database contains a detailed description of how
non-response for individual establishments was dealt with, there is no mentioning of why entire sectors or
even years are missing in some countries.
4Information on dropped sectors for individual countries can be found in appendix table 3.A.9. All
numbers presented rely on the balanced version of the data, i.e., including the imputed data points.
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Clearly, the most frequently dropped sectors are 19, 30, 32, 35, and 37. They are
available only for later time periods (1990s onwards) and their inclusion would therefore
mean a substantial loss in time coverage, especially when the time series is long and covers
a lot of the early years.5 Luckily, these sectors tend to be relatively small on average, with
wage shares ranging from 0.2 to a maximum of 2.9 percent of total manufacturing wages.
Apart from the wage share, the second aspect determining the importance of a sector
for the Theil index of wage inequality is the discrepancy between the wage- and the
employment share. Here, the omitted sectors cover a broad spectrum, with sectors 19
and 37 having a lower wage- than employment share and the rest having 25-37 percent
larger wage- than employment shares. These sectors therefore do contribute to inequality,
but because each contribution is weighted with a relatively small wage share, their final
contribution will be rather small.
Of course, there are other omitted sectors, and one might worry, for example, about
the exclusion of sector 23 in 15 cases, which is the sector with the highest average dis-
crepancy between the wage- and employment share, and has a wage share of 3.4 percent.
Furthermore, the low average size of the frequently omitted sectors does not mean that
this is also the case in an individual country, and some sectors might be of high economic
significance in single economies.
As a general check of the degree to which the ”long” version of the index, wherein
sectoral coverage has been sacrificed for the sake of a longer time series, is representative
of the overall level and development of between-sectoral wage inequality, I have therefore
also computed the index for every country and year using all of the available data, including
those for the dropped sectors. The resulting ”full” index is not comparable over time, but
it can serve as a benchmark for the comparison with the long version. The percentage
difference between the two measures serves as a first indication of the degree of distortion
introduced by the omission of certain sectors. Averaging over all the available countries and
years,6 the two versions seem rather similar, with the ”long” version yielding 10.6% higher
inequality numbers on average across all countries and years. This rather low average
deviation7 is, however, concealing large variations across, as well as within, countries.
While the two versions are virtually identical in a large number of countries, others display
a large difference between the indices. Moreover, in a substantial number of countries
which have a low average difference, there is a lot of variation over the years. Appendix
table 3.A.1 displays the deviation between the two versions of the Theil index for all
countries where the indices differ, sorted by the maximum percentage deviation.8 In
addition to the maximum, the table also reports the mean percentage deviation, and the
5The reason for this is the change of the ISIC classification scheme from Rev. 2 to Rev. 3 in 1989,
and the accompanying re-categorization of old industries, and creation of new industrial categories such
as, e.g., sector 37 (Recycling).
6Only years when deviations actually occur between the two indices have been included in the compu-
tation of the different measures of convergence. In the dataset, a deviation of 0 arises if, and only if, the
sectoral coverage is the same between the measure and including those years would skew the similarity
indicators upwards.
7While this number may not appear as very small at first glance, it is driven upwards by a few ”outlier”
countries with very high mean deviations of above 100%
8The mean deviation is based on the absolute value of the negative deviations, i.e., cases in which the
long version is larger than the full one.
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included excluded total share
15 Food products and beverages 113 0 113 22.7 102 Low
16 Tobacco products 96 9 105 2.4 176 Low
17 Textiles 111 2 113 10.7 85 Low
18
Wearing apparel; dressing and
dyeing of fur
105 5 110 8.3 73 Low
19
Tanning and dressing of
leather; luggage, handbags,
saddlery, harness & footwear
12 62 74 23 72 Low
20
Wood and of products of wood
and cork, excl. furniture; articles
of straw and plaiting materials
109 3 112 36 80 Low
21 Paper and paper products 109 3 112 25 118 Low
22
Publishing, printing and
reproduction of recorded media
103 9 112 39 124 Low
23
Coke, refined petroleum products
and nuclear fuel
89 15 104 34 271 Medium-Low
24 Chemicals and chemical products 109 3 112 76 144 Medium-High




109 3 112 64 110 Medium-Low
27 Basic metals 102 8 110 44 149 Medium-Low
28
Fabricated metal products, except
machinery and equipment
106 7 113 52 103 Medium-Low
29
Machinery and equipment not
elsewhere classified




9 52 61 11 137 Medium-High
31
Electrical machinery and
apparatus not elsewhere classified





9 54 63 29 128 Medium-High
33
Medical, precision and optical
instruments, watches and clocks
91 13 104 08 111 Medium-High
34
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers
96 11 107 41 122 Medium-High




107 5 112 36 83 Low
37 Recycling 8 50 58 02 84 Low
standard deviation. These figures can provide a broad idea of the ”static” resemblance
of the long- with the full version of the Theil index. Researchers who care less about the
level of wage inequality, but are rather interested in its development over time - which is
arguably one of the main advantages of this dataset - may be more concerned about the
ability of the index to trace changes in inequality. Table 3.A.1 therefore also includes the
correlation of both the level and the differences of the ”long”- with the ”full” index.9 Apart
from Kuwait, which has a correlation of 0.89 in differences, none of the countries with a
level deviation of less than 10% has a correlation lower than 90%, neither in levels nor
9Only looking at the correlations gives a slightly more optimistic, but qualitatively similar picture.
Those countries showing lower percentage deviations of inequality levels between the long and the full
version of the index generally have higher correlations as well, but not necessarily vice versa. Senegal, for
example, has a correlation of 0.998 between the two indices over the 28 years.
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differences.10 The same applies to the mean deviation, which - apart from the Philippines
- is always below 6.2 percent. Interestingly, in several cases where the deviation of the level
of the two indices is rather large (e.g., Botswana and the Netherlands), the correlation
between the two indices is still high (above 0.92). Despite starting from very different
levels of wage inequality, changes over time seems to still be well captured by the long
version of the index in several cases.11
In an attempt to address these issues and provide more accurate versions of the index,
I therefore recalculated the index including more of the previously omitted sectors, with
the same constraint of including the same sectors in all years. Naturally, this implies
losing several years of data given that the initial motive behind excluding the sectors
was to increase time coverage. In many cases, this leads to the inclusion of all sectors,
but there are still sectors which are excluded also from these ”short” versions. I have
calculated short versions for all countries with a deviation of more than 10% in any year
(as indicated by the maximum)12 and then repeated the above exercise (results are shown
in panel 2 of table 3.A.1).13
Of course, nothing can be said about the counterfactual deviation in the years for
which data is missing on the sectors which have been dropped from the index, but there
is no reason to suspect that the deviation would be larger than in the years covered.
Specifically, I checked whether there is a discernible time trend in the deviation over the
years, and it does not seem to be the case that the contributions of omitted sectors is
growing or decreasing over time. The contributions are also not varying in any other sys-
tematic manner which would allow inference about their development outside the sample
range. Overall, given the possibility to combine the two versions of the index provided for
countries with a deviation of more than 10% between the long and the full version, the
Theil index is able to provide an accurate picture of the extent of between-sectoral wage
inequality in manufacturing. It then depends on the purpose of the research which version
is preferable: those applications of the index for which the development over time is of
interest may still benefit from the long version despite larger differences in the levels, and
vice versa. The last column of table 3.A.1 provides a recommendation of which index to
use in dynamic applications. Since the main purpose of constructing the Theil index was
its ability to trace inequality changes over a longer time horizon, I decided to keep this
10The correlation is based on only those years with non-zero deviations in order to not artificially drive
the correlations upwards.
11While the reverse case can also be true, there are only two countries - Brazil and Algeria - which have
a high similarity of the inequality levels (less than 10% deviation on average), but a low correlation of the
indices over time.
12Apart from it being the strictest criterion, I focus on the maximum percentage deviation for another
reason: Because not all omitted sectors are always present at the same time, if there is a deviation between
the two indices, this is not necessarily the ”full” deviation. For example, of, say, 5 sectors which are not
covered by the ”long” index, only 1 might be included in a given year in the ”full” index. If, for that
reason, the deviation is lower in years where fewer sectors are present in the ”full” version as well, taking
the maximum deviation will provide a more accurate indication of the potential bias arising from the
omittance of sectors.
13In countries with remaining deviations, i.e., where some sectors are still being dropped in the short
version, the differences between the full- and the short version are now well below the 10% cut-off. There
are a few exceptions where the long version is retained despite larger deviations. They are marked with
an asterisk in appendix table 3.A.1 and the reasons for keeping them are explained in detail for every case
below the table.
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”dynamic” version of the index as the preferred version for the remainder of the paper.
In particular, part 3.3.1, describing the final index, and section 3.5 which analyzes its
similarity to other inequality indices, are based on the ”dynamic” version of the index.14
3.2.4 Retaining sectors: Imputation
Even after dropping sectors with low data coverage, the remaining dataset is far from
balanced. There are a lot of observations where only one of the two variables, wages and
employees, necessary for the index is provided. In other years, both variables are missing
in certain sectors. The remaining missings are therefore imputed in order to attain a
workable inequality index. It should be noted that due to the extremely heterogeneous
data coverage across variables, countries, and years, it is impossible to apply the same
imputation procedure to all countries, let alone sectors. There are different ways to impute
missing values, with varying degrees of sophistication, and which one is most suitable has
to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
The preferred method here is a regression-based approach. I prefer this approach over
other imputation methods because it allows exploiting other information from the UNIDO
industrial statistics to predict a missing value. Especially in years where there are large
changes in wage- or employment shares, simply interpolating values without consulting
other information provided in the dataset may lead to suboptimal outcomes and erratic
movements in inequality numbers due to large changes in relative sector shares.15 Two
more variables, output and the number of establishments, are provided at the sectoral
level and are positively associated with both the number of employees and their (total)
wages in a given sector. Their development can be indicative of changes in those variables
for which information is missing, and indeed, the relationship between these variables is
very strong in many instances. Additionally, often only one of the two variables needed
for the computation of the index is missing. In these cases the other one is used in the
regression as well (e.g., if a value exists for employees but not for wages, the ”employees”
variable enters as one of the predictors of wages). Finally, a time trend in the development
of wages or employee numbers is sometimes discernible and is also included in the set of
potential regressors. The fitted value from a simple OLS of the following exemplary form
is used to fill the missing value (in this case for wages):
Wagest = α + ρEmployeest + βEstablishmentst + γOutputt + δt + εt
Again, the main obstacle to the use of this more sophisticated imputation method is
data availability. It is not possible to always use the same regressors across countries or
sectors, with available variables differing even within the same sector between years. The
above example therefore only represents the most general specification while many of the
14Because the ”dynamic” version ensures accuracy in capturing changes over time and the comparison
with other inequality measures is based on fixed effects models, using the ”dynamic” version of the index
is considered as unproblematic.
15For example, if a sector’s employment numbers drop drastically in one year and the information on
wages is missing, simply linearly interpolating the value for wages based on the previous and next year’s
value would lead to a large change in the relative ratio of the sector shares, whereas taking into account
the information on employment and adjusting the wage value downwards leads to a smoother series.
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actual regressions only contain a subset of the variables.
Sometimes there is no further information available at all for a missing observation, or
predicting fitted values is not feasible for other reasons (e.g., due to a too-short time period
which leaves no degrees of freedom for estimation). In this case, alternative imputation
methods have to be explored. Second-best solutions employed in this paper are a simplified
hot-deck type approach,16 where an observation similar to the missing is used, or linear
interpolation based on the surrounding values. All methods are described in detail in
appendix 3.B, starting with the regression approach.
3.3 Inter-Industry Wage Inequality: Trends and Compar-
isons
3.3.1 Trends in between-sectoral wage inequality
Before moving to a comparison of the newly computed index with that constructed by the
UTIP, a few facts and figures of the index constructed and discussed so far are presented
below. All graphs and figures are based on the ”dynamic” version of the index as devel-
oped in section 3.2.3, which is based on the balanced sectoral dataset after imputation.
The overall development of wage inequality is depicted in figure 3.1 below. The first graph
shows the overall evolution of the index over a time period of almost 50 years and the
second graph breaks it down into developing and developed countries (as per the World
Bank GNI threshold definition). Note that in order to make inequality numbers compara-
ble between countries, which differ in the number of sectors underlying the measure, the
graphs rely on the normalized version of the Theil index. It is clear that between-sectoral
manufacturing wage inequality has been increasing over the sample period, but the largest
increase occurs in the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Inequality is higher in
developing countries throughout the entire time period and the two series develop rather
similarly. This is in line with Galbraith and Kum (2005), who find the same patterns for
the first version of the UTIP dataset with data until 1999. Breaking the data down by
region, as shown in figure 3.2, is more informative in terms of differential developments
across country groups.17
It becomes apparent that although a small spike around 1990 appears in several coun-
try groups, the large increase from 1980 to 1990 seems to be driven to a large extent by the
Middle East and North African (MENA) region (comprising both developed and develop-
ing countries). Within this group of countries, it is Tunisia and Kuwait which show very
large increases in the late 1980s (shown in appendix figure 3.A.1). The country means of
the normalized (Theil(n)) and non-normalized Theil index are compiled in appendix table
3.A.2 along with the main outcomes of the robustness exercises from sections 3.2.3 and
3.2.4, i.e., the number of sectors included the measure in each country and the number of
imputed data points. Besides the basic information, which is provided for the preferred,
16See Andridge and Little 2010 for a review of the method.
17The regional grouping relies on the World Bank classification, but Europe and North America have
been pooled together into one category due to the small number of countries in the former.
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Notes. The first graph is based on a (relatively) constant sample of the 56 countries with a minimum
time coverage of 30 years to avoid fluctuations in the time series caused by countries entering or exiting
the sample in certain years. Similarly, years with fewer than 30 data points are not shown (affecting the
years after 2008). The same years are omitted in the second graph for the same reasons and to ensure
comparability of the two graphs.
”dynamic” version for all countries covered by the index, it contains the standard devi-
ation of the (non-normalized) version in the last column to give an idea of the variation
of the index within a country. The overall impression from the country averages is in
line with the usual country rankings in terms of inequality: the lowest numbers are found
in Europe, especially the Scandinavian countries, and high numbers are most prevalent
in developing countries and countries from the Middle East. There are a few surprising
cases though, such as The Gambia, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan scoring very low on man-
ufacturing wage inequality and Romania, a former communist country, scoring very high.
This already provides some indication that manufacturing wage inequality is not always
very closely related to a country’s overall income inequality, and can sometimes generate
a misleading image if such generalizations are drawn. The relationship between manu-
facturing wage inequality as constructed here and overall income inequality is examined
more systematically in section 3.5. Before moving to the question of internal and external
validity of the newly constructed index, I compare it to the UTIP index. The more similar
the two measures turn out to be, the more will the results from the subsequent validity
analysis also apply to the UTIP index. Furthermore, the comparison with the UTIP index
can yield some indication as to whether the extent of imputation systematically distorts
the resulting measure.
3.3.2 Comparison to the UTIP-index
The first noticeable difference between the newly constructed index and the Theil index
calculated by the UTIP is country and time coverage. The average time coverage of the
new Theil index is 28.5 years,18 vs. 26.2 years for the UTIP one, and has information
for 137 countries, whereas the UTIP index covers a total of 154 countries. There are 2
countries (Liberia and Serbia) with a total of 15 observations which are in the new index
18For the ”long” version, average time coverage is 31.3 years.
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Notes. The graphs are subject to composition effects due to the entering and/or
exiting of countries throughout the sample period. The regional subsamples have not
been restricted any further to improve time consistency in country coverage because
of the lower number of countries per group as compared to the graphs in figure 3.1
but not in the UTIP one, and 19 countries with a total of 210 observations for which the
UTIP provides information but which are not covered by the new index. 10 out of these
19 countries are not part of the UNIDO industrial statistics,19 and another five countries
(Armenia, the Bahamas, Rwanda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe) have not been included in the
new index due to the lack of useable raw data.20 This implies that the UTIP indices
are based on older versions of the UNIDO data for those countries.21 Because the older
UNIDO data rely on different industrial classification schemes, the index values do not
necessarily compare easily from the new to the old versions. In particular, it appears that
the previous version of the UTIP index was based on a more detailed, 3-digit level of
classification, which makes it more accurate in capturing manufacturing wage inequality.
It is not clear from the documentation of the UTIP index in which cases other versions
of UNDIO industrial statistics were consulted, and what differences arise from comparing
values based on the different industrial classification schemes. It is also not clear when
and how the data were harmonized with the previous version of the index. I can therefore
not ultimately determine whether differences between the new index and the UTIP one
arise due to differential sectoral coverage or varying data sources.
19These are Bahrain, Bhutan, Cap Verde, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, West
Germany, Equatorial Guinea, Myanmar, the Seychelles, and Togo.
20That is, although some data is provided for these countries in the UNIDO industrial statistics, the
data never covers both wages and employees at the same time.
21The other four countries covered by the UTIP but not by the new index have been excluded due to
insufficient time coverage. Angola, the United Arab Emirates, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Cambodia
have a maximum time coverage of four years in the UNIDO industrial statistics, of which a maximum of
two years are consecutive. The resulting inequality measure would therefore be of little use for comparisons
over time, which is the main selling point and the reason for constructing the index in the first place.
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The overall correlation between the UTIP and the newly constructed Theil index across
all 135 countries covered by both indices is 0.83 for inequality levels and 0.79 for changes
in inequality. Although the two indices appear to develop rather similarly on average,
the correlations by country reveal large differences and range from a perfect correlation
of 1.0 in 17 countries to negative correlations in Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Jamaica,
and Uganda.22 Appendix table 3.A.3 displays the number of imputed data points, the
year coverage for the UTIP and the ”dynamic” version of the Theil index, as well as the
correlations and relative deviations of the two measures in levels and differences. The
degree of divergence between the two measures is weakly, but significantly correlated with
the extent of imputation23 in the new index. This makes perfect sense given that the reason
for imputing values was that the raw data was not utilizable and hence the construction
of any sort of index requires a choice of whether to impute or not, and, if applicable,
of the imputation method. Obviously, if no imputation is carried out, differences in the
measures are implied. But even if the data have been modified in some way, the outcome
is not necessarily the same and the resulting indices are likely to still differ to some
- smaller - extent. On average, the dynamic version of the Theil index is 3.8 percent
higher than the UTIP measure whereas the long version is 1.2 percent lower. While these
averages again differ substantially across countries, neither the dynamic, nor the long
version display significant correlations between the average sign of the deviation and the
number of imputed data points at the country level.
Looking at those countries which display low correlations or very high deviations from
the UTIP in more detail, a few peculiarities are noticeable. First, the association with
the number of imputations is not stronger in the countries displaying negative correlations
with the UTIP index than for the rest of the sample. This supports the stance that
the imputation of missings in the underlying sectoral wage and employment data does
not lead to systematically different numbers in the resulting inequality index. Second, in
many cases with low correlations, the deviations between the UTIP and the new index
are equally high across all versions of the index - that is the long, short, and full ones
- making it fairly certain that the data used for the UTIP index again stem, at least
partly, from other versions of the UNDIO industrial statistics.24 If anything, correlations
are lower with the short version of the index, which is an indication that the UTIP in
some cases appears to also use only a subset of sectors for the calculation of their index.
This is, presumably, a reflection of efforts to keep the measure time-consistent.25 The
22The correlation is equal to one in Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Belize, Congo, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Gabon, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Puerto Rico, El Salvador, and Tanzania. Five more
countries display negative correlations in differences: Australia, Belgium, Moldova, the Netherlands, and
Puerto Rico.
23As measured by the total number of imputed values over all years and sectors for a given country.
Appendix table 3.A.3 provides an overview of the correlation between the two measures and the extent of
imputation.
24E.g., in Puerto Rico, Estonia, Bulgaria, Jamaica, and Uganda, among others.
25This is more prevalent for the levels than for the differences, which is in line with the previous finding
that even when inequality levels are different, a slimmer version of the index is still able to trace changes over
time quite well. By construction, countries where this was the case have been included in the ”dynamic”
version of the index and hence the higher deviation of the ”short” version for the levels as compared to
the differences is implied. The lower similarity with the UTIP also shows up in the average correlation
across all countries, which drops to 0.6. To name a few country cases, lower correlations for the short
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lower correlation with the short- as compared to the long version of the index occurs in
several instances where the short version was kept due to the inaccurate representation of
inequality levels and/or dynamics of the long version, as explained in section 3.2.3. This
finding potentially casts doubt on the capability of the UTIP index to be a fully accurate
indicator of manufacturing wage inequality. Lastly, in several instances, the deviations
from the UTIP are substantially lower (but never zero) with the ”full” (time-inconsistent)
version of the Theil index.26 Because the ”full” index is based on a differential sectoral
coverage over the years, this suggests that some of the UTIP numbers might rely on
unbalanced underlying sectoral data, which would put into question the time consistency
of their index. It could, however, again also stem from harmonization efforts with the
previous version of the index.
In order to get an idea of the drivers of the divergence between the UTIP measure
and the new index, a simple panel regression27 is employed with the percentage difference
between the UTIP- and the new index as the dependent variable. The number of dropped
sectors and the number of imputed data points in the underlying sectors in each year
are the main explanatory variables, and year dummies are added to the model to check
whether the difference between the indices is growing over time. Table 3.2 contains the
results.
Clearly, the number of imputations is related to the divergence of the two measures,
with one additional imputed data point implying a 3 percentage point higher deviation.
Interestingly, the number of dropped sectors has a negative coefficient, meaning that for
every dropped sector, the two indices are on average 5 percentage points more similar.
However, the use of robust standard errors, as warranted by a maximum likelihood ratio
test, renders the coefficient insignificant. The last two columns do not contain the year
fixed effects, which clearly reduces the size of the coefficient on the dropped sectors.
Looking at the values of the year dummies (displayed in the full version of the table
in the appendix, table 3.A.4, it becomes clear why this is the case: from 1990 onwards,
the year dummies become positive and keep increasing over the 1990s and 2000s. This
can be explained by the fact that, as mentioned in section 3.2.3, data for five sectors
(19, 30, 32, 35, and 37) are only available from 1990 onwards and often only start in
the mid-1990s. As explained earlier, they are therefore frequently dropped for the long
version of the Theil index, and the same appears to be the case for the UTIP index.
Additionally, harmonization efforts of the new and old UTIP index mainly focus on the
version are found in the Netherlands, Great Britain, Bolivia, and Romania, among many others. It should
not go unmentioned that the opposite case also occurs in the data a few times, e.g., in Botswana, where
the correlations jump from 0.23 from the long/dynamic to 0.95 for the short version in differences, or
Madagascar, where they rise from 0.66 to 0.96 for the levels. It should be noted, however, that these cases
also display almost equally high (and sometimes even higher, as, e.g., in Ireland,) correlations with the
”full” (time-inconsistent) version of the index and the short version may merely be a reflection of sectoral
coverage in the full version, especially if there are few years with missing sectors.
26Most notably, this is the case for Madagascar, New Zealand, Moldova, Great Britain, and Austria for
inequality levels. The problem is less prevalent for differences, where the correlation is often higher with
the short version than the ”full” one.
27The initial idea was to estimate the model in fixed effects to account for the fact that the UTIP relies
on data sources other than the UNIDO industrial statistics in some countries. However, a Hausman test
indicates that the estimates do not differ from the more efficient random effects model (chi2(47) =49.61,
p = 0.3697), which is therefore retained.
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Table 3.2: Explaining differences to the UTIP index: imputation vs. sectoral coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
r r
Imputations 3.030*** 3.030** 3.111*** 3.111***
(0.466) (1.225) (0.460) (1.154)
Dropped sectors -5.282*** -5.282 -2.396*** -2.396
(0.815) (3.444) (0.607) (1.817)
Constant 0.0131 0.0131 0.105 0.105
(10.30) (5.216) (4.026) (4.081)
Observations 3.627 3.627 3.627 3.627
Year dummies YES YES NO NO
# of countries 135 135 135 135
R2 0,036 0,036 0,016 0,016
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
percentage deviation between the dynamic version of the newly constructed Theil index and the UTIP
index. All estimations are employing random effects. The ”r” in the top column indicates that standard
errors are robust. R2 refers to the within R2.
time periods in which the indices overlap, and data from older classifications schemes can
only be employed before the transition from the old to the new classification took place.
The year dummies pick up this effect which is similar across all countries and allow the
coefficient on the sectoral coverage to capture the remaining variation in sectoral coverage.
Also note that the constant is not significantly different from zero, which means there does
not seem to be an inherent difference between the two indices.
Overall, while I can replicate a major part of the UTIP inequality statistics with the
newly computed index, there are large differences in quite a few cases. This is in line
with the fact that the explanatory power of the model analyzing the differences between
the new index and the UTIP one is very low. These results suggest that other factors
not contained in the model - in line with the descriptive evidence discussed above, one
of them most likely being the underlying data source - are more relevant for causing the
difference between the two indices. For the remainder of this paper, this implies that all
conclusions drawn only apply to the inequality numbers based on the sectoral information
from the UNIDO industrial statistics using the ISIC Rev. 3, and not necessarily to those
stemming from other, possibly more detailed data sources or sources using other industrial
classification schemes. However, given that future values will be in the new classification
scheme as well, the relevance of my results will be growing as the time coverage of the
index is extended to more recent years.
3.4 On the role of within-sectoral inequality
Although the UNIDO industrial statistics do not contain individual-level data, one can
still compute part of the within-sectoral inequality by exploiting the more refined sectoral
classifications up to the 4-digit level, as provided by the Industrial Statistics Database
(INDSTAT4). The share in total wage inequality of the within-component at the 3- and
4-digit level can give at least a rough idea of the lower bound of overall manufacturing
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wage inequality.28 Unfortunately, the time coverage is much lower than for the 2-digit
level data and spans only for the years from 1990 onwards. It should be noted that the
raw data at the 3- and 4-digit level suffer from the same problems of unbalancedness as
the 2-digit ones, but have not been modified in any way to address the resulting problems
of comparability.29 Inequality numbers - both between- and within-sectors - are therefore
not generally comparable over time and shall merely provide an indication of the potential
magnitude of within-sectoral inequality.
Within-sectoral inequality is created at three levels, 4d representing the most detailed
(4 digit) level. The formula, introduced in section 3.2.1, is, in its expanded version, easily





























The different parts are calculated separately in order to enable statements about the
contribution of 3-digit ”between sector”-inequality as the within-sectoral component at the
2-digit level, without adding the 4-digit level contribution as well. The following terms
28Note that the sum of the between-component and the within-components at the 3- and 4-digit levels
is in the following referred to as ”total” or ”overall” inequality for the sake of simplicity, although it is
technically not total or overall inequality given that within-sectoral inequality at the 4-digit level remains
unaccounted for.
29Another problem of the multi-level data for the calculation of a decomposable Theil index is that
subgroups must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. I.e., all lower-level (4- and 3-digit) numbers must
add up to the total value provided for next level. Since this is a necessary requirement, the raw data had
to be adjusted in a way such that the numbers add up at the different levels. If the higher-level value
was higher or lower than the sum of the lower-level values, the difference has been added to or subtracted
from the higher-level figure. While a desirable alternative would have been to create an extra category at
the lower level containing the missing amounts in the case of too-low sublevel sum, this would have meant
that in some cases, positive numbers for one variable (wages or employees) are matched up with zeros for
the other one, and including this ”residual” sector in the calculation of the Theil index is impossible due
to the logarithmic transformation of the ratios.
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are retained separately:

























Within sectoral inequality at the 2 digit level








The final index is then computed as BE2 + WI. The average contribution across all
sectors, countries, and years of within-sectoral inequality at the 3- and 4-digit levels (WI) is
33.7%, which would indicate that between-sectoral inequality (BE2) still explains around
two thirds of overall inequality in manufacturing. In terms of contributions to the within-
component of the 3- vs. the 4-digit level, interestingly, the one-third/two-third ratio found
previously for the between- versus within 2-digit level is reversed. On average, little over
one third of within-sectoral inequality stems from inequality at the more aggregate 3-digit
level (BE3) while two thirds can be attributed to inequality between 4-digit level sectors
(BE4). Of course, true total within-sectoral inequality will be larger given that inequality
within the 4-digit level sectors remains unaccounted for here.
Especially the result for the overall contribution of the within-component should, how-
ever, be taken with caution given the unbalancedness of the raw data.30 The actual 3- and
4-digit within-sectoral inequality is certain to be higher in years with larger gaps and more
missing data at the lower levels, and a first, crude correlation analysis indeed confirms a
small positive correlation of 0.2 between the number of subsectors per 2-digit category
and the share of the within-component. Moreover, the variation in the importance of
the within-component across countries and years is very large and there are cases where
within-sectoral inequality explains as much as 87% (Moldova in 2002) of overall inequality.
Country averages also show a lot of variation and range from 66.6% in Lebanon to 5.4%
in Kuwait. There are no clear trends in the development over time, either - in some coun-
tries, the within component seems to be growing, in other it is decreasing, and in several
cases it is relatively constant over the years. Again, it is important to keep in mind that
at least part of the variation in the within component stems from the unbalancedness of
30This is less of a problem for subsectors at the 3- and 4-digit level, given that a missing 2-digit sector
implies that all of its subsectors are missing as well, whereas a missing 3-digit sector ”only” leads to
missings at the 4-digit level, which is the smallest available bracket already.
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sectoral coverage over the years. Appendix figure 3.A.2 displays, for every country, the
development of both the contribution of the within component - that is, the percent of
total inequality which stems from the within-component - and the total number of sub-
sectors (both 3- and 4-digit) with non-missing values in all 2-digit categories per year. As
can be seen in the graphs, there are several countries with consistently high (or low) data
coverage, which potentially mask the importance of the balancedness issue for teasing out
the true within-component. Indeed, the standard deviation of the variation in sub-sector
coverage is a mediating variable in the association of the contribution of the within compo-
nent and sectoral coverage.31 Once the countries with a low variation in sectoral coverage
are discarded, the correlation between the share of within-sectoral inequality and sectoral
coverage rises to 0.25 (countries above the mean variation). Only using countries with one
standard deviation above the mean variation, it is 0.52, and for countries with variation
higher than two standard deviations above the mean, it is 0.71. This indicates that very
large changes in sectoral coverage are accompanied by increases in the importance of the
within-component as well. Nevertheless, balancedness does not seem to be the only driver
of the importance of the within component across the entire sample, and in particular it
is not very relevant for those countries with good data coverage throughout.32
The second major factor for the extent of within-sectoral inequality is the sectoral
composition of the manufacturing industry of a country. Some sectors by construction
have more subsectors than others. In the extreme case of only one subcategory per 2- and
3-digit category, there is no within-group inequality by construction. This is the case for
sectors 16 (Tobacco products) and 30 (Office, accounting and computing machinery), and
consequently, countries whose manufacturing industry is concentrated in those sectors are
likely to have a lower share of within sectoral inequality. Averages across sectors indeed
reveal large differences in the importance of the within-component, and the ranking of
2-digit sectors in terms of the size of their within-component (taking both 3- and 4-digit
sectoral inequality into account) is clearly correlated with the number of subsectors into
which each category is divided.33 Appendix table 3.A.5 provides more detailed information
on the association between the number of subsectors and the size of the within component
for every sector.34
In order to work out the importance of the sectoral composition, a simple country and
year fixed effects regression is conducted, where the share of within-sectoral inequality is
31The correlation between the standard deviation in the total number of subsectors (across years within
a country) and the correlation of the same with the share of the within component is 0.44.
32Another explanation for the low average correlation is the very crude measure of data coverage provided
by the total number of subsectors. It could still very well be - in fact, it is likely to be the case fairly
often - that some sectors are included in some years while others are not. This variability is very likely to
substantially affect the within-component. In order words, it does not only matter how many sectors are
included, but also which ones are included (and which ones are not).
33The correlation is 0.75 and the number of subsectors refers to the mean number of 4-digit sectors per
2-digit category. The correlation with the total number of subsectors (3- and 4-digit sectors) is very similar
(0.77). Only cases which have a non-zero within-component have been considered in the calculations.
34Clearly, those sectors ranking high on within-sectoral inequality (that is, the logged ratio of the wage-
over the employment share) also tend to have a higher number of subsectors. This is still true for the
weighted component shown in panel 3 of table 3.A.5, although the association is slightly weaker due to the
weighting with the sector’s wage share shown in panel 2.
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regressed on the number of subsectors covered by the data and a set of year dummies.35
The results are displayed in column 1 of table 3.3. For an assessment of the importance
of sectoral coverage versus sectoral composition, the wage shares of the different 2-digit
sectors are then added to the regression in column 2.36
Clearly, the sectoral composition takes away from the sectoral coverage effect, which de-
creases by more than 40%. While the fixed effects estimator does remove all time-invariant
country-specific factors which potentially affect the size of the within-component, it still
estimates a common slope parameter for the sectoral coverage variable for both high- and
low-variability countries. Random effects estimation confirms that the coefficient on the
sectoral coverage variable (”subsectors”) is hardly affected by the removal of the country
fixed effects (as shown in appendix table 3.B.6). As argued above, sectoral coverage is likely
to be a relevant factor skewing the size of the within-component only for those countries
where sectoral coverage varies substantially over the years. The fixed effects regression
is therefore repeated for two different high-variation subsamples: one with above-average
variation in sectoral coverage, and one with one standard deviation above the average
variation. Table 3.3 displays the results.
According to the point estimate of the number of subsectors, an additional sector
is associated with a 0.026 percentage point higher wage share. Although it is highly
significant and robust across specifications, this is a rather small number. Relating it to the
standard deviation of the ”subsectors” variable, an increase of one standard deviation (43)
would imply a mere 1.12 percent higher within-sectoral wage share. For the high-variation
subsamples, the point estimates rise to 0.03 and 0.05, implying higher within-sectoral
wage shares of 1.4 and 2.1 percent, respectively, for a one-standard deviation increase in
subsectoral coverage. If one considers the average maximum distance between the highest
and the lowest sectoral coverage within a country, numbers for between-sectoral inequality
would be between 3 and 5.75 percent higher on average. More noticeable than the increase
in the coefficient is the substantial rise in the R-squared for the high-variation subsamples.
It does indeed seem that sectoral coverage explains the lion’s share of the variation in the
within-component in those countries displaying major changes in sectoral coverage.
In order to get at least a rough idea of what the within-component would be if sectoral
coverage had been larger in those countries displaying large variations over the years, the
coefficient estimates obtained from the above regressions are used to obtain counterfactual
35The results presented use the number of 3-digit categories per 2-digit sectors because, as previously
show, the 3-digit level accounts for two thirds of the within-component. Results are very similar when the
number of 4-digit categories, or the number of total subcategories is used instead (results available upon
request).
36Note that sectors 16 and 30 have been omitted from the regressions. If all sectors (including 16
and 30, which have no subsectors and can therefore never positively contribute to the share of the within-
component) are included in the regression containing the sector shares, all sectoral coefficients have positive
signs and interpretation of the results is not straightforward. This is because the shares of all other sectors
are implicitly evaluated against the shares of sectors 16 and 30, which by definition (due to the lack
of subsectors) never contribute to within-sectoral inequality. Hence, the larger the shares of the other
sectors, the smaller will be by construction the share of sectors 16 and 30, which ceteris paribus implies
a larger within-component. Moreover, because both sectors 16 and 30 have on average larger wage- than
employment shares (the ratios being 176 and 137, see table 3.1) , whenever the wage share of those
sectors rises, the between component of the Theil index will rise as well, implying by definition a smaller
within-component.
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Table 3.3: Within-component: sectoral coverage vs. sectoral composition, FE results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High variation High variation
sample1 sample2
Subsectors 0.0451*** 0.0261*** 0.0301*** 0.0505***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Share 15 0.799 1.805** -0.205
(0.970) (0.798) (2.772)
Share 17 -0.0140 0.728 -0.797
(0.950) (0.838) (2.224)
Share 18 -0.616 -0.360 -5.747**
(0.951) (0.915) (2.361)
Share 19 -0.654 1.798 8.376**
(1.306) (1.732) (3.015)
Share 20 2.989** 4.801*** 6.038*
(1.416) (1.102) (2.934)
Share 21 0.370 1.637 1.527
(1.401) (1.186) (3.452)
Share 22 -0.452 -0.466 -6.338**
(0.967) (1.015) (2.013)
Share 23 -1.629 -0.826 -3.250
(1.508) (0.580) (2.187)
Share 24 -0.542 -0.409 -2.067
(0.976) (0.879) (2.292)
Share 25 0.604 0.848 -3.434
(1.037) (0.992) (1.965)
Share 26 1.135 1.419 -0.253
(1.040) (1.069) (2.192)
Share 27 -1.132 -0.494 -3.148
(0.817) (0.725) (2.401)
Share 28 0.658 1.135 -0.683
(0.866) (0.836) (2.440)
Share 29 -0.181 0.358 -0.784
(0.900) (0.833) (3.053)
Share 31 -0.489 0.119 -2.919
(1.231) (0.852) (3.596)
Share 32 -0.578 -0.00135 -4.494*
(0.902) (0.947) (2.454)
Share 33 -0.108 -0.685 -6.274
(1.516) (2.246) (4.080)
Share 34 -0.446 2.191* -8.611
(1.028) (1.109) (5.839)
Share 35 -0.567 0.124 -1.805
(0.877) (0.838) (2.448)
Share 36 -2.478* -1.338 -4.480
(1.297) (1.311) (2.993)
Share 37 2.189 1.967 2.196
(2.656) (2.070) (6.554)
Constant 15.14** 26.44 -46.73 201.4
(6.63) (85.10) (73.66) (223.0)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 429 429 221 74
R-squared 0,465 0,465 0,654 0,898
# of countries 53 53 27 11
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable
is the share of within-sectoral inequality in %. Numbers 15 to 37 refer to the 2-digit sector’s wage share
in total manufacturing wages in %. High variation samples 1 and to refer to subsamples of countries
with above-average variation in sectoral coverage (1), and countries with one standard deviation above
the average variation (2).
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values when sectoral coverage is raised to a level found in other years in the same country.37
The adjustment is done for all three samples.38 The first adjustment on the full sample
yields a within-component of 34.5, which is less than 1 percentage point higher than the
unadjusted value of 33.7. The adjustment for the first subsample, displaying an above-
average standard deviation of sectoral coverage, results in a very similar value of 34.4 for
the full sample. However, adjusting the high-variation subsample leads to a substantial
increase in the average within-component to around 40.5%. Given that the rest of the
sample remains unadjusted, the true extent of within-sectoral inequality at the 3- and
4-digit level is likely to be above 40%. Furthermore, sectoral composition has not yet
been accounted for, either. As shown in table 3.3, including the sector shares takes away
from the positive effect of sectoral coverage and hence sectoral composition is likely to
increase the within-component even further. This is especially true for those countries
with a lower variation in sectoral coverage where the sectoral coverage adjustment would
make very little difference.
The full extent of within-sectoral inequality in manufacturing is of course not covered
by including sectoral data at lower levels. There is certainly a substantial amount of
inequality within 4-digit sectors, which on average still have almost 22,000 employees. In
a country like Great Britain, where the within-component accounts for as much as 85%
of overall inequality in 2009, average employee numbers in that year at the 4-digit levels
are 44,600, leaving room for a substantial amount of unequal pay among these workers.
If inequality within the 4-digit sectors was added to the within-component, it is fairly
certain that between-sectoral inequality would explain very little of the overall inequality
in manufacturing.
Nevertheless, it is possible that changes in inequality over time in between-sectoral
inequality can reflect the overall trends in inequality. Conceição and Galbraith (2000: 67)
argue that this is likely to be the case, given that ”while within-group inequalities are
likely to be large relative to differences between group averages, the internal rigidity of
industrial structure tends to assure that changes in within group inequalities in an indus-
trial classification will be small relative to changes between groups.” However, building
on the argument that ”industries [...] mean something, and if they mean anything at all,
the effect must be to impose a measure of homogeneity on entities classified together, and
a measure of distinctiveness to entities classified as being in different groups,” it is much
37It is not obvious what this level should be and setting it is somewhat arbitrary. In order to not over-
estimate the potential within-sectoral inequality numbers due to outliers at the top, the sectoral coverage
numbers are split into quintiles and the lowest value of the highest quintile is used as the counterfactual
coverage value for all years with lower sectoral coverage. When numbers of sectoral coverage are identical
at the upper end of the distribution, or when there are too few data points for a country, the highest value
of the 4th quintile is used instead. In those cases where both values are available, the difference between
the two is very small (8 on average), with a maximum of 33 for Ireland, where the values are rather high
at 415 and 448.
38Because sectoral composition is by construction skewed in those years with missing data because
sectoral shares for non-missing sectors are larger than they would be if the missing sectors were present,
simply using fitted values from the previous regression model would distort the results substantially for
precisely those years where sectoral coverage is lower. Therefore, only the coefficient estimate for sectoral
coverage is used and is multiplied with the yearly difference between the counterfactual high data coverage
and the actual number of 3-digit level subsectors. This value is then added onto the observed within-
component. Where the counterfactual high data coverage is lower than the actual number of 3-digit level
subsectors, the original value is retained and consequently, the within-component is not modified.
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easier for a worker to switch between subsectors within a broad industrial category than
to switch between industries. In fact, it is possible that there is no change in inequality
at the broader 2-digit sector level, with employee and wage bills remaining unchanged,
but there can be a substantial amount of re-shuffling within industries which remains un-
accounted for entirely. It is true that for a large number of sectors (wherein 22, being
the number of manufacturing sectors covered by the data, can be considered large), the
overall effect of large within-changes is mitigated due to the presence of 21 other sectors.
However, these 22 sectors are far from equally sized, and it is precisely the large sectors
which are divided into more subcategories and display larger amounts of within-sectoral
inequality to begin with. Most notably, sector 15 (food and beverages) makes up 20%
of the wage share on average. Looking at developing countries, where this sector is of
higher economic significance than in the developed world, it accounts for over one fourth
of overall manufacturing wages. It also has the highest within-sectoral inequality, and,
consequently, more than forty percent of within-sectoral inequality can be attributed to
sector 15 on average in developing countries. The average contribution of 14% of the
sector to between-sectoral inequality at the 2-digit level is also large. It is, however, to a
large extent attributable to the sector’s large wage share - in fact, sector 15’s discrepancy
between wage- and employment shares is among the lowest of all sectors, at least for de-
veloping countries. Hypothetically, if one assumed an increase in wages in sector 15, this
would decrease between-sectoral inequality because the sector’s contribution to the Theil
index is negative, i.e., it has a lower wage- than employment share. Nevertheless, the
within-sector component would be assigned a higher weight due to the sector’s increased
wage share, even assuming that the increase in wages is distributed within the sector in
such a way that does not lead to higher within-sectoral inequality itself. As a result,
between-sectoral inequality would decrease but within-sectoral inequality would increase.
Unfortunately, the unbalancedness of the 3- and 4-digit level data, which is even more
severe for developing countries, makes it difficult to empirically test whether this scenario
is occurring in practice.
What is feasible, however, is a check of whether the data given in any single year would
theoretically allow for this case to happen. That is, the change in the wage share which
would lead to a zero within-component for a given sector is multiplied with the within-
component (which, for a conservative scenario, is assumed to remain unchanged). This
increase in the within-component is then compared to the maximum possible inequality de-
crease in the opposite direction for the between-sectoral component. Mathematically, this




















The first element is made up of the difference in the new and the old wage share of the
sector of interest j, which is the weight for Tj, representing inequality within the sector.
The second element is the between-component. One can think of this as a hypothetical
2-sector scenario in which all other sectors (which, for simplification purposes, are assumed
to not display any within-sectoral wage inequality) apart from the sector of interest are
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aggregated into one large sector. Although the interest here is in comparing changes in
the two elements, because the minimum value for between sectoral inequality is zero, the
maximum possible decrease is equal to the entire between-sectoral component at the 2-
digit level - arguably, a rather unrealistic scenario, but nevertheless one which serves in
proving the point that within-sectoral inequality trends can outweigh between-sectoral
movements in inequality. What is not so unlikely is an increase in wages to a level that
leads to a contribution of a large sector close to zero, given that the employment and wage
shares are already relatively equal for sector 15 in many cases.
It turns out that there is only one single case in the data where in the above scenario it
is theoretically possible that the first component outweighs the second, namely sector 15
in Rwanda in 2009. It is worth noting, however, that in a number of cases, the two effects
- the inequality-decreasing effect of the between-component and the inequality-increasing
effect of the within-component - almost cancel themselves out. The true decrease in overall
wage inequality is therefore substantially lower than what it seems if only the change in
the between-component is considered and the opposing effects of the within-component
are ignored.
There are more reasons to believe that the between-component is a poor indicator of
overall movements of between-sectoral inequality. First, it seems implausible that overall
wage inequality drops to zero as a result of an increase in wages in one sector. The true
decrease in the between-component in the above scenario is therefore likely to be much
smaller, leaving more room for the within-component to counteract this effect. Second,
the within-component is still vastly underestimated in many countries and years due to
the unbalancedness in the raw data. This may be one of the reasons for why the above
counterfactual exercise only yields a single case in which the within-component could
outweigh the between-sectoral effect if the latter drops to zero. Third, adding to this
underestimation, the within component is in all cases missing a further element due to the
lack of individual-level data. Fourth, the assumption of a zero change in within-sectoral
wage inequality was made to demonstrate the most conservative (and mathematically most
simple) case of changes in the two components, where the change in the within-component
was constructed to be minimal and the change in the between-component to be maximal.
If the assumption of a zero change of the within-component is dropped as well and replaced
with an increase in within-sectoral inequality - which is, after all, the scenario we are truly
interested in - it is very likely that more cases can be identified in the dataset which have
the potential to display divergent trends in between- and within-sectoral wage inequality.
Going through different scenarios of changes in the within- and between-components is a
tedious exercise, which can be circumvented by directly performing comparisons of the two
components on the raw data. Despite the previously discussed limitations of comparing
changes over time due to the unbalancedness of the 3- and 4-digit level data, conclusions
can still be drawn from comparisons of the direction of changes of the within- and the
between component given the following considerations. While it is clear that the size
(and hence the share in overall inequality) of the within-component is affected by the
availability and composition of subsectoral data, this does not affect the change observed
in the between component. Assuming that the pattern of missings is random across
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subsectors and it is not the case that sectors with higher within sectoral inequality are
missing more (or less) often than those with lower sectoral inequality, looking at changes
between years with similar subsectoral coverage can provide some indication of whether
changes in the between- and the within-component go into different directions. Indeed, out
of the 968 observations with changes of less than 1% in subsectoral coverage from one year
to the next, around 13% (stemming from both developing and developed countries from
all regions) show opposing trends of changes in overall and changes in between-sectoral
coverage. The change in the within-component goes in the opposite direction than that of
the between-component, and is large enough to outweigh its effect. This picture changes
very little if only those cases are considered where sectoral coverage is entirely unchanged:
again, around 14% of the 294 cases show different trends in overall and between-sectoral
wage inequality.39
In sum, there is strong indication that the Theil index relying on the between-sectoral
component of manufacturing wages computed here and by the UTIP may provide a wrong
image of overall changes in manufacturing wage inequality in around 13% of cases. Given
that the ”true” extent of within-sectoral inequality (taking into account individual-level
data) is likely to be substantially larger, this number has to be taken as a lower bound to
the true discrepancy between between-sectoral and overall changes in manufacturing wage
inequality.
Of course, many more things can be done to assess the plausibility and extent of error of
only looking at between-sectoral changes in inequality. Besides the counterfactual exercises
on the UNIDO data discussed above, one could look into country cases with better data
for manufacturing wages. This would allow, at least in some cases, the calculation of
inequality up to the individual level and provide some indication of the remaining extent
of inequality not captured by the sector-level data, no matter how detailed. However,
doubts also arise about ”external validity” of the index in the remainder of this paper,
which, if taken seriously, limits its relevance to a narrowly defined set of applications
focusing specifically at manufacturing. I therefore leave it up to those who have such a
confined focus and need to take into account changes within sectors to assess this last
component of within-sectoral inequality which remains unaccounted for here.
3.5 The relationship to overall income inequality
3.5.1 Comparison with overall inequality statistics
In an effort to validate the capacity of the Theil index to serve as a proxy for, and
basis of, developments in overall monetary inequality, Galbraith and Kum (2005) (hence-
forth GK2005) relate it to the Gini coefficients compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996)
(DS1996). They find an elasticity of between 6 and 8.5 %, which they explain with ”the
much greater volatility of the Theil measure [due to the varying number of manufactur-
ing industries per year and country], and also the greater volatility of manufacturing pay
39The result also holds for different threshold of change in subsectoral coverage of between 5% and 50%.
In fact, the share of 13% remains remarkably stable across all chosen thresholds.
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compared with household income [because it includes income from other sources such as
non-labor wage, land and capital]” (GK2005: 128). Adding the share of employment in
manufacturing as a control variable, and dummies for the different income categories un-
derlying the DS1996 Gini coefficients, they use the predicted relationship between their
Theil index and the Gini coefficients to scale up the Theil index and obtain a broad mea-
sure of income inequality, the ”Estimated Household Income Inequality” (EHII) dataset.
In a more recent update of their estimates, they confirm the relationship with the DS1996
data (Galbraith et al. 2014, 2015).
This paper aims to expand upon this approach and to also explore the circumstances
under which the two measures are more (dis-)similar by regressing the difference between
the Theil index and overall income inequality on a number of control variables. Instead
of the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset, which only contains data until 1996, the
Gini coefficients from the World Income Inquality Database (WIID) provided by UNU-
WIDER are used which comprise and extend the DS1996 data. All the controls proposed
by GK05 are included and several other potentially important determinants of the asso-
ciation between manufacturing wage inequality and overall inequality are added to the
model. To eliminate volatility stemming from differential sectoral coverage of the Theil
index, the normalized version of the Theil index is used so that numbers are comparable
between countries with differential sectoral coverage. To tackle another potential source
of volatility in the income inequality measure, a few more control variables are added, and
other, arguably more consistent, measures of income inequality are used in addition to the
WIID.40
Most notably, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Gini coefficients are derived from
harmonized primary micro data, which is currently considered the ”gold standard” in
terms of consistency and accuracy of the resulting inequality measures. Unfortunately,
time and country coverage of the LIS data is still limited and the resulting sample size is
correspondingly small. Nevertheless, the comparison with the LIS can be used to validate
the results from the WIID. The second alternative measure of income inequality used are
the SWIID Gini coefficients provided by Solt (2015). He addresses the inconsistencies in
the WIID, arising from the previously discussed heterogeneity of data sources by provid-
ing multiple solutions to mitigate the same and combining them into a single workable
dataset.41 The result is a balanced multiply imputed dataset of broad country and time
coverage. Although the underlying method has been criticized (Jenkins 2015), the SWIID
certainly provides a more sophisticated, prudent, and explicit way of making the WIID
data comparable, especially when compared to the much more crude alternative of merely
introducing dummy variables for the numerous categories of income and other underlying
40It should not go unmentioned that the creators of the EHII have put their resulting estimates through
a number of validity checks and comparisons with other data on income inequality, including the LIS
(Galbraith et al. 2014, and 2015). They have not, however, repeated the initial exercise of relating the
different data sources directly to the UTIP-UNIDO index of wage inequality.
41Importantly, it should be noted that the SWIID uses other data sources to cross-check its values,
among them the UTIP-UNIDO Theil index. One might therefore suspect a built-in association between
the index calculated in this paper and the SWIID Gini coefficients which is closer than for the other data
sources. As shown in table 3.4, this is clearly not the case and suggests that the use of the SWIID is
unproblematic in this context.
CHAPTER 3. AN INDEX OF INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE INEQUALITY 71
concepts on which the WIID relies. That the latter approach imposes constant differences
between concepts across countries and over time is just one of its problems42 and has
been shown to be invalid (Atkinson and Brandolini 2009, Galbraith and Kum 2003. The
SWIID data have another advantage: they provide Gini coefficients for both market and
net inequality, and thereby render the inclusion of a variable for government transfers,
as suggested to GK2005 but excluded by the authors due to insufficient data coverage
of the variable, unnecessary. Manufacturing wage inequality is expected to show a closer
relationship with market- than with net inequality since the latter includes transfers which
are designed for the very purpose of mitigating inequalities arising from (inter alia) wages.
Two further data sources are added: the EU SILC data and the Gini coefficients from
the World Development Indicators (WDI). They are tested here to allow comparisons to
Galbraith et al. (2015), who use them to validate their EHII data.
The three control variables used in GK2005 are the ratio of manufacturing employ-
ment to population, the share of urban population, and the population growth rate. Apart
from measuring the importance of manufacturing for overall incomes, the share of man-
ufacturing is also supposed to capture the part of the labor market which tends to be
more unionized, and is therefore expected to be associated with lower inequality. Urban-
ization is expected to be associated with more inequality because ”wealthy people live in
cities,” and population growth serves as a proxy for the age structure of a country and
the composition of households, and is expected to be associated with higher inequality at
the household level if poorer households tend to be larger.
Instead of the ratio of manufacturing employment, the share of value-added in GDP
from manufacturing (Mfg va) is used here, which features a good coverage of the countries
in the sample.43 The variable, along with the share of urban population (urban) and
population growth (gpop) is taken from the WDI (2016). In addition to these variables,
three more controls are added. The first one is the price level of investment (pl i), taken
from the Penn World Tables (PWT, V8.1, Feenstra et al. 2015). The variable is a proxy
for the rate of returns of capital, and since capital is a component of overall income, higher
returns to capital might increase the divergence of the two measures.
GK2005 argue that one of the reasons why changes in manufacturing wage inequal-
ity will likely not counteract developments in overall wage inequality is that low-skilled
workers, forming the lower end of the distribution in manufacturing wage inequality, are
substitutes for low-skilled workers in other sectors such as agriculture and services. It is
therefore unlikely that wages at the lower end of manufacturing pay decrease or increase
without an equivalent shift in the wage levels of other sectors of the economy. That being
said, the same logic does not apply to the upper end of the wage spectrum, where workers
are skilled in a specific profession and are much less likely to easily switch between man-
ufacturing and other sectors. To also account for changes at the upper end of the wage
42Another problem is how to deal with multiple observations per country and year of the same quality.
Here, the researcher faces a trade-off between various dimension, e.g., sacrificing demographic for geo-
graphic coverage. Approaches which directly adjust the WIID Ginis by adding or subtracting the average
differences between the underlying categories, as e.g. in Gruen and Klasen (2012) and Easterly (2007) do
not circumvent the problem, either, since differences remain also for the adjusted Ginis.
43The variable leads to very similar coefficient estimates as found in Galbraith and Kum (2005) when
their index is used on the WIID data. Results can be found in appendix table 3.A.12.
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distribution, a measure of total factor productivity (tfp) is included which is constructed
to reflect cross-country differences in aggregate technology (Feenstra et al. 2015). As the
technological frontier of a country shifts outwards, this is likely to encompass all sectors
of the economy and affect skill premia everywhere. Technological change can therefore be
assumed to sway manufacturing wage inequality and overall income inequality in the same
(upward) direction.
Naturally, both of these mechanisms are weakened by the extent of openness of an
economy. While ”cheaper” foreign workers may - indirectly through trade - be substitutes
for some low-skilled manufactures, the same cannot be said for non-tradable services or
some segments of agriculture. Similarly, countries can gain access to technology through
trade, which may again affect the tradable sectors more than the non-tradable ones. In
addition to these effects, trade openness (defined as import and export value over GDP
and taken from the WDI) is also a proxy of the extent to which a country is vulnerable to
external shocks which are likely to affect overall (income) inequality much more and cause
divergences from the wage inequality measure. To generally account for shocks which
potentially affect all countries, year dummies are added to the model as well. Lastly, since
many of the above control variables are correlated with GDP per capita, it is included to
make sure that its effect gets picked up separately.
In addition to these ”external” variables, the number of imputations is added to the
regression to account for the fact that in the case of linear interpolation, the idea was to
be as conservative as possible in mapping observed changes in employment and wages in
the underlying sectors over the missing years. Consequently, actual changes which may
show up in the overall income inequality statistics are less likely to be captured in those
cases where imputations were necessary. The impact of the second ”internal” variable,
sectoral coverage of the wage inequality measure (# of ISIC), is time-invariant and cannot
be estimated with the fixed effects approach. Therefore, random effects estimations are
employed additionally to get an idea of the role of this variable as well as of the impact of
controlling for all other country-specific time-invariant factors.
Before moving to the analysis of the deviations between the two measures, the specifi-
cation by GK2005 is replicated using my newly constructed index and the WIID instead
of the DS1996 data. One the one hand, this serves as a check as to whether the new
Theil index yields results similar to theirs. On the other hand, it tests whether their
results also hold with the extensions discussed above which will be used in the analysis
of the deviations of the measures. Having reduced the two sources of volatility identified
by GK2005, the relationship between the inequality data and the Theil index should be
stronger in general, and in particular with the newly added, more consistent income in-
equality measures. Finally, it gives a first idea of how the new control variables relate to
overall (income) inequality. Table 3.4 contains the fixed effects results for the expanded
specification of GK2005 and features the estimates from their paper in the first column
for better comparison.44 As in their model, the Theil index enters in logs to simplify
44Note that these are not based on estimations done in this paper, but they are literally the numbers
published in table 5 of their paper.
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interpretation and to account for its log-normality (as shown in appendix figure 3.A.3).45
The random effects results are displayed in appendix table 3.A.8 and do not show ma-
jor changes in the results. Note, however, that the Theil index should not be employed
as a representation of overall manufacturing wage inequality in random effects models
in general, given that within-sectoral is not accounted for and the measure hence mas-
sively understates overall manufacturing wage inequality levels. Fixed effects models on
the other hand only consider mean-deviations over time and hence might still be able to
trace changes in overall manufacturing wage inequality - although the accuracy thereof is
questionable as well (see section 3.2).46
First, comparing columns 1 and 2 of table 3.4, the coefficients on the Theil index are
substantially lower than those found by GK2005 for the UTIP measure. This is not due to
the use of the DS1996 instead of the WIID data in column 1. Very similar coefficient esti-
mates are obtained when the UTIP index is regressed on the WIID instead of the DS1996
data (results for the reduced model can be found in appendix table 3.A.12.) Despite the
larger sample size, significance disappears in the fixed effects model, and drops to the 5
percent level in the random effects specification, as shown in column 2 of appendix table
3.A.8. The coefficient remains small and insignificant for all other inequality measures.
Ironically, the only variable displaying similar effects as in the GK2005 estimations is the
importance of the manufacturing sector, which is based on a measure different from theirs.
The negative coefficients are more in line with the interpretation of the manufacturing sec-
tor as a proxy for the extent of unionization than as a mediating variable capturing the
role of manufacturing wage inequality for overall income inequality, but are very small
throughout.
While the results look rather similar for most measures, many coefficients change
drastically when the LIS data are used. Most notably, the sign on the Theil index becomes
negative (although the standard error is very large). The other variables population growth
and urbanization also change substantially and are significant in some cases, despite the
small sample size. When using only the LIS countries in the other specifications, it becomes
clear that this is entirely due to the sample composition.47 The fact that these differences
arise between different samples despite the fact that country fixed effects are contained
in the model also puts into question the universality of the relationship between the two
measures for all countries.
Regarding the two versions of the SWIID, interestingly, the Theil index appears to
45In addition to the changes in the model described above, it also contains dummy variables for the
underlying categories in the WIID data (for the full list, consult appendix table 3.A.7), while GK2005
only include dummies for the income concept and the income sharing unit (i.e., whether the data were
measured at the household- or the person level) used in the DS1996 data. Note that the results do not
change much when only the set of variables used in GK2005 is included (the fixed effects results can be
found in appendix table 3.A.9). The largest change in coefficients is triggered by the inclusion of the GDP
per capita variable, which affects the estimates of the control variables, but not that of the Theil index
(results available upon request).
46Although the fixed effects model is clearly preferable due to the removal of time-invariant country
specific factors, the random effects model is estimated to be able to compare also the random effects
estimates by GK2005, and to get a benchmark estimate of the effects of the time-invariant factors on the
income inequality measures to be able to better interpret the results from the next specification trying to
explain the differences between the Theil index and the income inequality measures.
47Results available upon request.
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be more closely related to net inequality than to market inequality, as indicated by the
consistently larger coefficients on the former, although all are insignificant. One explana-
tion for this finding is that it is not primarily labor market income of employees which is
redistributed, and that redistributive taxes are on average similar across sectors so that
the post-tax distribution of wages resembles the pre-tax one, but the post-tax distribution
of overall incomes now has less resemblance to the pre-tax distribution of wages.
Table 3.4: Relationship between Theil and Income inequality: FE results, extended model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GK05
(DS1996)
wiid swiid n swiid m lis silc wb
ln(Theil) 0.079*** 0.0168 0.00776 0.00521 -0.00260 0.0272 0.00956
(6.60) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0323) (0.0166) (0.0177)
GDPpc -9.46e-07 1.42e-06 9.69e-07 -4.10e-06 -2.30e-06 1.23e-06
(3.02e-06) (2.02e-06) (2.50e-06) (3.58e-06) (2.86e-06) (5.35e-06)
Pop. growth -0.578 -5.58e-05 0.00505 0.00727 0.0121 -0.0185 -0.00472
(-0.81) (0.0130) (0.0101) (0.0110) (0.0347) (0.0131) (0.0169)
Share urban 0.001 -0.00950** 0.00206 -0.00148 0.0205* -0.00365 0.00770**
(-1.57) (0.00408) (0.00312) (0.00374) (0.0118) (0.00512) (0.00314)
Manuf.v.add. -0.001*** -0.00683* -0.00323* -0.00430** -0.00439 -0.00244 0.000585
(4.50) (0.00356) (0.00188) (0.00196) (0.00773) (0.00593) (0.00334)
Trade open. 0.000746* 0.000148 2.53e-05 0.00101 0.000423 0.000440
(0.000447) (0.000310) (0.000364) (0.000802) (0.000526) (0.000494)
Price level inv. 0.0217 0.0463 0.0589 -0.116 0.107 0.0839
(0.0559) (0.0328) (0.0366) (0.0919) (0.0920) (0.0619)
# imputed -0.00244** 0.000900 0.00118 -0.00306 0.00157 -0.00101
(0.00120) (0.00123) (0.00156) (0.00320) (0.00152) (0.00174)
Tfp 0.264** 0.0612 0.0780 0.329 0.321** 0.210*
(0.110) (0.0501) (0.0719) (0.248) (0.117) (0.113)
Constant 3.893*** 3.923*** 3.479*** 3.887*** -2.838*** 3.461*** 2.991***
(51.38) (0.324) (0.132) (0.181) (0.964) (0.417) (0.279)
Year dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 481 618 1.521 1.511 120 256 483
R-squared unreported 0,81 0,12 0,166 0,522 0,25 0,188
# of countries 81 66 82 82 35 28 73
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
logged Gini coefficient from the data source indicated in the top row. Swiid n and swiid m refer to net and
market inequality, respectively. Silc denotes the EU SILC data and wb the WDI Gini coefficients. Instead of the
share of manufacturing value added, the model by GK05 displayed in column 1 uses the ratio of manufacturing
employment. It also uses the DS1996 data as the dependent variable, and the UTIP Theil index. Note that
the coefficients displayed in column 1 are not based on estimations done in this paper, but they are literally
the numbers published in table 5 of GK05. Their model contains a set of dummy variables for the underlying
welfare concepts in the DS1996 data. Column 2 contains the full set of dummy variables for the underlying
welfare concepts, income definitions, and other categories used in the WIID. The full results, including the year
dummies, can be found in appendix table 3.A.7.
As for the newly added control variables, only total factor productivity has a stable
positive effect across all models and is significant and rather sizeable in some cases. Ac-
cording to the WIID fixed effects point estimate, it increases income inequality by around
30%. The effect of GDP is negligible, but it is kept in the model because its inclusion affects
the estimates of some of the other controls such as population growth, and urbanization.48
In terms of the ”internal variables,” the effect of the time-invariant variable sectoral
48Results available upon request.
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coverage can be seen in the random effects results (table 3.A.8). The coefficient is small
and only significant for the LIS data. This is reassuring given that the Theil index has
been normalized with the underlying number of sectors for the random effects estimations
already. It does not seem to be the case that countries with better sectoral coverage sys-
tematically differ from those with worse coverage, even when many time-invariant factors
are not controlled for. This, again, supports the stance that the missings in the underlying
sectoral data are random.
Overall, these results do not lend much support for the findings of GK2005, which
suggest a stable association between the Theil index of manufacturing and overall inequal-
ity. While the findings for the WIID data are qualitatively still relatively similar to their
estimates, other, and arguably more consistent, measures of income inequality yield rather
different results. Not only does the association with the Theil index become insignificant,
but the coefficients are also too small to postulate any economically meaningful link be-
tween the two variables. This is true even for the WIID specification, where according
to the (insignificant) WIID fixed effects point estimate, doubling the Theil index would
lead to an increase in the Gini coefficient of little under one percent. Given the high R-
squared of 0.81 in the specification, the low association does not seem to be the result of
an incomplete or widely misspecified model, either. One reason for the weak association
of the between-sectoral Theil index and overall measures of income inequality could be the
neglect of the within-component. It might be worthwhile to repeat the exercise with man-
ufacturing wage inequality measures using more detailed sector- or individual-level data.
That the UTIP index displays a stronger link with the income inequality measures could
also be owing to the fact that it partly relies on earlier industrial classification schemes
with higher levels of detail.
Given that there are good theoretical reasons to expect a robust relationship between
manufacturing wage inequality and overall income inequality, an explicit analysis of the
factors which might cause the two measures to differ stands to reason. All of the theoret-
ically motivated variables discussed above are included in the model, along with the full
set of year dummies and, for the WIID data, the underlying categories. The dependent
variable is the logged percentage difference between the (normalized) Theil index and the
respective Gini coefficient, as indicated in the top row of table 3.5.49 The logarithmic
transformation is used, on the one hand, to make interpretation easier, and on the other
hand, because the differences are approximately log-normally distributed (see appendix
figure 3.A.4).
With a few exceptions, the results do not match the theoretical predictions derived for
the variables above, and most coefficients are insignificant. To begin with, a higher share of
manufacturing value-added is associated with a higher discrepancy of the Theil index and
income inequality. Apart from the smaller size on the WIID data, the coefficient is rather
stable across the different data sources, and significant for the SWIID. In line with the
interpretation that the variable is capturing the extent of unionization, one way of reading
this result is that with a larger manufacturing sector, a higher share of the economy is
isolated from other (dis-)equalizing forces which drive up overall income inequality, but not
49A full version showing the coefficients for the year dummies can be found in appendix table 3.A.10.
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wage inequality. More surprisingly, trade openness is associated with a higher similarity
between income inequality and the Theil index for all measures, and is significant for the
SWIID. The absolute effect is rather small, however: A one percentage point increase in
the openness ratio implies a 0.1-0.5% lower dissimilarity in the two measures. Nevertheless,
it is interesting to note that trade seems to be associated with wage inequality and overall
income inequality going in the same direction - although causality could also be the other
way around.
The tfp variable, capturing the level of technology, is significantly associated with a
smaller gap between wage and income inequality in the SWIID specifications. Its effect
is large50 compared to that of the other variables, and it would appear that technological
change is affecting both wage and income inequality in the same way. However, the effect
is not robust across data sources with coefficients turning positive in the WIID, LIS, and
SILC models.
Table 3.5: Determinants of the difference between wage and income inequality, FE results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wiid swiid n swiid m lis silc wb
GDPpc 9.51e-06 1.78e-05 1.77e-05 2.72e-05 2.05e-05 4.40e-05
(1.03e-05) (1.25e-05) (1.24e-05) (1.97e-05) (1.40e-05) (3.07e-05)
Pop. growth 0.192** 0.0493 0.0488 -0.0548 -0.0392 0.0992
(0.0740) (0.0503) (0.0504) (0.151) (0.0750) (0.0724)
Share urban 0.0304* 0.00710 0.00224 -0.0243 -0.0251 0.0200
(0.0169) (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0764) (0.0274) (0.0153)
Manuf.v.add. 0.00266 0.0173* 0.0193** 0.0307 0.0247 0.0146
(0.0147) (0.00964) (0.00910) (0.0405) (0.0260) (0.0152)
Trade open. -0.00352 -0.00471** -0.00481** -0.00318 -0.00278 -0.00389
(0.00289) (0.00234) (0.00241) (0.00301) (0.00255) (0.00304)
Price lev. inv. -0.470* 0.485 0.522 0.324 -0.473 -0.0473
(0.271) (0.327) (0.330) (0.580) (0.680) (0.301)
# imputed -0.0408** -0.0659*** -0.0659*** 0.000215 -0.0355** -0.0649***
(0.0172) (0.0181) (0.0185) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0200)
Tfp 0.895* -0.513*** -0.460* 0.257 0.349 -0.198
(0.459) (0.192) (0.249) (1.154) (0.659) (0.416)
Constant 4.421*** 8.101*** 8.490*** 4.682 9.531*** 8.313***
(1.173) (0.737) (0.718) (5.502) (2.312) (0.982)
Year dummies
&other controls
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 618 1.521 1.511 120 256 483
R-squared 0,383 0,327 0,323 0,56 0,228 0,358
# of countries 66 82 82 35 28 73
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
logged percentage difference between the (normalized) Theil index and the Gini coefficient from the data
source indicated in the top row. Swiid n and swiid m refer to net and market inequality, respectively. Silc
denotes the EU SILC data and wb the WDI Gini coefficients. The full results, including the year dummies,
can be found in 3.A.10.
50The variable is for every country normalized to a baseline value of 1 in 2005. A one standard deviation
increase, equivalent to 0.27 points on the normalized scale, would lead to a 13.5 percent lower difference
between the Theil index and the SWIID indices of income inequality.
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Another surprising finding is that the variable measuring the extent of imputation in
the underlying data points is negative and significant in all specifications except the LIS.
One interpretation of this finding is that, because of the attempt to tamper with the data
as little as possible, the Theil index tends to show small changes in inequality in years
with more imputations in the sectoral data. Because income inequality is more sluggish
than wage inequality, this could mean that the smoother series has a closer resemblance
to the developments in income inequality than the more erratic one. Another explanation
is that countries where manufacturing wage inequality is closer to overall inequality have
more missing data points, which is somewhat puzzling, but fits with the result on sectoral
coverage (shown in the random effects results in table 3.A.11). Like in the previous esti-
mations of the relationship between the Theil index and the income inequality measures,
the sectoral coverage variable is positive, but significant only for the WIID. Considering
the fact that it effectively ranges from 0 to 18, the effect is rather large in the WIID speci-
fication (and the LIS, where it is borderline significant). According to the point estimates,
the inclusion of one additional sector in the Theil index is associated with a 6 to 7 percent
higher difference between wage and income inequality. One would expect that a better
sectoral coverage would lead to more accurate numbers of wage inequality and, because
wage inequality is a constitutive part of income inequality, this would lead to lower average
differences between the two measures.
It is also interesting to note the value of the constant. Focusing on the fixed effects
specifications, there appears to be a ”baseline” difference between wage and income in-
equality of roughly between 4.5 and 9.5 percent. Apart from Europe and Central Asia,
which display consistently larger differences between the two measures across all speci-
fications, no new insights are obtained about the baseline differences between wage and
income inequality from the regional dummies shown in the random effects results (see
table 3.A.11). The year dummies do, however, indicate that the differences between the
wage inequality index and the income inequality measures are decreasing over time for all
measures except the WIID Ginis.
The last thing worth mentioning is that although almost nothing is significant in
the LIS specifications, the included variables explain over 50% of the variation in the
differences between the two measures. Given that the LIS data are of high quality and the
most consistently measured data source of the four measures included, this suggests that
the other measures still suffer from a substantial amount of measurement error. Apart
from the abovementioned change in the industrial classification scheme to a new and more
crude version, this might be the main reason for the lack of a robust association between
the Theil index and other measures of income inequality in the previous estimations.
Overall, - measurement error - new classification (given that the new UTIP index also
does not )
3.6 Conclusion
The core of this paper is the construction of a Theil index of between-sectoral wage in-
equality for the manufacturing industry, based on the UNIDO industrial statistics. A very
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similar index has been built by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) for the
years 1970 to 2008; however, their UTIP-UNIDO index does not include any information
on within-sectoral inequality, and it is not clear which sectors are included in the index
every year, and in which cases previous versions of the UNIDO industrial statistics have
been used directly, or through smoothing out differences with previous versions of the
UTIP index. I have therefore recalculated the Theil index for the 48-year time period
from 1963 to 2010 for which data was available at the time of writing of this paper. The
index relies exclusively on the UNIDO industrial statistics (Rev. 3), which provide data at
the 2-digit sector level. I provide detailed information with respect to the sectors covered
in each country, as well as the imputation methods used and further variables from the
UNIDO incorporated into the same. I then make a recommendation as to which version
can be used best in the context of dynamic empirical applications of wage inequality based
on an analysis of different versions of the Theil index, reflecting the trade-off between time
and sectoral coverage.
The narrow scope of the wage inequality measure, on the one hand, has the advantage
of being consistently defined across countries and years, but, on the other hand, restricts
the applicability of the index. This paper argues that the latter point is one of the
main drawbacks of the index, and presents evidence that its generalizability is severely
limited. This applies not only to the extent to which the index allows conjectures about
the overall level of income inequality in a society. There is reason to also question the
”internal” capability of the index to accurately reflect developments in manufacturing
wage inequality. Because it relies on sector-level data on wages and employment which is
aggregated at the 2-digit level of industrial classification, the index only measures between-
sectoral wage inequality and cannot give account of inequality within sectors. Using data
provided at the more disaggregated 3- and 4-digit level, the potential magnitude of within-
sectoral inequality is estimated to be at least 40 percent of overall manufacturing wage
inequality. Moreover, I find that the between-sectoral index is not generally able to trace
changes in between-sectoral inequality over time, contrary to what has been argued by
Conceição and Galbraith (2000). Using more detailed sector-level data, I find that looking
only at changes in between-sectoral inequality leads to an erroneous image of developments
in overall manufacturing wage inequality in around 13% of cases. Given that the sector-
level data still do not account for individual inequality within sectors, the true error is
likely to be larger and remains open to further exploration.
The analysis of the ”external” validity of the index, that is, the extent to which the
Theil index is representative of overall income inequality, builds on prior work by Galbraith
and Kum (2005), and Galbraith et al. (2015). The authors argue in favor of a stable
relationship between the narrowly defined Theil index of wage inequality and the Gini
indices of income inequality provided in the WIID and other data sources, which comprise
other components besides labor market income. Their finding cannot be confirmed in a
broader setting which employs several additional, arguably more consistent, measures of
income inequality. Going one step further, this paper tries to find out what causes the
measures to show such a weak association with the Theil index, given that there are good
theoretical reasons to expect a strong link between them. The deviations between the
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Theil index and the other measures of income inequality are regressed on a number of
potential explanatory variables. The explanatory power of this model is much lower than
for the approach in which both measures are directly regressed on each other, and the
coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables are not very insightful. Nevertheless,
a few stylized facts emerge. A baseline difference of around 4.5-9.5% between the Theil
index and measures of income inequality is found. Furthermore, the signs and robustness
of the two ”internal” variables, sectoral coverage and the number of imputations, might
indicate that there are more missing data points in countries where wage- and income
inequality are more similar. Although they do not matter much in the association of the
level variables, they are able to explain part of the deviations of the two measures.
In sum, while a measure of between-sectoral wage inequality certainly has its merits
and is a valuable resource for empirical analyses with a focus on manufacturing and/or
the development of industrial sectors, the general applicability of the index appears to be
much more limited than suggested elsewhere. Although all conclusions drawn only apply
to the inequality numbers based on the most recent industrial classification scheme used
in the UNIDO industrial statistics, given that newly added years after 2010 will - at least
for now - be in the new classification scheme as well, the relevance of these results will be










































Table 3.A.1: Deviations between the long and short versions of the Theil index by country

























































CAF 4628.98 1142.2 1489.72 0.05 0.14 8 0.0296 0 0.0604 1 Short
MDA 4546.43 483.7 1005.23 0.22 0.27 25 0.0164 0 0.0919 11 Short
NLD 691.79 81.8 181.68 0.35 0.03 14 0.0103 0 0.0254 5 Short
NZL 649.09 128.9 133.09 0.93 0.96 24 0.0415 0 0.1268 4 Long
BWA 520.4 161.8 130.33 0.96 0.92 13 0.0964 3.54 0.73 1.75 1 1 0.2419 8 11 Long
ROU 402.39 75.6 90.66 0.53 0.92 21 0.0538 0 0.0472 6 Long
HUN 359 27.2 85.61 0.09 0.51 18 0.0246 0 0.0568 5 Short
MUS 235.51 24.4 52.81 0.98 0.96 43 0.0586 0 0.0683 4 Long
MLT 225.96 60.3 62.46 0.68 0.47 14 0.0128 0 0.029 7 Short
MDG 218.44 81.7 68.62 0.96 0.92 29 0.0463 0 0.0427 5 Long
JAM 192.6 56.5 65.51 0.77 0.64 44 0.15 11.89 4.18 4.85 0.99 0.99 0.2936 23 7 Short
SWE 102.18 16.2 23.8 0.91 0.41 20 0.0054 0 0.0083 5 Short
FIN 97.21 21.9 31.3 0.76 0.8 19 0.0107 0.21 0.03 0.11 1 1 0.0125 15 5 Short
MEX 96.72 17.2 28.82 0.96 0.87 22 0.0517 0.04 0.04 0.0641 1 5 Long
MNG 76.36 13.4 21.2 0.91 0.9 17 0.0842 2.72 -0.36 0.82 1 1 0.09 16 5 Long
DZA 60.09 20.1 25.27 0.83 0.78 14 0.0165 0 0.008 10 Short
LSO 59.87 47.8 9.72 0.81 0.49 9 0.2062 0 0.1371 5 Short
MWI 57.98 15.2 16.39 1 0.98 32 0.0948 6.09 0.59 1.76 1 1 0.0812 25 4 Long
AZE 51.08 18 14.36 0.92 0.86 16 0.1113 0 0.1608 5 Long
AUS 49.72 14.1 19.94 1 1 14 0.0526 0 0.1456 4 Long
FRA 46.83 24 10.49 0.86 0.8 20 0.0285 0 0.0177 5 Short
SWZ 43.11 9.4 14.72 0.97 0.94 11 0.1115 0 0.1003 7 Long
BRA 40.89 8 9.4 0.7 0.39 15 0.124 0 0.122 5 Short
GBR 40.48 9.6 9.82 0.86 0.83 17 0.0144 0 0.0182 5 Short
SGP 40.35 32.8 4.08 0.95 0.66 20 0.0598 2.7 -1.53 0.68 1 1 0.0374 20 5 Short
AUT 37.14 14.5 11.25 0.77 0.77 20 0.0166 0.94 -0.07 0.4 1 1 0.0197 15 5 Short
ALB 29.94 7.5 12.23 0.98 0.98 11 0.0689 0.65 0.06 0.61 1 1 0.1045 3 9 Long
SVK 28.02 11.7 8.05 0.98 0.84 17 0.0249 0 0.0277 1 Short
HRV 27.2 8.6 6.92 0.95 0.89 14 0.0296 0 0.0406 5 Long
MYS 26.59 19.8 3.27 0.89 0.77 11 0.0332 0 0.0342 5 Short
POL 26.44 6.2 8.71 0.96 0.87 18 0.0154 0 0.0282 5 Long
CHN 24.94 13.6 9.95 0.84 0.99 8 0.0785 0 0.0292 5 Long
HTI* 24.35 10 11.88 0.94 0.99 10 0.104 3.48 2.04 0.6 1 1 0.1096 10 2 Long









































UGA* 22.83 6.4 8.48 1 1 23 0.109 0.1092 4 Long
KOR 20.83 11 5.43 0.98 0.87 17 0.024 0 0.0212 5 Long
SUR* 19.11 3.5 5.97 1 0.98 19 0.0488 0.0514 7 Long
SEN* 18.46 7.7 7.26 0.92 0.97 5 0.041 0.0418 5 Long
ISR 17.23 4 5.2 0.99 0.92 46 0.0485 0 0.0713 4 Long
TTO* 17.14 2.7 5.86 1 0.99 8 0.1525 0.1569 5 Long
TON* 16.33 4.9 6.66 0.99 0.98 9 0.0626 0.0627 5 Long
MAC 16.27 6.1 5.31 1 0.99 11 0.014 0 0.0258 2 Long
PRT 15.37 10.3 2.67 0.99 0.98 15 0.0489 0 0.0508 5 Long
GRC 14.14 6.1 3.46 0.98 0.93 15 0.0284 0.07 -0.03 0.05 1 1 0.031 6 5 Long
PHL 14.08 9.1 5.21 0.99 0.98 13 0.055 0 0.0503 5 Long
SVN 13.63 2 3.59 1 0.98 24 0.0246 2.41 -1.08 0.79 1 1 0.0275 11 6 Long
ITA 13.6 6.2 4.2 0.93 0.98 19 0.0179 0 0.0186 5 Long
NOR 13.55 6 7.27 0.99 0.99 18 0.0107 0 0.014 5 Long
ECU 13.06 5 4.36 0.99 1 14 0.0408 0 0.0547 5 Long
LUX 12.45 4 4.98 1 1 20 0.03 0 0.039 4 Long
IDN 11.35 4 3.94 1 1 20 0.0854 0 0.0968 6 Long
BOL 11.3 3.8 5.55 0.92 0.94 7 0.0543 0 0.0789 5 Long
TUN 11.14 4.9 4 1 1 33 0.1527 0 0.1276 4 Long
IRL* 10.61 5 4.6 0.98 0.91 19 0.0166 10.48 -4.02 3.37 0.99 0.97 0.0154 19 5 Long
COUNTRIES WITH ABSOLUTE DEVIATIONS OF LESS THAN 10%
USA 9.11 5.3 4.97 0.98 0.95 11 0.0251 5
JPN 8.76 3.6 3.15 1 0.99 26 0.0418 6
TUR 8.6 3.2 2.42 1 1 18 0.0505 5
MKD 8.37 2.8 3.73 0.99 0.97 11 0.0634 5
JOR 8.1 3 3.21 0.99 1 37 0.0839 6
UKR 8.08 5.8 2 1 0.99 11 0.0465 5
DNK 7.97 2.9 3.64 0.99 0.99 18 0.007 5
EGY 7.82 2.1 2.91 1 0.99 14 0.0523 5
LBY 7.6 7.6 1 0.0376 1
THA 7 4.9 2.8 1 0.98 11 0.0578 5
PNG 6.97 2.8 2.19 1 1 15 0.0806 2
MAR 6.89 3.6 2.25 1 0.98 12 0.0911 6
COL 6.71 4.2 1.35 1 0.99 11 0.0346 4
LKA 6.44 4.2 4.12 1 1 5 0.062 5
PSE 6.36 4 3.65 1 0.99 14 0.0377 6
ZAF 6.34 3.5 1.57 1 0.99 20 0.0566 5
ARG 6.24 2.9 1.47 1 1 10 0.0524 4
PER 6.18 4 1.75 1 0.99 12 0.2091 5
BRB 5.57 2.3 2.52 0.99 0.99 11 0.055 5
CZE 5.05 1.1 1.28 1 0.99 20 0.0099 6
URY 5.02 3.1 1.4 1 1 11 0.0452 5
CAN 4.97 2.1 1.88 0.99 0.99 21 0.0183 4
PAN 4.9 1.3 1.82 1 1 14 0.0589 2
SYR 4.87 2 2.28 1 1 15 0.1205 4









































BGD 4.76 3.5 3.42 1 1 4 0.0299 5
BGR 4.68 1.6 1.97 1 1 16 0.0841 6
KGZ 4.62 1.3 1.73 1 1 17 0.1636 5
KWT 4.42 3.6 0.74 1 0.89 3 0.2844 5
IND 4.33 1.4 1.94 0.98 0.95 12 0.0778 5
NPL 4.04 1 1.89 1 1 6 0.0635 9
CYP 3.97 1.5 2 1 1 12 0.0286 5
IRN 3.54 1.6 0.86 1 1 12 0.035 5
BEL 3.28 1.1 1.38 1 1 15 0.0566 5
FJI 2.87 0.9 1.06 1 1 32 0.5819 5
SOM 3.16 3.2 1 0.044 2
CHE 2.83 1.7 1.11 1 1 3 0.0229 1
CIV 2.58 1.9 0.7 1 1 4 0.052 2
QAT 2.06 0.9 0.62 1 1 11 0.3886 7
GEO 1.94 0.6 0.85 1 1 5 0.061 2
PAK 1.64 1.6 1 0.0556 4
CHL 1.55 1.2 0.71 1 1 8 0.0606 4
RUS 1.44 0.6 0.45 1 1 9 0.0494 4
PRY 0.72 0.7 1 0.0277 3
Notes.
HTI: Sectors 16, 18, 28, 29, and 34 have imputed values for years 1988-1997. A short version of the index (including sectors 19 and 32) would therefore mean that those other
sectors should be dropped, and consistency would still not be established. One alternative would be to have two different, non-comparable short versions for Haiti: one from
1988-1997, and one from 1968-1987. The long version of the index displays larger deviations of around 20% only in the last 4 years (1994-1997), despite the fact that the
same 2 sectors are omitted throughout - sectoral composition is therefore not driving the differences in the deviations between the long- and full versions. Because of the high
correlation between the two measures over time in both levels and differences, retaining the long version seems justifiable.
UGA: For Uganda, the long version is retained despite deviations of up to 22% in first few years since including the sector causing this deviation (27) would effectively mean
a time coverage of only four years from 1963-1966. Additionally, the contribution of the sector causing the deviation is vanishing over time and in the second time spell where
data for the sector is present, the deviations are very small (between 2 and 7.5%), in line with the decrease in absolute size of the sector. Additionally, Uganda has a low
average deviation of around 6% and almost perfect co-movement of the long- with the full version over time, as indicated by correlation coefficients which round up to one at
2 digits.
SUR: In Suriname, the index would decrease from 20 to only four years of data coverage in the short version. I have therefore decided to keep the long version given that the
maximum deviation of 19% only arises in the first year of data (1974) and keeps decreasing thereafter to around 13% in 1975 and 1976 and 10% in 1977. Assuming that the
downward trend continues, sacrificing 16 years of data for achieving higher accuracy of supposedly less than 10% seems unreasonable. The very high correlation of the long-
with the full version in both levels and differences also supports the long version.
SEN: In Senegal, keeping the sectors causing the deviation of around 18.5% would leave only 5 years of data (1998-2002). Given that only a single year has such a high
deviation (again, this is not because more sectors are omitted in that year) and the correlations over time are fairly high, the long version is retained.
TTO: In Trinidad and Tobago, only a single year (1998) is causing the deviation of around 17%. Upon closer inspection of the data, this deviation can be traced back to what
is likely to be a glitch in the data, with employee numbers in sector 35 suddenly dropping to 16 (160 being a much more reasonable number) before rising again to 176 in 1999.
This drop is also not warranted by changes in any other variables, or by a similar drop in other sectors in that year.
TON: In Tonga, sector 35 is responsible for the one-year deviation of around 16% in 1991. The contribution of the sectors is decreasing thereafter and the deviations are very
small. While this does not point towards a lower contribution of the sector in the years preceding 1991, keeping only the years 1991-2004 for which data are provided in sector
35 would lead to another problem: many other sectors have 0s for wages and employees in the later years, making the short index not very informative for the overall level
and development of inequality in the country. Given the low average deviation of less than 5%, and the high correlation of the long- and full indices, retaining the long version
therefore seems like the better option.
IRL: In Ireland, changing to the short version requires the dropping of two sectors (23 and 36) which have a lot of imputed data in the years covered by the ”short” version.









































Table 3.A.2: Overview of the Theil index by country
country code country years sectors imputed dynamic version region dev. status Theil(normalized) Theil standard deviation Theil
AFG Afghanistan 9 9 6 long SA developing 0.0023 0.00497 0.00519
ALB Albania 18 12 40 long ECANA developing 0.0292 0.06891 0.05679
ARG Argentina 19 18 72 long LAC developed 0.0182 0.05239 0.01377
AUS Australia 44 18 184 long EAP developed 0.0181 0.05263 0.08744
AUT Austria 20 18 80 short ECANA developed 0.0067 0.01973 0.00277
AZE Azerbaijan 21 18 49 long ECANA developing 0.0386 0.11126 0.0596
BDI Burundi 23 18 166 long SSA developing 0.0235 0.06206 0.0324
BEL Belgium 47 18 130 long ECANA developed 0.0181 0.05659 0.06289
BEN Benin 8 18 9 long SSA developing 0.0256 0.07825 0.01784
BFA Burkina Faso 10 18 0 long SSA developing 0.0115 0.03322 0.02159
BGD Bangladesh 32 18 144 long SA developing 0.0096 0.02987 0.02131
BGR Bulgaria 48 17 55 long ECANA developing 0.0293 0.08411 0.04892
BLZ Belize 4 16 24 long LAC developing 0.035 0.1149 0.07713
BOL Bolivia 32 18 22 long LAC developing 0.0188 0.05431 0.02979
BRA Brazil 15 18 636 short LAC developing 0.0394 0.12196 0.01522
BRB Barbados 28 12 0 long LAC developed 0.0221 0.055 0.01579
BWA Botswana 30 8 73 long SSA developing 0.038 0.0964 0.08864
CAF Central African Republic 8 16 64 short SSA developing 0.0211 0.06039 0.01242
CAN Canada 48 18 24 long ECANA developed 0.0063 0.01831 0.0037
CHE Switzerland 11 19 158 long ECANA developed 0.0034 0.02285 0.01407
CHL Chile 46 18 65 long LAC developed 0.021 0.06057 0.02375
CHN China 34 18 294 long EAP developing 0.0272 0.07853 0.09696
CIV Cte d’Ivoire 22 15 9 long SSA developing 0.0194 0.05199 0.01735
CMR Cameroon 33 18 205 long SSA developing 0.0382 0.10795 0.06666
COG Congo 21 14 142 long SSA developing 0.0222 0.06684 0.02836
COL Colombia 48 18 78 long LAC developing 0.0119 0.03459 0.00721
CRI Costa Rica 41 18 364 long LAC developing 0.0118 0.05152 0.02943
CUB Cuba 15 14 42 long LAC developing 0.0015 0.00477 0.00293
CYP Cyprus 48 18 30 long ECANA developed 0.0099 0.02861 0.00953
CZE Czech Republic 21 17 38 long ECANA developed 0.0035 0.00988 0.00389
DEU Germany 27 18 72 long ECANA developed 0.0015 0.00438 0.00563
DNK Denmark 47 18 152 long ECANA developed 0.0022 0.00699 0.00289
DOM Dominican Rep. 23 18 0 long LAC developing 0.0219 0.06321 0.02334
DZA Algeria 14 8 48 short MENA developing 0.0028 0.00802 0.00273
ECU Ecuador 46 18 2 long LAC developing 0.0141 0.04084 0.01833
EGY Egypt 47 18 256 long MENA developing 0.0147 0.05229 0.04363
ERI Eritrea 19 23 9 long SSA developing 0.0134 0.04191 0.02442
ESP Spain 47 18 6 long ECANA developed 0.0095 0.02757 0.00788









































country code country years sectors imputed dynamic version region dev. status Theil(normalized) Theil standard deviation Theil
ETH Ethiopia 20 23 7 long SSA developing 0.0117 0.0365 0.02189
FIN Finland 19 18 24 short ECANA developed 0.0041 0.01247 0.00482
FJI Fiji 42 15 276 long EAP developing 0.0203 0.05819 0.04232
FRA France 20 18 339 short ECANA developed 0.006 0.01766 0.00208
GAB Gabon 16 18 181 long SSA developing 0.0326 0.10511 0.04791
GBR United Kingdom 17 18 171 short ECANA developed 0.0059 0.01825 0.00366
GEO Georgia 13 21 20 long ECANA developing 0.0202 0.06097 0.0227
GHA Ghana 25 18 0 long SSA developing 0.0328 0.09483 0.03213
GMB Gambia 8 18 0 long SSA developing 0.0049 0.01419 0.00389
GRC Greece 45 18 146 long ECANA developed 0.0098 0.02839 0.00401
GTM Guatemala 31 18 180 long LAC developing 0.0284 0.07959 0.06715
HKG Hong Kong 35 18 29 long EAP developed 0.0092 0.02642 0.03769
HND Honduras 34 18 233 long LAC developing 0.0239 0.06183 0.03547
HRV Croatia 25 18 12 long ECANA developed 0.0103 0.02959 0.01218
HTI Haiti 30 17 121 long LAC developing 0.0415 0.10405 0.09331
HUN Hungary 18 18 112 short ECANA developed 0.0168 0.05677 0.02448
IDN Indonesia 40 17 57 long EAP developing 0.0305 0.08543 0.03494
IND India 47 18 8 long SA developing 0.027 0.07777 0.01954
IRL Ireland 47 18 77 long ECANA developed 0.0058 0.01658 0.00319
IRN Iran 43 18 36 long MENA developing 0.012 0.03503 0.0227
IRQ Iraq 30 18 108 long MENA developing 0.0082 0.02301 0.01413
ISL Iceland 29 16 39 long ECANA developed 0.0086 0.02371 0.01183
ISR Israel 47 16 36 long MENA developed 0.0173 0.04853 0.02216
ITA Italy 43 18 18 long ECANA developed 0.0062 0.01793 0.00581
JAM Jamaica 34 11 233 short LAC developing 0.1169 0.29362 0.15091
JOR Jordan 48 17 87 long MENA developing 0.0303 0.08387 0.02922
JPN Japan 48 17 12 long EAP developed 0.0148 0.04183 0.02265
KAZ Kazakhstan 10 23 0 long ECANA developing 0.021 0.0657 0.02997
KEN Kenya 48 18 400 long SSA developing 0.0234 0.0787 0.02738
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 21 18 58 long ECANA developing 0.0569 0.16359 0.18953
KOR Korea 44 18 0 long EAP developed 0.0083 0.02396 0.00564
KWT Kuwait 44 17 210 long MENA developed 0.0912 0.28442 0.14956
LBR Liberia 3 18 0 long SSA developing 0.0192 0.0554 0.01436
LBY Libya 17 16 32 long MENA developing 0.0141 0.03762 0.03062
LKA Sri Lanka 41 18 244 long SA developing 0.0215 0.06201 0.02747
LSO Lesotho 9 7 27 short SSA developing 0.0566 0.13708 0.04618
LTU Lithuania 19 23 66 long ECANA developed 0.014 0.04312 0.01508
LUX Luxembourg 25 13 52 long ECANA developed 0.0141 0.02996 0.0307
LVA Latvia 19 21 101 long ECANA developed 0.0139 0.04154 0.04273
MAC Macao 30 18 94 long EAP developed 0.0056 0.01396 0.01243









































country code country years sectors imputed dynamic version region dev. status Theil(normalized) Theil standard deviation Theil
MDA Moldova 10 3 18 short ECANA developing 0.036 0.09187 0.05026
MDG Madagascar 29 15 75 long SSA developing 0.012 0.04632 0.05341
MEX Mexico 27 18 224 long LAC developing 0.0146 0.05173 0.03196
MKD Macedonia 21 18 97 long ECANA developing 0.022 0.06341 0.03355
MLT Malta 14 16 54 short MENA developed 0.0094 0.029 0.02796
MNG Mongolia 19 18 102 long EAP developing 0.0312 0.08422 0.03902
MOZ Mozambique 26 18 252 long SSA developing 0.0507 0.1965 0.19345
MUS Mauritius 43 15 20 long SSA developing 0.0218 0.05858 0.0268
MWI Malawi 40 11 58 long SSA developing 0.0403 0.09476 0.06529
MYS Malaysia 11 18 46 short EAP developing 0.011 0.03418 0.00308
NGA Nigeria 34 18 216 long SSA developing 0.0106 0.02885 0.01468
NIC Nicaragua 21 18 0 long LAC developing 0.005 0.01453 0.00502
NLD Netherlands 14 18 66 short ECANA developed 0.0087 0.02539 0.02359
NOR Norway 46 18 78 long ECANA developed 0.0037 0.01067 0.006
NPL Nepal 13 14 58 long SA developing 0.0254 0.06354 0.03242
NZL New Zealand 47 18 295 long EAP developed 0.0165 0.0415 0.08545
OMN Oman 18 22 22 long MENA developed 0.0357 0.10944 0.03435
PAK Pakistan 44 18 432 long SA developing 0.0159 0.05563 0.02346
PAN Panama 43 18 228 long LAC developing 0.0217 0.05888 0.02269
PER Peru 28 18 177 long LAC developing 0.0676 0.20908 0.16057
PHL Philippines 46 18 152 long EAP developing 0.0188 0.05496 0.01344
PNG Papua New Guinea 25 16 0 long EAP developing 0.0291 0.08062 0.02301
POL Poland 40 18 130 long ECANA developed 0.005 0.01541 0.01157
PRI Puerto Rico 20 18 144 long LAC developed 0.0319 0.1185 0.08301
PRT Portugal 20 18 142 long ECANA developed 0.0172 0.04886 0.01008
PRY Paraguay 2 17 0 long LAC developing 0.0098 0.02766 0.00007
QAT Qatar 25 13 189 long MENA developed 0.0134 0.38861 0.05925
ROU Romania 33 17 124 long ECANA developing 0.1512 0.0538 0.07169
RUS Russia 15 18 0 long ECANA developed 0.0191 0.04944 0.01314
SEN Senegal 29 18 120 long SSA developing 0.0171 0.04101 0.02397
SGP Singapore 20 18 40 short EAP developed 0.0158 0.03737 0.00509
SLV El Salvador 36 18 216 long LAC developing 0.0124 0.0407 0.02331
SOM Somalia 14 16 6 long SSA developing 0.0141 0.04401 0.02047
SRB Serbia and Montenegro 12 18 90 long ECANA developing 0.016 0.12232 0.11691
SUR Suriname 20 11 0 long LAC developing 0.0427 0.04876 0.02528
SVK Slovakia 17 21 18 short ECANA developed 0.0203 0.02772 0.00936
SVN Slovenia 24 17 66 long ECANA developed 0.0091 0.02459 0.00939
SWE Sweden 20 18 38 short ECANA developed 0.009 0.00829 0.00549
SWZ Swaziland 24 5 30 long SSA developing 0.0027 0.11148 0.04479
SYR Syria 48 18 267 long MENA developing 0.069 0.12055 0.05836









































country code country years sectors imputed dynamic version region dev. status Theil(normalized) Theil standard deviation Theil
TON Tonga 30 18 175 long EAP developing 0.0225 0.06259 0.06513
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 42 17 257 long LAC developed 0.0223 0.15252 0.08948
TUN Tunisia 37 14 116 long MENA developing 0.0505 0.15268 0.13522
TUR Turkey 47 18 42 long ECANA developing 0.0369 0.05052 0.03092
TWN Taiwan 29 18 72 long EAP developed 0.0173 0.01477 0.00341
TZA Tanzania 43 18 349 long SSA developing 0.0051 0.08027 0.03656
UGA Uganda 23 10 26 long SSA developing 0.0279 0.10898 0.0796
UKR Ukraine 19 18 6 long ECANA developing 0.0488 0.04651 0.01613
URY Uruguay 41 18 216 long LAC developed 0.0161 0.04516 0.01753
USA United States 45 18 54 long ECANA developed 0.0158 0.02505 0.00448
VEN Venezuela 35 18 72 long LAC developed 0.0086 0.04673 0.01972
YEM Yemen 9 17 18 long MENA developing 0.0156 0.08202 0.02211
ZAF South Africa 48 18 223 long SSA developing 0.0289 0.05658 0.00942
ZMB Zambia 22 17 146 long SSA developing 0.0046 0.0518 0.01617
Notes. The column ”years” is the number of total (not necessarily consecutive) years covered for each country. ”Sectors” refers to the number of ISIC 2-digit level sectors
on which the Theil index is based. ”Imputed” contains the total number of imputed data points across all sectors and years. It should be noted that this number tends rise
with higher time coverage. ”dynv” is short for ”dynamic version” and contains the recommendation as to which version in the case of deviations between the two version
of more than 10% in any year, with the exceptions discussed in appendix table 3.A.1. ”Region” refers to the geographic region and relies on the World Bank classification.
SSH=Sub-Saharan Africa, SA=South Asia, LAC=Latin America and Caribbean, ECANA=Europe, Central Asia, and North America, MENA=Middle East and North Africa,
and EAP=East Asia and Pacific. ”Devstat” refers to the classification of countries as developed or developing and relies on the World Bank categorization, which is based on
GNI. Theil(n) is the normalized version of the Theil index. The standard deviation in the last column is for the non-normalized version of the Theil.
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AFG 6 9 22 0.982 0.979 59.3 59.3
ALB 40 18 19 0.973 0.974 25.9 25.9
ARG 72 19 17 0.999 0.997 0.9 0.9
AUS 184 44 40 0.568 -0.393 21.1 21.1
AUT 80 20 44 0.673 0.584 12.5 12.5
AZE 49 21 17 0.973 0.749 11.3 11.3
BDI 166 23 17 1 1 0 0
BEL 130 47 42 0.136 -0.054 22.3 22.3
BEN 9 8 7 1 1 0 0
BFA 0 10 10 1 1 0 0
BGD 144 32 28 0.997 0.97 0.6 0.6
BGR 55 48 45 -0.169 -0.152 47.5 47.5
BLZ 24 4 2 1 n/a 0 0
BOL 22 32 32 0.882 0.366 24.4 24.4
BRA 636 15 17 0.879 0.919 13.1 13.1
BRB 0 28 28 0.984 0.988 3.4 3.4
BWA 73 30 27 0.048 0.234 62.5 62.5
CAF 64 8 19 0.984 0.997 28.9 28.9
CAN 24 48 45 0.972 0.906 2 2
CHE 158 11 5 0.872 0.954 3.5 3.5
CHL 65 46 44 0.994 0.988 5.7 5.7
CHN 294 34 16 0.997 0.61 2.4 2.4
CIV 9 22 22 1 0.999 0.3 0.3
CMR 205 33 28 1 0.998 1.4 1.4
COG 142 21 14 1 1 0 0
COL 78 48 43 0.997 0.996 0.6 0.6
CRI 364 41 22 1 1 0.1 0.1
CUB 42 15 13 1 1 0 0
CYP 30 48 46 0.948 0.825 19.8 19.8
CZE 38 21 20 0.991 0.831 10 10
DEU 72 27 30 -0.454 -0.025 344.6 344.6
DNK 152 47 42 0.998 0.998 3 3
DOM 0 23 23 1 1 0 0
DZA 48 14 27 0.997 0.998 2.7 2.7
ECU 2 46 45 0.997 0.997 1.3 1.3
EGY 256 47 39 1 0.997 0.2 0.2
ERI 9 19 42 0.734 0.966 26.3 26.3
ESP 6 47 45 0.992 0.994 2.7 2.7
EST 337 19 9 -0.027 -0.599 29.3 29.3
ETH 7 20 44 0.996 0.995 0.4 0.4
FIN 24 19 45 0.931 0.751 7.5 7.5
FJI 276 42 32 0.717 0.861 13.7 13.7
FRA 339 20 30 0.902 0.934 11.8 11.8
GAB 181 16 8 1 1 0 0
GBR 171 17 41 0.647 0.508 12.7 12.7
GEO 20 13 11 0.998 0.999 1.6 1.6
GHA 0 25 28 0.191 0.619 35.6 35.6
GMB 0 8 8 0.994 1 4.2 4.2
GRC 146 45 41 0.987 0.979 1.1 1.1
GTM 180 31 26 0.996 0.831 24.1 24.1
HKG 29 35 36 0.847 0.692 12.9 12.9



























HND 233 34 26 0.178 0.1 41.1 41.1
HRV 12 25 23 0.996 0.984 3.6 3.6
HTI 121 30 21 0.288 0.423 23.8 23.8
HUN 112 18 43 0.954 0.694 8.2 8.2
IDN 57 40 36 0.903 0.922 3.8 3.8
IND 8 47 45 0.999 0.988 0.3 0.3
IRL 77 47 45 0.858 0.921 12.3 12.3
IRN 36 43 42 0.999 0.998 1.4 1.4
IRQ 108 30 27 1 1 0 0
ISL 39 29 20 0.985 0.941 3.4 3.4
ISR 36 47 44 0.996 0.944 2.1 2.1
ITA 18 43 40 0.997 0.989 1.7 1.7
JAM 233 34 34 -0.136 -0.032 57.5 57.5
JOR 87 48 42 0.743 0.471 8.1 8.1
JPN 12 48 45 0.999 0.998 1.8 1.8
KAZ 0 10 10 1 1 0 0
KEN 400 48 40 0.602 0.879 6.1 6.1
KGZ 58 21 13 0.856 0.961 24.2 24.2
KOR 0 44 44 0.995 0.989 2.1 2.1
KWT 210 44 35 1 1 0 0
LBR 0 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
LBY 32 17 17 0.984 0.94 6.7 6.7
LKA 244 41 26 0.999 1 0.5 0.5
LSO 27 9 14 0.973 0.964 4 4
LTU 66 19 16 0.984 0.954 1.5 1.5
LUX 52 25 45 0.105 0.288 20.8 20.8
LVA 101 19 16 0.686 0.143 22.8 22.8
MAC 94 30 26 0.971 0.952 13.7 13.7
MAR 64 35 33 0.99 0.961 4.7 4.7
MDA 18 10 17 0.556 -1 20.8 20.8
MDG 75 29 26 0.661 0.784 64.3 64.3
MEX 224 27 31 0.887 0.249 9.6 9.6
MKD 97 21 20 0.986 0.959 9.9 9.9
MLT 54 14 44 0.979 0.991 19.3 19.3
MNG 102 19 17 0.928 0.907 8.5 8.5
MOZ 252 26 13 0.966 1 2.1 2.1
MUS 20 43 40 0.992 0.987 9.6 9.6
MWI 58 40 35 0.971 0.958 15.1 15.1
MYS 46 11 39 0.994 0.996 2.5 2.5
NGA 216 34 28 1 1 0 0
NIC 0 21 21 1 1 0 0
NLD 66 14 43 0.473 -0.129 43.4 43.4
NOR 78 46 44 0.304 0.057 6.4 6.4
NPL 58 13 10 1 1 0.3 0.3
NZL 295 47 41 0.467 0.457 24.6 24.6
OMN 22 18 15 1 1 0 0
PAK 432 44 32 1 1 0.1 0.1
PAN 228 43 40 0.864 0.848 36 36
PER 177 28 21 1 0.996 1.6 1.6
PHL 152 46 41 0.964 0.997 2.4 2.4
PNG 0 25 27 0.997 0.998 1.7 1.7
POL 130 40 37 0.993 0.902 2.7 2.7



























PRI 144 20 12 1 1 0 0
PRT 142 20 27 0.089 -0.686 7.3 7.3
PRY 0 2 3 -1 13.7 13.7
PSE 9 14 15 0.987 0.981 8.3 8.3
QAT 189 25 15 1 1 0.4 0.4
ROU 124 33 26 0.942 0.699 14.6 14.6
RUS 0 15 44 0.999 0.999 0.8 0.8
SEN 120 29 29 0.979 0.968 17.2 17.2
SGP 40 20 46 0.986 0.968 6.1 6.1
SLV 216 36 28 1 1 0 0
SOM 6 14 12 0.978 0.966 2 2
SRB 90 12 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
SUR 0 20 24 0.997 0.985 3.3 3.3
SVK 18 17 17 0.918 0.823 14.6 14.6
SVN 66 24 22 0.933 0.86 13.6 13.6
SWE 38 20 38 0.903 0.67 21.1 21.1
SWZ 30 24 26 0.985 0.968 4.9 4.9
SYR 267 48 28 0.94 0.719 43.8 43.8
THA 588 39 23 0.885 0.622 7 7
TON 175 30 23 0.998 0.996 2.5 2.5
TTO 257 42 26 0.997 0.992 0.7 0.7
TUN 116 37 29 1 0.999 6.2 6.2
TUR 42 47 43 1 0.998 0.5 0.5
TWN 72 29 25 1 1 0 0
TZA 349 43 34 0.875 0.878 9.1 9.1
UGA 26 23 21 -0.016 -0.01 56.1 56.1
UKR 6 19 19 0.992 0.996 4.1 4.1
URY 216 41 32 0.985 0.859 2.9 2.9
USA 54 45 42 0.714 0.424 3 3
VEN 72 35 34 0.938 0.837 38.1 38.1
YEM 18 9 10 0.051 0.431 33.5 33.5
YUG 0 27 35 1 1 0 0
ZAF 223 48 41 0.969 0.953 1.8 1.8
ZMB 146 22 18 0.983 0.977 7.4 7.4
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Table 3.A.4: Imputed values vs. dropping of sectors: RE and FE results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE se FE se, r RE se RE se, r
Imputations 3.030*** (0.466) 3.030** (1.225) 3.111*** (0.460) 3.111*** (1.154)
Dropped
sectors -5.282*** (0.815) -5.282 (3.444) -2.396*** (0.607) -2.396 (1.817)
1964.year 1.090 (13.44) 1.090 (1.367)
1965.year 0.915 (13.25) 0.915 (1.908)
1966.year -0.912 (13.15) -0.912 (2.741)
1967.year 2.733 (12.86) 2.733 (3.271)
1968.year -0.793 (12.36) -0.793 (3.941)
1969.year -1.377 (12.61) -1.377 (4.602)
1970.year -0.557 (12.48) -0.557 (4.956)
1971.year -2.374 (12.34) -2.374 (5.034)
1972.year 0.193 (12.41) 0.193 (5.308)
1973.year 3.219 (12.34) 3.219 (6.548)
1974.year 3.266 (12.22) 3.266 (6.888)
1975.year 2.218 (12.20) 2.218 (7.074)
1976.year 3.129 (12.21) 3.129 (7.159)
1977.year 0.184 (12.13) 0.184 (7.882)
1978.year 4.355 (12.13) 4.355 (7.570)
1979.year -0.618 (12.13) -0.618 (6.960)
1980.year 4.184 (12.07) 4.184 (8.647)
1981.year 2.055 (12.07) 2.055 (9.078)
1982.year 0.204 (12.10) 0.204 (9.514)
1983.year -4.433 (12.10) -4.433 (9.099)
1984.year -5.342 (12.10) -5.342 (10.06)
1985.year -41.32*** (12.09) -41.32 (37.52)
1986.year -6.042 (12.08) -6.042 (13.27)
1987.year -7.133 (12.05) -7.133 (13.97)
1988.year -13.52 (12.20) -13.52 (16.13)
1989.year -8.212 (12.17) -8.212 (14.38)
1990.year 1.174 (12.05) 1.174 (7.983)
1991.year 2.955 (11.99) 2.955 (8.181)
1992.year 2.617 (12.13) 2.617 (8.634)
1993.year 5.108 (12.10) 5.108 (9.354)
1994.year -4.776 (11.97) -4.776 (9.583)
1995.year -6.343 (12.20) -6.343 (11.63)
1996.year 11.93 (12.19) 11.93 (13.04)
1997.year 12.82 (12.26) 12.82 (14.22)
1998.year 18.33 (12.29) 18.33 (15.03)
1999.year 17.17 (12.58) 17.17 (15.78)
2000.year 19.42 (12.39) 19.42 (15.90)
2001.year 18.17 (12.49) 18.17 (15.88)
2002.year 22.11* (12.69) 22.11 (16.88)
2003.year 17.89 (12.79) 17.89 (17.33)
2004.year 22.07* (12.80) 22.07 (16.96)
2005.year 18.88 (12.84) 18.88 (17.25)
2006.year 21.41* (12.95) 21.41 (17.46)
2007.year 23.76* (13.45) 23.76 (18.16)
2008.year 5.556 (17.10) 5.556 (25.21)
Constant 0.0131 (10.30) 0.0131 (5.216) 0.105 (4.026) 0.105 (4.081)
Observations 3,627 3,627 3,627 3,627
# of countries 135 135 135 135
R2 (within) 0.036 0.036 0.016 0.016
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variable is the percentage deviation between the dynamic version of the newly constructed
Theil index and the UTIP index. FE refers to fixed effects estimation, RE refers to random effects
estimation, se refers to the standard error, and r indicates that standard errors are robust.
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Table 3.A.5: Contribution of the 2-digit sectors to the within-component of inequality









sector mean rank mean mean rank 3 digit 4 digit
15 0.0575 1 0.209 0.01477 1 4.8 12.9
16 0 22 0.0218 0 22 1 1
17 0.0182 11 0.0934 0.00094 11 2.8 5.6
18 0.0019 21 0.0739 0.00008 20 1.6 1.6
19 0.0165 15 0.0195 0.0003 18 1.9 2.5
20 0.0175 13 0.0355 0.00065 13 1.9 4.1
21 0.0115 19 0.0294 0.00037 17 1 2.7
22 0.0232 5 0.0451 0.0012 7 2.5 5.3
23 0.0136 17 0.0315 0.00057 15 1.5 1.5
24 0.0254 4 0.0743 0.00284 3 2.5 7
25 0.0138 16 0.0376 0.0006 14 1.9 2.5
26 0.0486 2 0.0615 0.00474 2 1.9 6.1
27 0.0178 12 0.057 0.00107 10 2.6 3
28 0.0188 10 0.0611 0.00114 9 1.9 6
29 0.0224 6 0.0605 0.00122 6 2.9 11.9
30 0 23 0.0148 0 23 1 1
31 0.0193 9 0.0468 0.00056 16 5.2 5.2
32 0.0202 8 0.039 0.00066 12 2.7 2.7
33 0.0128 18 0.0138 0.00022 19 2.4 3.9
34 0.0217 7 0.0544 0.00117 8 2.5 2.5
35 0.027 3 0.0333 0.00129 5 3.3 4.8
36 0.0166 14 0.0367 0.00176 4 1.9 4.3
37 0.0105 20 0.0026 0.00004 21 1.7 1.7
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) contain the unweighted and weighted within-components and the ranking of
every 2-digit sector for each of these categories. Column (2) contains the weight and links the numbers
in columns (1) and (2). Columns (4) display the average number of sectors covered by the data at the
3- and 4-digit level.
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Table 3.A.6: Sectoral composition vs. sectoral coverage: FE and RE results
(1) (2)
Fixed effects Standard error Random effects Standard error
Subsectors 0.0261*** (0.009) 0.0245*** (0.006)
Share 15 0.799 (0.970) 0.219 (0.692)
Share 17 -0.0140 (0.950) -0.209 (0.633)
Share 18 -0.616 (0.951) -0.986 (0.653)
Share 19 -0.654 (1.306) -0.520 (1.032)
Share 20 2.989** (1.416) 1.057 (0.865)
Share 21 0.370 (1.401) -1.124 (0.843)
Share 22 -0.452 (0.967) -0.257 (0.790)
Share 23 -1.629 (1.508) -1.089 (1.061)
Share 24 -0.542 (0.976) -0.725 (0.695)
Share 25 0.604 (1.037) 0.640 (0.911)
Share 26 1.135 (1.040) 0.735 (0.649)
Share 27 -1.132 (0.817) -1.301** (0.636)
Share 28 0.658 (0.866) -0.00429 (0.736)
Share 29 -0.181 (0.900) -0.476 (0.754)
Share 31 -0.489 (1.231) -0.761 (0.904)
Share 32 -0.578 (0.902) -0.788 (0.764)
Share 33 -0.108 (1.516) 1.158 (1.376)
Share 34 -0.446 (1.028) -1.049* (0.618)
Share 35 -0.567 (0.877) -0.451 (0.657)
Share 36 -2.478* (1.297) -2.267* (1.232)
Share 37 2.189 (2.656) -0.343 (1.824)
Constant 26.44 (85.10) 57.99 (62.20)
Year FE YES YES
Observations 429 429
R2 0.465
# of countries 53 53
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
share of within-sectoral inequality in percent. Numbers 15 to 37 refer to the 2-digit sector’s wage share in
total manufacturing wages and are also in percent. High variation samples 1 and to refer to subsamples of
countries with above-average variation in sectoral coverage (1), and countries with one standard deviation
above the average variation (2). Note that a Hausman test clearly rejects the random effects model at the
<1% significance level.
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Table 3.A.7: Relationship between Theil and income inequality: FE results, extended
model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wiid swiid n swiid m lis silc wb
ln(Theil) 0.0168 0.00776 0.00521 -0.00260 0.0272 0.00956
(0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0323) (0.0166) (0.0177)
GDPpc -9.46e-07 1.42e-06 9.69e-07 -4.10e-06 -2.30e-06 1.23e-06
(3.02e-06) (2.02e-06) (2.50e-06) (3.58e-06) (2.86e-06) (5.35e-06)
Population growth -5.58e-05 0.00505 0.00727 0.0121 -0.0185 -0.00472
(0.0130) (0.0101) (0.0110) (0.0347) (0.0131) (0.0169)
Share urban -0.00950** 0.00206 -0.00148 0.0205* -0.00365 0.00770**
(0.00408) (0.00312) (0.00374) (0.0118) (0.00512) (0.00314)
Manuf. value added -0.00683* -0.00323* -0.00430** -0.00439 -0.00244 0.000585
(0.00356) (0.00188) (0.00196) (0.00773) (0.00593) (0.00334)
Trade openness 0.000746* 0.000148 2.53e-05 0.00101 0.000423 0.000440
(0.000447) (0.000310) (0.000364) (0.000802) (0.000526) (0.000494)
Price level of inv. 0.0217 0.0463 0.0589 -0.116 0.107 0.0839
(0.0559) (0.0328) (0.0366) (0.0919) (0.0920) (0.0619)
# imputed -0.00244** 0.000900 0.00118 -0.00306 0.00157 -0.00101
(0.00120) (0.00123) (0.00156) (0.00320) (0.00152) (0.00174)
Tfp 0.264** 0.0612 0.0780 0.329 0.321** 0.210*

















1972.year 0.409*** -0.0242 -0.00968
(0.108) (0.0240) (0.0421)




1975.year -0.0259 -0.0137 -0.0276
(0.0297) (0.0254) (0.0439)






1979.year 0.343*** -0.00225 -0.0101
(0.0797) (0.0412) (0.0478)




1982.year 0.262*** -0.0361 -0.0451
(0.0886) (0.0417) (0.0561)
1983.year 0.0258 -0.0286 -0.0392 -0.0656
(0.115) (0.0379) (0.0547) (0.0744)
1984.year 0.319*** -0.0449 -0.0506 0.0381 -0.0814
(0.0954) (0.0374) (0.0537) (0.0686) (0.0658)
1985.year 0.207* -0.0447 -0.0491 -0.0870
(0.120) (0.0361) (0.0501) (0.0841)
1986.year 0.246*** -0.0494 -0.0458 0.00666 -0.104
(0.0629) (0.0337) (0.0487) (0.0343) (0.105)
1987.year 0.292*** -0.0585 -0.0535 -0.0425
(0.0851) (0.0370) (0.0513) (0.0582)
1988.year 0.329*** -0.0583 -0.0465 -0.0873
(0.0826) (0.0391) (0.0534) (0.0811)
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1989.year 0.291*** -0.0638 -0.0447 0.0680 -0.0436
(0.0691) (0.0415) (0.0558) (0.0436) (0.0821)
1990.year 0.322*** -0.0715 -0.0460 -0.0986
(0.0744) (0.0479) (0.0606) (0.0800)
1991.year 0.213** -0.0519 -0.0248 -0.0291 -0.0708
(0.0867) (0.0476) (0.0610) (0.0574) (0.0830)
1992.year 0.284*** -0.0502 -0.0188 0.0772 -0.101
(0.0748) (0.0488) (0.0621) (0.0524) (0.0878)
1993.year 0.261*** -0.0401 0.000750 0.0759 -0.0755
(0.0786) (0.0496) (0.0631) (0.0524) (0.0885)
1994.year 0.330*** -0.0393 0.00168 0.0710 -0.120
(0.0760) (0.0508) (0.0639) (0.0623) (0.0777)
1995.year 0.342*** -0.0312 0.00722 0.0525 -0.0759
(0.0761) (0.0526) (0.0645) (0.0505) (0.0819)
1996.year 0.319*** -0.0290 0.00663 0.0497 -0.0181 -0.0803
(0.0722) (0.0538) (0.0657) (0.0521) (0.0180) (0.0801)
1997.year 0.341*** -0.0299 0.00524 0.0368 -0.0455** -0.0911
(0.0754) (0.0554) (0.0672) (0.0507) (0.0208) (0.0797)
1998.year 0.350*** -0.0333 0.00134 0.101* -0.0341 -0.0908
(0.0732) (0.0559) (0.0682) (0.0532) (0.0276) (0.0803)
1999.year 0.346*** -0.0355 -0.00411 0.0406 -0.0331 -0.0796
(0.0758) (0.0555) (0.0682) (0.0529) (0.0236) (0.0814)
2000.year 0.325*** -0.0303 -0.000648 0.0384 -0.0153 -0.0903
(0.0748) (0.0564) (0.0701) (0.0629) (0.0349) (0.0814)
2001.year 0.327*** -0.0315 0.000166 -0.0361 -0.0162 -0.0809
(0.0712) (0.0570) (0.0709) (0.104) (0.0356) (0.0826)
2002.year 0.348*** -0.0362 -0.00356 0.0416 -0.0269 -0.0830
(0.0795) (0.0581) (0.0725) (0.0555) (0.0387) (0.0848)
2003.year 0.324*** -0.0419 -0.00447 0.0243 -0.00712 -0.0845
(0.0792) (0.0594) (0.0741) (0.0775) (0.0408) (0.0829)
2004.year 0.338*** -0.0463 -0.00648 0.0499 -0.0360 -0.111
(0.0846) (0.0601) (0.0760) (0.0708) (0.0433) (0.0825)
2005.year 0.337*** -0.0494 -0.0101 0.0327 -0.0152 -0.126
(0.0866) (0.0606) (0.0774) (0.0760) (0.0424) (0.0832)
2006.year 0.312*** -0.0585 -0.0179 -0.194 -0.0207 -0.142
(0.0935) (0.0619) (0.0790) (0.163) (0.0449) (0.0875)
2007.year 0.315*** -0.0578 -0.0158 0.00534 -0.0522 -0.152*
(0.0937) (0.0647) (0.0822) (0.0899) (0.0514) (0.0899)
2008.year 0.329*** -0.0747 -0.0279 0.143 -0.0611 -0.172*
(0.0921) (0.0650) (0.0819) (0.114) (0.0515) (0.0920)
2009.year 0.364*** -0.0637 -0.0108 -0.112 -0.0307 -0.145
(0.0839) (0.0633) (0.0789) (0.132) (0.0520) (0.0877)
2010.year 0.311*** -0.0429 -0.00323 0.0502 -0.0353 -0.199**
(0.0890) (0.0660) (0.0801) (0.0782) (0.0448) (0.0935)
Constant 3.923*** 3.479*** 3.887*** -2.838*** 3.461*** 2.991***
(0.324) (0.132) (0.181) (0.964) (0.417) (0.279)
WIID dummmies YES - - - -
Observations 620 1,521 1,511 120 256 483
R2 0.81 0.12 0.166 0.522 0.25 0.188
# of countries 66 82 82 35 28 73
Notes. Standard errors in parenthese; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
logged Gini coefficient from the data source indicated in the top row. Swiid n and swiid m refer to net and
market inequality, respectively. Silc denotes the EU SILC data and wb the WDI Gini coefficients. The
dummies for the underlying WIID categories are included in column 1 but are not shown to save space
(available upon request).
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Table 3.A.8: Relationship between Theil and income inequality: RE results, reduced model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wiid swiid n swiid m lis silc wb
ln(Theil) 0.0282** 0.00900 0.00390 0.0378 0.0799** 0.00679
(0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0259) (0.0325) (0.0161)
GDPpc -2.46e-06 3.24e-07 1.15e-06 -1.96e-06 -4.05e-06 -3.13e-06
(2.50e-06) (1.90e-06) (2.35e-06) (3.45e-06) (3.59e-06) (2.10e-06)
Population growth 0.0103 0.00623 0.00811 0.101*** 0.0276 0.00265
(0.0139) (0.00962) (0.0101) (0.0319) (0.0378) (0.0132)
Share urban -0.00347** 0.000770 -0.000387 -0.000549 -0.000786 0.00159
(0.00155) (0.00223) (0.00250) (0.00234) (0.00248) (0.00104)
Manuf. value added -0.00698** -0.00245 -0.00464*** -0.0102** -0.0120*** 0.000545
(0.00317) (0.00154) (0.00158) (0.00424) (0.00459) (0.00261)
Trade openness 0.000775** 0.000115 8.93e-05 -0.000461 -0.000414 6.48e-05
(0.000315) (0.000243) (0.000268) (0.000636) (0.000588) (0.000293)
Price level of inv. 0.00102 0.0447 0.0537 -0.444*** -0.194 0.0193
(0.0431) (0.0350) (0.0364) (0.137) (0.189) (0.0559)
# imputed -0.00128 0.00106 0.00177 0.00447 0.00176 -0.00226
(0.00119) (0.00110) (0.00152) (0.00514) (0.00518) (0.00175)
Tfp 0.313*** 0.0634 0.0800 0.671*** 0.566*** 0.226**
(0.108) (0.0514) (0.0697) (0.218) (0.176) (0.110)
# of ISIC 0.00626 0.00124 0.00351 0.0195* 0.00264 -0.00389
(0.00472) (0.00316) (0.00297) (0.0108) (0.00996) (0.00418)
ECA -0.177*** -0.204*** -0.00948 -0.0234 -0.149**
(0.0566) (0.0586) (0.0551) (0.116) (0.0599)
LAC 0.288*** 0.235*** 0.0947 0.154 0.257***
(0.0672) (0.0669) (0.0593) (0.119) (0.0662)
MENA -0.125 -0.00518 -0.0365 -0.143 0.0274
(0.0951) (0.0913) (0.0652) (0.0885) (0.0815)
NA -0.0649 -0.0950 0.0246 0.127 0.0720
(0.0931) (0.0870) (0.0802) (0.139) (0.0869)
SA -0.102 0.173 0.0246 -0.0358 -0.0549
(0.154) (0.138) (0.104) (0.164) (0.0776)
SSH 0.116 0.239*** 0.124 0.0139 0.217**

















1972.year 0.505*** -0.0200 -0.0141
(0.0602) (0.0238) (0.0401)




1975.year -0.0496** -0.00203 -0.0358
(0.0230) (0.0214) (0.0370)






1979.year 0.224*** 0.0122 -0.0200
(0.0802) (0.0326) (0.0377)




1982.year 0.224*** -0.0188 -0.0569
(0.0855) (0.0302) (0.0428)
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1983.year 0.0408 -0.0107 -0.0512 -0.0102
(0.118) (0.0271) (0.0410) (0.101)
1984.year 0.298*** -0.0268 -0.0627 -0.0767 -0.0708
(0.0993) (0.0269) (0.0404) (0.0900) (0.0834)
1985.year 0.174 -0.0265 -0.0611* -0.0442
(0.118) (0.0260) (0.0367) (0.104)
1986.year 0.206*** -0.0306 -0.0581* -0.00174 -0.0779
(0.0580) (0.0241) (0.0353) (0.0173) (0.125)
1987.year 0.280*** -0.0392 -0.0667* -0.00218
(0.0712) (0.0270) (0.0373) (0.0805)
1988.year 0.291*** -0.0377 -0.0608 -0.0135
(0.0746) (0.0290) (0.0382) (0.106)
1989.year 0.258*** -0.0417 -0.0590 0.0501 0.00678
(0.0634) (0.0309) (0.0397) (0.0651) (0.107)
1990.year 0.284*** -0.0484 -0.0622 -0.0339
(0.0641) (0.0365) (0.0433) (0.104)
1991.year 0.170** -0.0280 -0.0418 0.118* 0.00235
(0.0842) (0.0363) (0.0429) (0.0704) (0.108)
1992.year 0.242*** -0.0254 -0.0361 0.153*** -0.0289
(0.0671) (0.0386) (0.0447) (0.0578) (0.113)
1993.year 0.211*** -0.0138 -0.0177 0.287*** 0.00147
(0.0701) (0.0378) (0.0443) (0.0560) (0.116)
1994.year 0.285*** -0.0121 -0.0172 0.209*** -0.0309
(0.0672) (0.0383) (0.0445) (0.0556) (0.102)
1995.year 0.298*** -0.00373 -0.0119 0.225*** 0.0148
(0.0664) (0.0396) (0.0450) (0.0457) (0.108)
1996.year 0.274*** -0.000551 -0.0123 0.181*** -0.00717 0.00806
(0.0616) (0.0403) (0.0456) (0.0482) (0.0274) (0.103)
1997.year 0.294*** -0.000578 -0.0140 0.178*** -0.0700*** 0.0120
(0.0671) (0.0414) (0.0466) (0.0523) (0.0259) (0.102)
1998.year 0.302*** -0.00277 -0.0184 0.294*** -0.0185 0.00709
(0.0615) (0.0414) (0.0470) (0.0619) (0.0347) (0.104)
1999.year 0.299*** -0.00422 -0.0252 0.120 -0.0425 0.0205
(0.0657) (0.0405) (0.0464) (0.0851) (0.0269) (0.104)
2000.year 0.273*** 0.00229 -0.0219 0.172*** -0.0431 0.0154
(0.0660) (0.0409) (0.0475) (0.0547) (0.0294) (0.100)
2001.year 0.275*** 0.00207 -0.0216 -0.0524 -0.0602** 0.0196
(0.0617) (0.0411) (0.0478) (0.145) (0.0279) (0.100)
2002.year 0.301*** -0.00154 -0.0247 0.375* -0.0667 0.0325
(0.0709) (0.0420) (0.0492) (0.199) (0.0456) (0.102)
2003.year 0.274*** -0.00589 -0.0255 -0.00139 0.00136 0.0305
(0.0679) (0.0431) (0.0503) (0.157) (0.0414) (0.0983)
2004.year 0.291*** -0.00909 -0.0278 0.264*** -0.00221 0.00957
(0.0725) (0.0437) (0.0517) (0.0559) (0.0546) (0.0994)
2005.year 0.285*** -0.0110 -0.0321 0.158** -0.0161 0.00142
(0.0736) (0.0435) (0.0522) (0.0772) (0.0463) (0.101)
2006.year 0.259*** -0.0189 -0.0404 0.140 -0.00836 -0.00822
(0.0794) (0.0443) (0.0533) (0.131) (0.0511) (0.101)
2007.year 0.261*** -0.0164 -0.0381 0.256*** -0.0130 -0.00417
(0.0771) (0.0470) (0.0567) (0.0798) (0.0706) (0.101)
2008.year 0.284*** -0.0308 -0.0472 0.472*** 0.0110 -0.0130
(0.0775) (0.0471) (0.0569) (0.130) (0.0857) (0.101)
2009.year 0.323*** -0.0192 -0.0261 0.265*** -0.00436 -0.00359
(0.0734) (0.0458) (0.0555) (0.0953) (0.0696) (0.100)
2010.year 0.276*** 0.00240 -0.0202 0.322*** -0.00353 -0.0498
(0.0794) (0.0510) (0.0589) (0.0855) (0.0688) (0.103)
Constant 3.562*** 3.503*** 3.738*** -1.635*** 3.814*** -1.779***
(0.180) (0.129) (0.136) (0.372) (0.110) (0.520)
WIID dummmies YES - - - - -
Observations 620 1,521 1,511 120 1,741 121
R2 0.481
# of countries 66 82 82 35 100 36
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
logged Gini coefficient from the data source indicated in the top row. Swiid n and swiid m refer to net and
market inequality, respectively. Silc denotes the EU SILC data and wb the WDI Gini coefficients. The
dummies for the underlying WIID categories are included in column 1 but are not shown to save space
(available upon request).
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Table 3.A.9: Relationship between Theil and income inequality: FE results, reduced model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wiid swiid n swiid m lis silc wb
ln(Theil) 0.00909 0.0115 0.00788 0.00468 0.0315 0.00354
(0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0312) (0.0187) (0.0146)
Population growth -0.00217 0.0134** 0.0150* -0.0252 -0.0287** 0.00701
(0.0205) (0.00652) (0.00790) (0.0247) (0.0133) (0.0163)
Share urban -0.0134*** 0.00270 -0.000306 0.00753 -0.00758* 0.00802*
(0.00403) (0.00294) (0.00337) (0.00737) (0.00427) (0.00424)
Manuf. value added -0.00522 -0.00307* -0.00416** 0.00177 0.00189 -0.00120

















1972.year 0.357*** -0.0328 -0.0253
(0.102) (0.0311) (0.0364)




1975.year 0.0349** -0.0327 -0.0396
(0.0166) (0.0289) (0.0326)






1979.year 0.336*** -0.0110 -0.0234
(0.0707) (0.0423) (0.0424)




1982.year 0.342*** -0.0499 -0.0716
(0.0768) (0.0419) (0.0500)
1983.year 0.313*** -0.0341 -0.0541 -0.0979
(0.0510) (0.0396) (0.0467) (0.125)
1984.year 0.410*** -0.0529 -0.0636 0.0670 -0.0655
(0.0828) (0.0385) (0.0456) (0.0452) (0.102)
1985.year 0.300*** -0.0482 -0.0547 -0.101
(0.109) (0.0385) (0.0441) (0.133)
1986.year 0.315*** -0.0494 -0.0571 0.0416* -0.0755
(0.0520) (0.0402) (0.0457) (0.0242) (0.143)
1987.year 0.376*** -0.0536 -0.0597 -0.0241
(0.0795) (0.0434) (0.0479) (0.101)
1988.year 0.421*** -0.0516 -0.0494 -0.0488
(0.0748) (0.0448) (0.0492) (0.127)
1989.year 0.375*** -0.0587 -0.0425 0.0924** -0.00625
(0.0672) (0.0468) (0.0513) (0.0431) (0.131)
1990.year 0.415*** -0.0717 -0.0475 -0.0595
(0.0701) (0.0487) (0.0536) (0.122)
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1991.year 0.324*** -0.0512 -0.0244 -0.0149 -0.0340
(0.0744) (0.0490) (0.0545) (0.0519) (0.129)
1992.year 0.393*** -0.0456 -0.0136 0.110* -0.0616
(0.0644) (0.0509) (0.0562) (0.0573) (0.132)
1993.year 0.370*** -0.0368 0.000175 0.122** -0.0402
(0.0660) (0.0528) (0.0580) (0.0523) (0.131)
1994.year 0.447*** -0.0358 -0.00162 0.117* -0.0820
(0.0631) (0.0532) (0.0582) (0.0651) (0.125)
1995.year 0.449*** -0.0284 0.00608 0.0831* 0.00888
(0.0658) (0.0547) (0.0594) (0.0413) (0.126)
1996.year 0.436*** -0.0303 -0.00113 0.0804 -0.0120 -0.0542
(0.0597) (0.0557) (0.0604) (0.0630) (0.0170) (0.124)
1997.year 0.463*** -0.0322 -0.00300 0.0542 -0.0433** -0.0478
(0.0649) (0.0573) (0.0614) (0.0501) (0.0193) (0.126)
1998.year 0.480*** -0.0362 -0.00756 0.138** -0.0272 -0.0653
(0.0609) (0.0582) (0.0624) (0.0519) (0.0247) (0.126)
1999.year 0.474*** -0.0408 -0.0169 0.0401 -0.0267 -0.0582
(0.0652) (0.0590) (0.0631) (0.0563) (0.0164) (0.128)
2000.year 0.465*** -0.0381 -0.0168 0.0964* -0.0169 -0.0539
(0.0658) (0.0590) (0.0634) (0.0556) (0.0270) (0.126)
2001.year 0.466*** -0.0460 -0.0230 0.100 -0.0184 -0.0182
(0.0608) (0.0599) (0.0650) (0.0942) (0.0280) (0.126)
2002.year 0.485*** -0.0434 -0.0200 0.0599 -0.0226 -0.0530
(0.0680) (0.0611) (0.0663) (0.0673) (0.0309) (0.131)
2003.year 0.472*** -0.0454 -0.0170 0.0856 0.0277 -0.0432
(0.0646) (0.0617) (0.0665) (0.0656) (0.0313) (0.129)
2004.year 0.500*** -0.0459 -0.0163 0.0906 0.0115 -0.0531
(0.0711) (0.0621) (0.0675) (0.0632) (0.0325) (0.129)
2005.year 0.501*** -0.0446 -0.0163 0.0789 0.0337 -0.0591
(0.0697) (0.0624) (0.0683) (0.0687) (0.0334) (0.130)
2006.year 0.488*** -0.0454 -0.0169 -0.148 0.0377 -0.0553
(0.0747) (0.0622) (0.0682) (0.154) (0.0354) (0.130)
2007.year 0.495*** -0.0333 -0.00160 0.0606 0.0225 -0.0535
(0.0724) (0.0634) (0.0686) (0.0740) (0.0379) (0.129)
2008.year 0.505*** -0.0520 -0.0126 0.165 0.0195 -0.0738
(0.0705) (0.0656) (0.0696) (0.122) (0.0399) (0.130)
2009.year 0.519*** -0.0502 -0.00256 -0.0644 0.0249 -0.0750
(0.0705) (0.0675) (0.0709) (0.125) (0.0483) (0.130)
2010.year 0.471*** -0.0125 0.0221 0.0720 0.0166 -0.102
(0.0739) (0.0658) (0.0688) (0.0811) (0.0423) (0.133)
Constant 4.421*** 3.566*** 3.927*** -1.779*** 3.992*** 3.489***
(0.301) (0.0943) (0.126) (0.520) (0.200) (0.201)
Observations 633 1,765 1,741 121 256 538
WIID dummmies YES - - - - -
R2 0.799 0.057 0.089 0.481
# of countries 71 100 100 36 28 87
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
logged Gini coefficient from the data source indicated in the top row. Swiid n and swiid m refer to net and
market inequality, respectively. Silc denotes the EU SILC data and wb the WDI Gini coefficients. The
dummies for the underlying WIID categories are included in column 2 but are not shown to save space
(available upon request).
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Table 3.A.10: Determinants of the difference between wage and income inequality, FE
results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wiid swiid n swiid m lis silc wb
GDPpc 9.51e-06 1.78e-05 1.77e-05 2.72e-05 2.05e-05 4.40e-05
(1.03e-05) (1.25e-05) (1.24e-05) (1.97e-05) (1.40e-05) (3.07e-05)
Population growth 0.192** 0.0493 0.0488 -0.0548 -0.0392 0.0992
(0.0740) (0.0503) (0.0504) (0.151) (0.0750) (0.0724)
Share urban 0.0304* 0.00710 0.00224 -0.0243 -0.0251 0.0200
(0.0169) (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0764) (0.0274) (0.0153)
Manuf. value added 0.00266 0.0173* 0.0193** 0.0307 0.0247 0.0146
(0.0147) (0.00964) (0.00910) (0.0405) (0.0260) (0.0152)
Trade openness -0.00352 -0.00471** -0.00481** -0.00318 -0.00278 -0.00389
(0.00289) (0.00234) (0.00241) (0.00301) (0.00255) (0.00304)
Price level of inv. -0.470* 0.485 0.522 0.324 -0.473 -0.0473
(0.271) (0.327) (0.330) (0.580) (0.680) (0.301)
# imputed -0.0408** -0.0659*** -0.0659*** 0.000215 -0.0355** -0.0649***
(0.0172) (0.0181) (0.0185) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0200)
Tfp 0.895* -0.513*** -0.460* 0.257 0.349 -0.198

















1972.year 1.540*** -0.223 -0.214
(0.448) (0.209) (0.272)




1975.year -0.147 -0.172 -0.190
(0.0888) (0.262) (0.322)






1979.year 1.671*** -0.0736 -0.0855
(0.406) (0.290) (0.339)




1982.year 1.466*** -0.189 -0.195
(0.317) (0.263) (0.317)
1983.year 1.806*** -0.145 -0.155 -1.909***
(0.568) (0.264) (0.305) (0.652)
1984.year 1.602*** -0.164 -0.172 0.137 -0.944*
(0.305) (0.257) (0.298) (0.545) (0.518)
1985.year 1.523*** -0.140 -0.145 -1.770**
(0.285) (0.248) (0.295) (0.686)
1986.year 1.325*** -0.287 -0.284 0.189 -1.670**
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(0.300) (0.253) (0.299) (0.228) (0.746)
1987.year 1.316*** -0.473* -0.471 -1.641**
(0.341) (0.267) (0.308) (0.628)
1988.year 1.060*** -0.459 -0.450 -2.160***
(0.363) (0.289) (0.329) (0.716)
1989.year 1.125*** -0.587* -0.569 -0.615 -1.860***
(0.346) (0.303) (0.343) (0.446) (0.698)
1990.year 1.330*** -0.611* -0.588 -1.964**
(0.321) (0.331) (0.359) (0.771)
1991.year 0.951** -0.614* -0.566 -0.576 -2.062***
(0.372) (0.336) (0.363) (0.515) (0.677)
1992.year 1.055*** -0.548 -0.494 -0.158 -1.921***
(0.354) (0.338) (0.367) (0.581) (0.674)
1993.year 0.928*** -0.567* -0.515 -0.561 -1.734**
(0.317) (0.340) (0.368) (0.497) (0.730)
1994.year 1.078*** -0.571 -0.507 -0.309 -2.003***
(0.348) (0.347) (0.374) (0.557) (0.691)
1995.year 1.141*** -0.560 -0.524 -0.496 -1.853***
(0.327) (0.353) (0.382) (0.485) (0.661)
1996.year 1.010*** -0.633* -0.599 -0.491 0.0249 -1.990***
(0.364) (0.361) (0.387) (0.521) (0.0708) (0.676)
1997.year 0.942** -0.678* -0.645* -0.860* -0.112 -1.928***
(0.359) (0.357) (0.383) (0.471) (0.0868) (0.697)
1998.year 0.907** -0.740** -0.706* -0.635 -0.0915 -1.876***
(0.346) (0.354) (0.378) (0.496) (0.0850) (0.689)
1999.year 0.821** -0.772** -0.741* -0.803 -0.0984 -2.118***
(0.330) (0.355) (0.379) (0.552) (0.111) (0.719)
2000.year 0.815** -0.697* -0.668* -0.928* -0.111 -2.044***
(0.353) (0.359) (0.383) (0.537) (0.125) (0.690)
2001.year 0.847** -0.732** -0.695* -2.763*** -0.103 -2.215***
(0.364) (0.359) (0.384) (0.761) (0.139) (0.723)
2002.year 0.760** -0.784** -0.746* -0.748 -0.402* -2.172***
(0.341) (0.376) (0.399) (0.600) (0.226) (0.713)
2003.year 0.851** -0.830** -0.794* -1.356* 0.0273 -2.097***
(0.354) (0.387) (0.408) (0.701) (0.196) (0.719)
2004.year 0.880** -0.823** -0.787* -0.834 0.0672 -2.124***
(0.385) (0.404) (0.422) (0.711) (0.219) (0.727)
2005.year 0.854** -0.809* -0.772* -1.330 0.0627 -2.134***
(0.402) (0.412) (0.430) (0.790) (0.215) (0.726)
2006.year 0.776* -0.797* -0.762* -1.313 0.00280 -2.142***
(0.415) (0.429) (0.447) (0.818) (0.236) (0.726)
2007.year 0.912** -0.883** -0.850* -0.939 0.108 -2.171***
(0.438) (0.434) (0.449) (0.816) (0.287) (0.727)
2008.year 0.830* -0.857* -0.810* -0.942 0.0213 -2.116***
(0.459) (0.460) (0.475) (0.808) (0.328) (0.731)
2009.year 0.732 -0.910** -0.850* -0.921 -0.0215 -2.138***
(0.484) (0.457) (0.470) (0.867) (0.246) (0.733)
2010.year 0.902* -0.691 -0.650 -0.765 0.113 -2.081***
(0.460) (0.464) (0.475) (0.828) (0.261) (0.755)
Constant 4.421*** 8.101*** 8.490*** 4.682 9.531*** 8.313***
(1.173) (0.737) (0.718) (5.502) (2.312) (0.982)
Observations 618 1,521 1,511 120 256 483
WIID dummmies YES - - - - -
R2 0.383 0.327 0.323 0.560 0.228 0.358
# of countries 66 82 82 35 28 73
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
logged percentage difference between the (normalized) Theil index and the Gini coefficient from the data
source indicated in the top row. Swiid n and swiid m refer to net and market inequality, respectively. Silc
denotes the EU SILC data and wb the WDI Gini coefficients. The dummies for the underlying WIID
categories are included in column 1 but are not shown to save space (available upon request).
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Table 3.A.11: Determinants of the difference between wage and income inequality, RE
results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wiid swiid n swiid m lis silc wb
GDP per capita 8.77e-06 1.65e-05* 2.02e-05** 2.22e-05** -9.20e-07 2.69e-05**
(7.29e-06) (9.68e-06) (1.01e-05) (1.12e-05) (1.13e-05) (1.28e-05)
Population growth 0.146** 0.0613 0.0538 0.0371 0.0178 0.0734
(0.0711) (0.0437) (0.0443) (0.124) (0.0986) (0.0646)
Share urban 0.00199 0.00731 0.00791 0.00364 0.000452 0.00405
(0.00436) (0.00499) (0.00514) (0.0108) (0.00825) (0.00390)
Manufacturing value added 0.00633 0.0184** 0.0171** 0.0344* 0.00522 0.0168
(0.0118) (0.00818) (0.00794) (0.0191) (0.0170) (0.0130)
Trade openness -0.000161 -0.00215* -0.00234* -0.00381* -0.00276* -0.00266*
(0.00119) (0.00123) (0.00128) (0.00201) (0.00167) (0.00143)
Price level of investment 0.0222 0.507* 0.546* 0.444 1.581*** 0.0145
(0.275) (0.306) (0.301) (0.466) (0.499) (0.301)
# imputed -0.0296** -0.0603*** -0.0601*** 0.00903 -0.0216 -0.0537**
(0.0142) (0.0204) (0.0217) (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0242)
Total factor productivity 0.284 -0.496** -0.464* 0.718 0.467 -0.0676
(0.491) (0.200) (0.260) (0.890) (0.781) (0.349)
# of ISIC 0.0728** 0.0297 0.0350 0.0619 0.00503 0.0465
(0.0308) (0.0317) (0.0347) (0.0379) (0.0294) (0.0354)
ECA 0.579** 0.257 0.397* 1.263*** 0.273
(0.258) (0.229) (0.223) (0.372) (0.262)
LAC -0.0637 -0.188 -0.345* 0.492 -0.0266
(0.264) (0.210) (0.201) (0.607) (0.269)
MENA -0.201 -0.122 -0.159 -0.117 -0.179
(0.212) (0.271) (0.271) (0.329) (0.425)
NA 0.386 0.00148 0.00384 0.931** -0.0377
(0.393) (0.405) (0.423) (0.436) (0.412)
SA -0.245 0.101 0.0255 0.975 -0.113
(0.315) (0.330) (0.367) (0.650) (0.388)
SSH 0.396 0.0207 -0.0352 1.536*** 0.0944

















1972.year 0.886*** -0.238 -0.231
(0.224) (0.205) (0.264)




1975.year -0.0739 -0.215 -0.260
(0.101) (0.262) (0.317)






1979.year 1.185** -0.115 -0.168
(0.489) (0.281) (0.331)




1982.year 1.339*** -0.226 -0.284
(0.358) (0.236) (0.293)
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1983.year 0.839 -0.192 -0.255 -1.914***
(0.766) (0.219) (0.269) (0.625)
1984.year 1.585*** -0.204 -0.266 0.0507 -0.978*
(0.350) (0.216) (0.265) (0.374) (0.527)
1985.year 1.488*** -0.179 -0.237 -1.753***
(0.320) (0.212) (0.266) (0.638)
1986.year 1.226*** -0.311 -0.368 0.156* -1.598**
(0.336) (0.214) (0.267) (0.0919) (0.734)
1987.year 1.134*** -0.507** -0.567** -1.682***
(0.337) (0.229) (0.274) (0.616)
1988.year 0.967*** -0.502** -0.561** -2.105***
(0.352) (0.239) (0.286) (0.645)
1989.year 1.065*** -0.627** -0.680** -0.705** -1.795***
(0.341) (0.255) (0.302) (0.277) (0.669)
1990.year 1.254*** -0.663** -0.717** -1.935***
(0.266) (0.285) (0.319) (0.730)
1991.year 0.917** -0.665** -0.695** -0.707** -2.018***
(0.397) (0.288) (0.321) (0.304) (0.631)
1992.year 1.083*** -0.590** -0.622* -0.306 -1.842***
(0.360) (0.290) (0.326) (0.342) (0.625)
1993.year 0.980*** -0.619** -0.658** -0.713*** -1.692**
(0.336) (0.286) (0.325) (0.228) (0.693)
1994.year 1.079*** -0.632** -0.661** -0.468* -1.921***
(0.364) (0.289) (0.325) (0.241) (0.636)
1995.year 1.108*** -0.624** -0.681** -0.641*** -1.816***
(0.353) (0.287) (0.327) (0.247) (0.607)
1996.year 0.964** -0.693** -0.755** -0.635*** -0.0446 -1.964***
(0.395) (0.289) (0.329) (0.177) (0.0632) (0.613)
1997.year 0.932** -0.732** -0.799** -1.020*** 0.0403 -1.804***
(0.382) (0.287) (0.325) (0.254) (0.0869) (0.633)
1998.year 0.910** -0.794*** -0.866*** -0.783*** -0.0553 -1.767***
(0.363) (0.287) (0.324) (0.231) (0.0839) (0.626)
1999.year 0.830** -0.833*** -0.912*** -1.006*** 0.0380 -2.009***
(0.351) (0.284) (0.325) (0.299) (0.128) (0.651)
2000.year 0.852** -0.770*** -0.852*** -1.075*** 0.113 -1.938***
(0.372) (0.284) (0.326) (0.266) (0.125) (0.631)
2001.year 0.874** -0.800*** -0.880*** -2.694*** 0.172 -2.125***
(0.374) (0.285) (0.330) (0.370) (0.137) (0.660)
2002.year 0.766** -0.844*** -0.925*** -0.823*** -0.356 -2.051***
(0.339) (0.290) (0.336) (0.255) (0.227) (0.631)
2003.year 0.838** -0.886*** -0.973*** -1.412*** -0.210 -2.000***
(0.352) (0.295) (0.337) (0.363) (0.162) (0.638)
2004.year 0.838** -0.886*** -0.976*** -1.024*** -0.294* -2.016***
(0.388) (0.300) (0.340) (0.381) (0.158) (0.645)
2005.year 0.842** -0.883*** -0.976*** -1.580*** -0.244 -2.004***
(0.395) (0.299) (0.339) (0.513) (0.174) (0.637)
2006.year 0.731* -0.889*** -0.986*** -1.581*** -0.364* -2.008***
(0.400) (0.312) (0.352) (0.512) (0.192) (0.644)
2007.year 0.815* -0.978*** -1.081*** -1.189** -0.440** -2.025***
(0.424) (0.308) (0.345) (0.484) (0.218) (0.640)
2008.year 0.794* -0.920*** -1.009*** -1.131** -0.748*** -1.926***
(0.439) (0.330) (0.364) (0.527) (0.257) (0.634)
2009.year 0.843** -0.904*** -0.978*** -1.081** -0.584*** -1.884***
(0.411) (0.319) (0.350) (0.489) (0.177) (0.642)
2010.year 1.044** -0.694** -0.793** -0.833 -0.136 -1.832***
(0.443) (0.334) (0.364) (0.605) (0.225) (0.643)
Constant 4.319*** 7.279*** 7.382*** 0.0639 6.742*** 8.160***
(0.709) (0.938) (0.996) (1.502) (0.836) (1.102)
Observations 618 1,521 1,511 120 256 483
WIID dummies YES - - - - -
R2 0.383 0.327 0.323 0.560 0.228 0.358
# of countries 66 82 82 35 28 73
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
logged percentage difference between the (normalized) Theil index and the Gini coefficient from the data
source indicated in the top row. Swiid n and swiid m refer to net and market inequality, respectively. Silc
denotes the EU SILC data and wb the WDI Gini coefficients. The dummies for the underlying WIID
categories are included in column 1 but are not shown to save space (available upon request).
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Table 3.A.12: Relationship between Theil and Income Inequality: FE results, using the
UTIP index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wiid swiid n swiid m lis silc wb
ln(Theil utip) 0.0903*** 0.0116 0.0162 0.0731** 0.0335 0.0218
(0.0195) (0.0178) (0.0194) (0.0273) (0.0254) (0.0171)
Pop. growth -0.0179 0.0163*** 0.0155* -0.0158 -0.0266 0.00745
(0.0206) (0.00581) (0.00801) (0.0255) (0.0181) (0.0173)
Share urban -0.0135*** 0.00168 -0.000666 0.00304 -0.00546 0.00650*
(0.00433) (0.00261) (0.00269) (0.00425) (0.00606) (0.00361)
Manuf. v.add. -0.000860 -0.00295* -0.00444** 0.00489 0.00390 -0.00442
(0.00311) (0.00156) (0.00172) (0.00465) (0.00767) (0.00307)
Constant 4.724*** 3.589*** 3.978*** -1.154*** 3.853*** 3.459***
(0.289) (0.0980) (0.118) (0.298) (0.521) (0.218)
WIID dummies YES - - - - -
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 598 1,827 1,805 120 205 486
R-squared 0.790 0.067 0.108 0.748 0.186 0.106
# of countries 72 110 110 33 27 91
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
logged Gini coefficient from the data source indicated in the top row. Swiid n and swiid m refer to net and
market inequality, respectively. Silc denotes the EU SILC data and wb the WDI Gini coefficients. The
dummies for the underlying WIID categories are included in column 2 but are not shown to save space
(available upon request).
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Notes. The years 1982-1988 in Tunisia rely on linearly imputed values. This means that the increase in
inequality from the low level in the early years until 1981 to the peak in 1989 can, theoretically, occur less
continuously - and not necessarily in a monotonous manner in any of the imputed years. Within Tunisia,
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3.B Appendix
Imputation using fitted values from linear regressions
Filling missing values with predictions obtained from a regression permits the exploitation
of further available information provided in the UNIDO industrial statistics. For the in-
dex of inter-industry wage inequality, only the data on wages and employment are needed.
However, the UNIDO dataset also contains information on other sector-level characteris-
tics. For the prediction of missing values, I use data on the number of establishments and
on output as additional explanatory variables. If only one of the two variables needed for
the computation of the index is missing, the other one is used in the regression as well. A
time trend is also included in the set of potential regressors.
Once the first set of fitted values has been obtained from all available regressors, the
next step is to assess the plausibility of the obtained prediction of the missing. Checking
for plausibility is crucial for two reasons: First, the Theil index uses logarithmic transfor-
mations, which does not allow the inclusion of negative values. Second, because the index
is based on the ratio of shares, a too-large or too-small number in one variable has the
potential to affect the sector’s contribution rather substantially and lead to disruptions
in the series which may be unwarranted. In other words, the aim of the imputation is to
arrive at plausible values for the missings, which at the same time should keep the series
of inequality statistics smooth.
A good fit of the surrounding data points provides some indication of the appropriate-
ness of the underlying regression model for a particular missing value. While the R2 seems
like an obvious candidate to judge the general goodness of fit, a high R2 can sometimes
be misleading, especially when the time series is long. In several cases, the fit is very good
for part of the data, but captures relatively little of the variation in other parts. Whether
the fitted values are useful for imputation then depends on where the missings are located.
Each and every fitted value is therefore checked individually, and the regression is adjusted
if necessary.
If an imputed value is deemed implausible, there are 3 principal ways to adjust the
regression: (1) changing the regressors, (2) changing the time period, or (3) changing the
imputation method. Only the first two options are discussed in the following, whereas the
other imputation methods adopted are presented in the next subsections.
The first step is, of course, to identify ”bad” fitted values, and predictions which are
considered implausible for reasons other than a generally poor fit of the surrounding data
points. Deviations of more than 30 percent of the fitted- from the actual values of the
data points surrounding the missing are considered problematic and warrant changes in
the regression model used. Then there are problems which arise occasionally despite a
relatively good fit. The most obvious is a negative fitted value, which is conceptually
impossible for wages or employee numbers. Along the same lines, even if the overall fit
is good and the predicted value is positive, it can still be implausibly low or high. This
basically happens when the values in the forcing variables suggest a value very different
from the one obtained, and is mostly caused by large changes in one of the predictors to
a level which does not occur elsewhere in the underlying data. Similarly, predicted values
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can be very different from their ”surrounding” values and this is clearly not warranted
by an extreme value in one of the forcing variables. These problems are of course related
in many cases. In particular, negative values are just special case of an implausibly low
fitted value. Similarly, their causes as well as the strategies for addressing them apply for
several of the above cases.
Once a problematic fitted value has been identified, the next step is to check the
coefficients of the individual variables to see whether a single regressor is driving the
result.51 Things that may indicate problems are negative coefficients (given that the
initial reason for including the regressor was the assumption of a positive relationship)
or a very large (or very small) size of an individual coefficient. Often, dropping the
respective variable - which can also be the constant - solves the problem and yields a
more realistic estimate of the missing value. However, it is not always possible to clearly
identify an individual variable causing the problem. In many cases, all variables are useful
in predicting a missing value, and it is not the set of variables but the time period which
needs to be changed. This is especially true for long time series since the association
between some of the variables is likely to not remain constant over a time span of 30 years
or more, and sometimes changes visibly already in shorter time periods.
Some examples and illustrations with graphs and tables of the underlying data will
help demonstrate the conjunctures encountered. Starting with the case of negative fitted
values, suppressing the constant forces the regression line through the origin - an all
but reasonable assumption, which helps to resolve the problem in many instances. An
example is given below for missings in wages in Bolivia in sector 34 between 1971 and
1973, illustrated in table 3.B.1.52
As mentioned previously, implausible fitted values can be driven by outliers in one of
the regressors. An example is the case of El Salvador shown in table 3.B.2 below, where
the regression yields a very small number for the missing in wages in 1992 in sector 34.
This is clearly due to the very low value of 22 of the explanatory variable ”employees” in
that year in comparison to the rest of the data for this sector, where employee numbers
are always above 100. Obviously, the resulting wage number should also be substantially
smaller than before, but is arguably not in the 3-digit range, as indicated by the value
preceding the missing which is still around one third of the larger values in the later
years. Here, suppressing the constant alone does not solve the problem. Only when the
year 1998, containing substantially larger numbers for both wages and employees, is also
omitted from the regression does it yield plausible numbers for the missing wages. In this
case, plausibility is not only assessed through the deviations of the fitted values for the
surrounding values, but also from observations with similar values for other regressors (in
this case, establishments).
51While significance may seem like an obvious indicator of whether or not a regressor is useful, in many
cases, the number of observations is too low to allow a judgement of which regressors to keep based on
or the significance of the estimated coefficients - and whether or not they are robustly related to the
regressand during the time period of interest.
52An alternative would be to allow for a different functional form, e.g., by including a cubic term.
However, due to the often few degrees of freedom, this is not always feasible. Given the theoretically valid
assumption of a constant of zero, this approach is hence preferred.
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Table 3.B.1: Example of Bolivia: suppressing the constant
without constant with constant
Year Empl. Wages Estbl. Output Fv %dev Fv %dev
1970 59 166667 3588 -112731
1971 65 166667 37132 -102628
1972 25
1973 33 50000 13956 -166461
1974 166 100000 550000 112416 12 100131 0
1975 150 150000 750000 137362 8 90243 40
1976 318 750000 3900000 617896 18 641739 14
1977 352 650000 4300000 681558 5 733099 13
1978 313 550000 4800000 744133 3 710063 29
1979 478 1400000 8750000 1337179 4 1324724 5
1980 513 1200000 10280000 1560859 30 1514124 26
1981 577 1680000 22 15960000 2377494 4 2106231 25
1982 363 562500 14 4203125 670153 19 743361 32
Notes. Fv is short for fitted values. %dev is the deviation of the fitted from the observed values in %.
Table 3.B.2: Example of El Salvador (sector 34): suppressing the constant
without constant with constant
without 1998 with 1998
Year Empl. Wages Estbl. Output Fv %dev Fv %dev Fv %dev
1991 124740 1 1995841
1992 22 1 96187 773 234452
1993 135 306463 5 3196204 242767 21 624579 104 413323 35
1994 112 520464 2 3403122 212973 59 539949 4 391284 25
1995 152 309781 16 259864 264881 14 783491 153 462313 49
1996 273 731696 10 4286122 421835 42 1448971 98 653002 11
1997 223 571249 11 3397116 357026 38 1223695 114 591077 3
1998 968 7154426 8 20503255 1323221 82 5139651 28 1703586 76
Notes. Fv is short for fitted values. %dev is the deviation of the fitted from the observed values in %.
A generally bad fit is frequently caused by a particular data structure, wherein one
can observe 2 different ”regimes” in the development of wages and employees over time.
Pooling these together in one regression yields a mediocre fit for both regimes. Excluding
the years which display a different pattern from the one where the missings are located
often solves the problem. Again using the example of El Salvador, in the first spell of data
(pre-1985), wages are fairly stable, whereas in the second data spell (post-1990), they are
much more dispersed and display high growth rates. Only post-1990 values are therefore
used for the imputation of wages in 1992 in sectors 26, 27, 28, and 31. To give a better
impression of this type of data structure, wages in these sectors are plotted in figure 3.B.1.
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Figure 3.B.1: Log-normality of the (normalized) Theil index (wages in mn. USD)
That the association with a forcing variable is deficient - as indicated most clearly by
a large negative coefficient - occurs repeatedly in the estimations. It is easy to detect, and
the straightforward thing to do is drop the respective variable. This improves the result
in most instances. An example is Mozambique, where the ”establishments” variable has a
negative and relatively large coefficient in sector 34 for explaining employee numbers, and
produces a correspondingly poor result with partly negative fitted values. The exclusion
of the variable leads to a substantial improvement of the fit and yields positive values.
Table 3.B.3 contains the raw data, and table 3.B.4 displays the results with and without
the exclusion of establishments.53
53Note that although the ”output” variable also has a negative coefficient, its effect is much smaller and
its exclusion does not lead to a better fit, nor does it solve the problem of negative fitted values. Also note
that the variable turns positive once establishments have been excluded from the regression equation.
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Table 3.B.3: Example of Mozambique (sector 34, 1997/98 employees): dropping a variable
without estbl. with estbl. without output
Year Empl. Wages Estbl. Output Fv %dev Fv %dev Fv %dev
1986 1240 5 7892849 1433199 4335966 1179593
1987 2710 7160227 1317665
1988 2920 10 980049
1989 2760 9 916807
1990 2487 1767323 9 843129 52
1991 2276 943206 9 6923114 909802 4 1220781 29 76946 18
1992 1102 590888 11 3145974 732922 24 600248 2 674896 14
1993 1138 640900 11 2064663 610363 5 613682 4 601218 6
1994 1049 875039 10 2618161 520744 40 888217 2 537976 39
1995 446 179071 11 2179552 411135 130 196929 10 45386 153
1996 911 327082 10 3541943 337816 3 313905 4 390618 19
1997 24 4005683 246389 -8087087 170818
1998 35 17402439 415559 -1.7E+07 -17670
1999 19 75647
2000 475 68430 17 22842 67
Notes. Fv is short for fitted values. %dev is the deviation of the fitted from the observed values in %.
Table 3.B.4: Example of Mozambique (sector 34, 1997/98 employees): regression output





Year -100,771 -197,187** -73,679
(102,847) (15,080) (68,392)
Constant 2.014e+08 4.004e+08** 1.476e+08
(2.049e+08) (3.038e+07) (1.358e+08)
Observations 5 5 6
R2 0.329 0.995 0.567
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three columns contain the
regression output for the three sets of fitted values/ %-deviations of table 3.B.3.
Individual variables can also cause a generally bad fit and dropping the variable often
helps resolve the problem. An example is sector 36 in Bulgaria, where the inclusion of the
variable ”establishments” leads to large deviations and negative values in some years (see
table 3.B.5). Here, the large coefficient on the variable (shown in table 3.B.6) is indicative
of the problem. This example also demonstrates how a short time period restricts the
options for achieving a better fit: excluding the later years containing substantially higher
numbers for establishments would theoretically also be possible, but would leave even
fewer years for estimation. Excluding the ”establishments” variable is therefore preferable
in this context.
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Table 3.B.5: Example of Bulgaria (sector 37, 1996 wages): dropping a variable
without estbl. with estbl.
Year Empl. Wages Estbl. Output Fv %dev Fv %dev
1996 26 736414 95838.74 771319.9
1997 100 117882 26 1413299 103559.1 12 509868.9 333
1998 100 120108 25 1411643 102262.8 15 187921.1 56
1999 123 131675 18 2722748 118410.9 10 -433161.2 429
2000 303 370117 19
2001 290 219709 24
2002 426 385656 40
2003 550 772205 46 47902118 713671.8 8 493296 36
2004 158 206335 57 5079010 143350.2 31 292953.3 42
2005 282 387516 64 7623259 175884.7 55 420798.6 9
2006 1211 2174736 62 2.53E+08 3431034 58 2952456 36
2007 1540 5682796 86 3.56E+08 4805079 15 5169121 9
Notes. Fv is short for fitted values. %dev is the deviation of the fitted from the observed values in %.
Table 3.B.6: Example of Bulgaria (sector 37, 1996 wages): regression output











Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The two columns contain the
regression output for the two sets of fitted values %-deviations of table 3.B.5.
There are also reasons to ex ante exclude available regressors from the estimation. This
often concerns the ”establishments” variable, where the absolute numbers are sometimes
very low (single-digits) and/or where there is little variation (e.g., in Lesotho, the number
of establishments is constant and below 10 in several sectors for the 2001 to 2008 period
and varies only by 1 in a few others). Another limitation to the inclusion of regressors is the
number of observations. Due to the unbalancedness of the data, including an additional
variable often reduces the years available for estimation. Again using the example of
Lesotho, for predicting missing employee numbers in sectors 17 and 24 in 1980/81, the
”output” variable is available only for years post-1981, but not for the earlier ones. As
its inclusion would reduce the number of observations to a level where no degrees of
freedom are left for estimation, it is dropped for the estimation. Omitting the constant
also increases the degrees of freedom and performs better in other sectors where the output
variable is more important in predicting the missing and is therefore retained.
Implausible values of any kind can of course also arise from a simple outlier in one
of the forcing variables, in which case it suffices to exclude the respective year from the
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regression. An example from Puerto Rico is shown in table 3.B.7, wherein employee num-
bers drop to 650 in one year from a level of around 4000 in all other years, worsening the
fit substantially.
Table 3.B.7: Example of Puerto Rico (sector 26, 1987/88 wages): outlier years
with 1998 without 1998
Year Empl. Wages Estbl. Output Fv wages %dev Fv wages %dev
1987 4520 162 2.33E+07 4.09E+07
1988 4630 164 2.91E+07 4.87E+07
1989 4950 34800000 167 5.00E+08 3.11E+07 11 5.75E+07 65
1990 3920 36900000 159 5.01E+08 5.81E+07 57 6.05E+07 64
1991 3620 92500000 156 5.02E+08 7.17E+07 23 6.66E+07 28
1992 3460 92100000 41 5.06E+08 9.42E+07 2 8.10E+07 12
1993 3370 93800000 151 5.25E+08 9.25E+07 1 8.06E+07 14
1994 3600 98300000 157 5.67E+08 9.57E+07 3 8.87E+07 10
1995 3620 1.03E+08 162 5.42E+08 1.03E+08 0 9.59E+07 7
1996 3610 1.06E+08 196 6.32E+08 1.07E+08 2 1.01E+08 4
1997 3760 1.09E+08 184 7.00E+08 1.14E+08 5 1.10E+08 1
1998 650 96400000 37 7.03E+08 1.92E+08 99 1.12E+08 16
1999 4010 1.19E+08 214 7.69E+08 1.22E+08 3 1.24E+08 4
2000 4340 1.31E+08 197 7.38E+08 1.26E+08 4 1.34E+08 2
Notes. Fv is short for fitted values. %dev is the deviation of the fitted from the observed values in %.
If none of the described regression-based solutions yield any useful results, another
type of imputation is applied. The idea is similar to a simple linear interpolation but
still exploits some of the information contained in other variables. The method assumes a
constant co-movement of the missing with another variable (that is, not using the ”year”
variable, which would be the case in a ”normal” linear interpolation) and traces its devel-
opment in the missing years. Missing employees in 1995 in sector 35 in Slovenia provide
an example, shown in table 3.B.6. Here, the numbers rise so drastically for other variables
in the years following the missing that no regression model can be found which results in
acceptably low, but still positive, numbers. In this case, the problem stems from a lack of
support for numbers of this magnitude in the data. Employee numbers have to be imputed
differently and are assumed to move in accordance with wages54 in the concerned years.55
54The imputed values for wages are used, which have a fairly good fit in the early years (shown in the
last two columns table 3.B.6).
55The relatively high correlation of 0.78 between the two variables supports this assumption.
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Table 3.B.8: Example of Slovenia (sector 35, 1995 employees): linear interpolation







1995 33 84922771 1373 17911636
1996 144 33 53110129 144 7478213 6
1997 143 43 39017597 143 2982585 4 25
1998 835 10097149 51 57697994 835 10097149 4 15
1999 2808 39551278 60 1.27E+08 2808 39551278 5 19
2000 2818 34440932 64 1.25E+08 2818 34440932 6 8
2001 1362 12833498 69 69103452 1362 12833498 5 3
2002 1373 17954450 87 1.02E+08 1373 17954450 3 32
2003 1317 20826801 94 1.16E+08 1317 20826801 11 36
2004 1332 9965221 119 67265244 1332 9965221 25 19
2005 2027 39793868 128 1.44E+08 2027 39793868 8 4
2006 2568 51433489 157 2.06E+08 2568 51433489 4 15
2007 2587 60224473 170 2.55E+08 2587 60224473 31 26
2008 1496 42479950 86 1.93E+08 1496 42479950 4 29
2009 84 17911636 4
2010 81 7478213 5
Notes. Fv is short for fitted values. %dev is the deviation of the fitted from the observed values in %.
The estimation for wages in 1997 is based on a regression of wages on employees, output, establishments,
and a time trend, whereas the 1996 value is based on output only.
Other imputation approaches
If no information is provided for other variables which would allow a regression-based
imputation, a simple linear interpolation between the surrounding values is performed.
This is equivalent to the above approach of imputation alongside another variable, but
always using the ”year” variable. For example, in the case of Bangladesh, there is no data
in the years 1993 and 1994 but values for both wages and employees are available in 1992
and 1995. In sector 15, the number of employees is 107882 in 1992 and 126220 in 1995. The
resulting values for 1993 and 1994 are calculated as (126220-107882)/3+107882 ≈ 113995,
and (126220-107882)/3*2+107882 ≈ 120107. Imputation based on linear interpolation
hence always implicitly assumes a linear development over time of the target variable for
the missing years between the two surrounding data points.56
A disadvantage of the linear interpolation approach is that is requires both a start- and
an end-observation for the missing time period. If a missing is located in the first or last
year of the available data, the method cannot be applied. Instead, for missings located at
the beginning or the end of a data spell, a time trend is used to extrapolate values when
no other information is provided by the dataset - again exploiting the year variable.57 The
56In a few cases, means imputation is based on starting or ending values which are the result of a
regression-based fitted value imputation (e.g., sector 27 in Fiji for the missings in wages in 1994-95, which
use as the ”starting” observation the fitted value of 1993). This is done because the alternative would be
to start linear interpolation at the closest data points provided by the raw data, which means that the
fitted value would be overruled by the linearly interpolated one. This runs contrary to the initial idea that
regression-based fitted values are always favoured over linear interpolation, as they incorporate all of the
information available from the data.
57One could also use a time trend to impute values missing ”in the middle” as an alternative to the simple
linear interpolation described above. Using a time trend is advantageous when there are outliers at the
beginning or end of a linear imputation, as well as a discernible time trend in the data. Otherwise, it is less
CHAPTER 3. AN INDEX OF INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE INEQUALITY 115
same procedure as with the regression-based approach is applied, including the option to
drop the constant or change the time period when the fit is bad.
Again, there are several cases where it is not possible to find a good fit which would
support extrapolation based on a time trend. In those cases, the first (or last) available
value - which is in some cases an imputed one58 - is then repeated in the missing years.
This has, e.g., been done in Fiji in 1995, where the 1996 value is used to fill the missing
in sector 20. Whether such a procedure is reasonable also depends on the development of
the data in the preceding or following years: if they have been relatively stable, using the
same values seems valid.59
Of course, the discrete procedure of imputing data on a case-by-case basis is inherently
arbitrary. This applies not only to the imputation procedure, but also to the preceding
decision of whether or not to impute in the first place. As a rule of thumb, no sector is
used in the final index in which more than 50% of the data need to be imputed.
suppositional to assume that values do not range outside the value of the start and the end year of the gap.
Given that the goal is to tamper with the data as little as possible, if no further information is provided in
the data which would point towards the missing going into a particular direction, it is desirable to merely
preserve the ratio of wage and employee numbers in order to maintain time coverage, but influence the
inequality index as little as possible. Linear interpolation effectively means that the resulting contribution
of the imputed missing will lie between that of the start and that of the end year, and is therefore the least
intrusive option and preferred over the use of a time trend.
58An example for when an imputed value was used to fill missings in the first few missing years (1970-
1973) is sector 27 in Indonesia.
59There are only two cases with imputation approaches different from the ones described, but based
on the same techniques. The first one is Bulgaria, which is the only case where a squared term has
been employed to impute employee numbers post-2003 due to the clearly discernible inverse U-shaped
development of employee numbers in sector 23. The second case is Tunisia, where the fitted values for
sectors 22, 28, and 36 are located in a time period relatively far from another data spell containing
support for both variables involved in the imputation. The fitted values are the result of an average of
two imputation approaches with very different results, but an equally good fit in their respective (non-









In the 1980s, developing countries considerably lowered barriers to international trade,
thereby substantially boosting trade flows. This comprehensive economic change has not
been without distributional consequences. The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory (Heckscher
1991) yields clear predictions of the effects of trade on the distribution of income among
production factors. Their relative abundance is also the source of comparative advantage
in international trade and countries abundant in one production factor will specialize in
the production of goods relatively intensive in that factor. The relatively abundant factor
will gain, while the scarce factor, experiencing the opposite effects, will lose from trade
(Stolper and Samuelson 1941).
Developing countries, relatively abundant in low-skilled labor, would hence specialize
in low-skilled labor-intensive production. Because low-skilled labor is generally located at
the lower end of the wage distribution while high-skilled labor forms the upper end, wage
inequality should decrease in developing countries as a result of increased exposure to
international trade. Furthermore, because capital is complementary to high-skilled labor
in many cases and relatively scarce in developing countries, the same should be true for
income inequality (Krusell et al. 2000, Goldin and Katz 1998).
Available data on both wage and income inequality describe a reality very different
from what one would expect based on traditional trade theory after the large increases in
world trade volumes. Inequality has been rising not only in the industrialized countries
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but also across the developing world. The correlation between the expansion of world
trade and rising inequality does, of course, not imply causality. There are many factors
related to both globalization and trade which may conflate or counteract any equalizing
effects of trade on the income distribution.
Several papers have shown that trade has a differential impact on inequality in high-
and low-income developing countries and that this effect differs depending on the trading
partner as well (e.g., Gourdon 2011, Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). The differential impact
has been attributed to technology transfers from rich to poor countries, although this
transmission channel is rarely tested directly (one notable exception being Conte and Vi-
varelli (2011), who find evidence of such transfers). Rising skill premia have indeed been
shown to increase wage inequality not only in developed countries, but in developing coun-
tries as well (for an overview of the literature, see Vivarelli 2014). Failing to account for
the source of this development leaves open the question of whether technological change
does in fact arise through trade, or whether it could be domestic technological change
stemming from technological innovation within the respective country itself which raises
skilled wages. Taking technological change into account is important because it is po-
tentially driving both exports and wages in certain sectors and may thereby introduce
a spurious correlation between trade and wage inequality. Most studies ”assume away”
domestically induced technological change in developing countries and argue that all tech-
nological advancements stem from external sources. To support their claim, they refer to
the low level of research and development activities, as first stated by Coe et al. (1997).
While it may be true that there is very little domestically induced technological advance
in earlier time periods (before the 1990s) for certain countries, it does not seem plausible
for upper-middle income countries such as South Korea, Spain, or Slovenia even in earlier
years of the sample periods used, or for countries like India in the early 2000s.
Another shortcoming of many empirical papers using the H-O model to test the effects
of trade on the income distribution is the timing of the trade effect. Certain factors of
production cannot be assumed to be mobile between sectors in the short run, and hence the
predicted effects may not be visible in a contemporary or one-year lagged specification. The
Ricardo-Viner model (Viner 1932, Jones 1971, Mussa 1974), introducing specific factors
into the theoretical framework, is often interpreted as a short-run version of the H-O model
and is thus likely to better capture the effects within the time horizon of a few years which
can be feasibly estimated with the available data. According to the model, immobile
factors of production may lose from trade if employed in import-competing industries,
even if they are overall relatively abundant. The opposite holds true for relatively scarce
factors which are employed in exporting industries and which may gain from trade in the
short run. With skilled labor being one of the most frequently cited examples of a specific
factor, the model is highly relevant in the context of this paper in which skill premia are
a key mechanism in driving up wage inequality.
This paper addresses the identified shortcomings of previous studies in several ways.
First, it directly measures the technology content embedded in trade by categorizing trade
flows into different technology levels. Second, it includes a new measure of technological
change to address potential omitted variable bias. The measure captures movements in
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the technological frontier, which is estimated using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and
based on the same raw data used in the inequality index. It is hence able to control for
advancements in technology in exactly those sectors included in the inequality measure as
well. Differentiating between imports and exports helps to disentangle the two technology
transmission channels. Furthermore, different types of hypotheses can be tested on the
two variables. In particular, the H-O model does not provide any insights into the effect
of imports, whereas the specific factors model provides clear distributional implications
with respect to import-competing industries.
In order to maximize the time coverage, a Theil index of between-sectoral wage in-
equality covering the years 1970-2010 has been constructed (see chapter 3). It is based on
the UNIDO industrial statistics, covering manufacturing industries in a large number of
developing countries. A major advantage of the lengthy time coverage with a maximum
of 41 years is that fixed effects estimation delivers reliable estimates in terms of Nickell
bias despite the dynamic specification of the econometric panel data model. The sample
for the preferred specification contains 58 developing countries over an average time span
of 16 years, and results from a GMM estimation confirm that Nickell bias does not affect
the estimates.
Results suggest that while technology transfer through trade does play a role in driv-
ing up wage inequality in developing countries, it is important to control for domestic
technological change as some of the effects otherwise attributed to trade disappear once
the measure is included. Trade does not seem to per se drive up wage inequality, and
the traded technology appears to play an important role. The disequalizing effects stem
primarily from trade in medium-technology intensive goods and occur mainly in countries
in the second education quartile, that is, with medium skill endowments. Few results are
found for trade with high-technology goods, which casts doubt on the hypothesis that
it is technology transfer in these goods causing the disequalizing impact of trade with
developed countries in developing countries found in previous studies.
Although there is a large recent literature emphasizing the impact of trade on wage
inequality within industries and occupations (broadly categorized into effects due to het-
erogeneous firms, labor market frictions, and incomplete contracts), the present study
focuses exclusively on inequality between sectors and refers to sector-based classical trade
theory. Although this choice is partly dictated by the nature of both the wage inequality
data as well as the sector-based classification of the trade data, both of which are only
available at a sectoral level, this paper addresses several of the previously identified short-
comings of existing sector-based studies. Results suggest that the lack of strong results
pertaining to the effects of the neoclassical, sector-based mechanisms is at least partly
due to flaws in the empirical approach of estimating the relationship between trade and
inequality. Moreover, some of the explanations subsumed as challenges to the neoclassi-
cal trade theory, such as Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996) offshoring argument (as, e.g., in
Harrison et al. 2011) can be easily incorporated into the sector-based model.
Taking a detailed look at the available inequality data, several studies have identified
changes in the upper quintile of the income distribution to be the main driver of inequality.
The income share of the upper quintile increased at the expense of the middle part of the
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distribution while there has been little change at the bottom (e.g., Jaumotte et al. 2013).
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) find a pervasive increase in skill premia across developing
countries during the 1980s and 1990s, which translates in most cases into an increase in
wage inequality. The two decades are particularly interesting and are the focus of most
empirical studies because not only has inequality gone up, but many countries have opened
their economies to trade at the same time.
The determinants of the increase in income and wage inequality in advanced economies
are relatively well explored. Even though the co-movement of trade and inequality is in
line with the H-O/S-S predictions, trade has been found to be only of minor importance for
the large increases in inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, skill-biased technological
change (SBTC) has been identified as the main cause for the changes in the distribution
of wages and incomes (e.g., Berman et al. 1998; see Card and DiNardo 2002 for a more
critical review of the SBTC hypothesis and Kurokawa 2014 for a survey of trade-based
versus other explanations). The basic reasoning behind this is that technological progress is
complementary to high-skilled labor and consequently raises demand for the highly skilled
(Acemoglu 2003). There is evidence that SBTC is present in developing countries as well,
and that trade introduces or reinforces SBTC in those countries (Berman and Machin 2000,
Conte and Vivarelli 2007). More recent studies focusing on European countries ascribe
a larger role to trade in increasing inequality through exporter wage premia (Klein et al.
2013; Egger et al. 2013; Baumgarten 2013), which is even more pronounced if import
penetration is also accounted for (Du Caju et al. 2012). The latter study even finds
that the negative impact of imports on wage levels is larger for trade with developing
countries. However, it remains unclear how large the contribution of trade is to overall
wage inequality, and whether corresponding effects are present in developing countries.
The geographical distribution of trends in income inequality points toward another
explanation, which is complementary to the SBTC hypothesis. While the advanced and
newly industrializing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Europe have experienced in-
creasing income inequality over the 1980s and 1990s, this is not generally true for low-
income countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jaumotte et al. 2013). Several coun-
tries, in particular in Latin America, have also experienced marked decreases in income
inequality since the mid-1990s (Cornia 2014). This differentiated pattern of development
of income inequality across countries lends support to an argument first introduced by
Wood (1997), which explains the apparent lack of an equalizing effect of trade by making
a more detailed distinction between country groups. Trade between developing coun-
tries, often labeled ”South-South trade,” obviously does not fit in with the dichotomy
of ”North-South” trading partners and their relative endowments assumed in most H-O-
based models. What constitutes a comparative advantage in trade between ”Southern”
countries must be established before any predictions about the effect of trade on inequality
between developing countries can be derived.
In the following, the theory behind the technology and the South-South trade hypothe-
ses will be explained in more detail. Empirical evidence on the roles of trade, technology
and South-South trade as well as the effects of their interrelations on income inequality
will be reviewed thereafter. The empirical analysis is covered in section 4.3, which intro-
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duces the data and motivates the empirical specification. Estimation results are discussed
in section 4.4. Robustness checks are presented in section 4.5, and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
4.2.1 (Skill-biased) technological change
Katz and Autor (1998) and Conte and Vivarelli (2011) summarize the various patterns
on the production side of the economy indicating the occurrence of SBTC. Among them
is the constant or increasing ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers despite rising skill
premia, and thus relative wages, for the highly skilled. This phenomenon has recently
also been observed in several developing countries (e.g., Berman et al. 1998, particularly
in emerging economies such as India, Hong Kong, and several Latin American countries
(for a review see Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). Berman and Machin (2000) find evidence
of SBTC, measured by the share of non-production relative to production workers, in
middle-income, but not in low-income developing countries. They also notice that the
same industries are affected by SBTC in OECD and in developing countries and infer that
SBTC in developing countries is driven by a transfer of technology from industrialized
countries. Trade is an obvious candidate as one of the vehicles of technology transfer.
It can act as a catalyst of (skill-biased) technological change1 in developing countries,
thereby reinforcing the disequalizing effect of rising skill premia. Imports may provide
formerly unavailable goods that embody new technology complementary to skilled labor.
They can also be investment goods that enable the introduction or modernization of
production processes (Pissarides 1997), or final goods that allow for reverse engineering
(Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). Imported capital goods can also be substitutes for low-skilled
labor and introduce labor-saving technology, which leads to a widening wage gap through
the depression of low-skill wages (Behrman et al. 2007). Summarizing the above arguments
as the ”import channel,” Meschi and Vivarelli (2009) also identify an ”export channel”
through which SBTC is introduced in developing countries. Export partners in developed
countries have certain demands on the quality and up-to-dateness of the products they
import. They might therefore either directly assist their developing country partners in
upgrading their technology and the skills of their workforce, or make an investment in
such upgrading profitable. Intermediate goods can have effects through both the import-
and the export channel. Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 2001) argue that their impact on
wage inequality is particularly strong because demand for skilled labor does not only
affect the exporting or export-competing industry, but also all the industries that use the
intermediate goods as inputs, regardless of whether they trade the final product or not.
They also point out that some industries are more suitable for outsourcing than others.
Outsourcing is more present in industries in which the production process can be separated
into more or less independent stages and in which the different steps of production entail
1The term ”skill-biased technological change” is in the original sense different from mere technological
upgrading in developing countries, which is not necessarily skill-biased from a developed country point of
view. However, since such upgrading frequently is skill-biased from the developing country’s perspective,
the term will be used here to include both meanings.
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large differences in the skill composition. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) find that these
are mainly industries producing semi-durable consumer goods. The manufacturing sector
therefore seems particularly prone to such effects.
Given the potential for technological catch-up, the effect of trade on technological
upgrading may be particularly strong in developing countries, especially in emerging
economies. Schiff and Wang (2004) show that developing countries benefit more from in-
creased import volumes than developed countries in terms of productivity improvements.
The adoption of new or upgraded technologies not only depends on their availability, but
also on a country’s capability to employ it and take advantage of it. If there is an insuffi-
cient supply of knowledge and qualified labor, or low domestic demand, new technologies
will not be established. Acemoglu (2003) makes this point in his model of endogenous tech-
nological change: Technology used in developing countries prior to trade liberalization is
adapted to local circumstances, thus complementing low-skilled labor. New technologies
introduced via imports on the other hand are designed to match the mix of production
factors in developed countries and are therefore skill-intensive from a developing country’s
point of view. The decision as well as the possibility to adopt skill-intensive technology
depends on the ability of a country to use it and to benefit from it, which in turn depends
on the composition of its labor force and the supply of skilled labor. Zhu’s (2004) model
relies on a similar assumption and introduces a link to the product cycle, wherein new,
more skill-intensive goods developed in industrialized countries replace older ones. The
production of the older goods is then transferred to developing countries and constitutes a
new, relatively skill-intensive production technology there. As a consequence, skill premia
rise in both country groups. Pissarides (1997) argues that even if a new technology is not
skill-biased, its mere introduction requires skilled labor because new technologies have to
be learned about and put into use. The effect on the demand for skilled labor is then tran-
sitory. This is also true if one considers that skill-biased technologies can be modified in a
way such that they complement unskilled labor. This modification also requires a certain
amount of knowledge and skilled labor. A similar point is made by Bernard and Jensen
(1997) and Matsuyama (2007), who argue that the activity of exporting is skill-intensive
in itself.
Given the above considerations, it stands to reason that an educational expansion
fostering an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers is a prerequisite as well as an
accelerator of SBTC in developing countries. At the same time, it depresses skill premia in
the short run because of the time lag of new investments in more skill-intensive technology
reacting to the increased abundance of skilled labor. Acemoglu (1998) finds evidence in
the United States for both the short-run, equalizing effect of education on skill premia and
the long-run effect, fostering skill-biased technological change and raising skill premia. In
this paper, the short-run (supply) effect will be tested directly, whereas the long-run effect
is implicitly incorporated into the classification of countries according to their relative skill
levels.
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4.2.2 South-South trade
The basic reasoning behind the South-South trade argument is that countries that are
pooled in a rather undifferentiated manner under the label of ”developing countries” are
in fact so heterogeneous in terms of economic and human development that the relative
abundance of production factors, and hence the impact of trade, differs vastly between
them. While the unskilled workforce in the least developed countries generally benefits
from trade because it can exploit its comparative advantage in low-skill production sectors,
the case is different for middle-income countries, comprising also the newly industrializing
countries. These countries have evolved to a stage where they no longer have a com-
parative advantage in unskilled labor. One can therefore not per se assume that trade
with either developed or developing countries leads to a decrease in wage inequality in
these countries. The fact that many developing countries felt the need to protect low-skill
sectors through tariffs and other trade barriers prior to trade liberalization underpins the
hypothesis that this is not where they had their comparative advantage. It rather shifted
to medium-skill intense production, in particular when many developing countries with a
large unskilled labor force - the most prominent example being China - entered the world
market during the period of liberalization in the 1980s (Wood 1997).2 The impact of
trade with low-income countries in the low-skill, labor intensive sectors of middle income
developing countries would then again be in line with the predictions of H-O/S-S: product
prices fall and factor rewards are reduced - implying a larger wage gap. Davis (1996) has
formalized this point in a theoretical model on the effects of trade liberalization on factor
rewards within different groups of countries with similar endowments. It is hence crucial
to differentiate between different kinds of developing countries in order to get clear results
on the effects of trade on wages.
4.2.3 Empirical evidence
As previously mentioned, the results of ”early” studies (meaning that neither technology
nor trade between developing countries is taken into account) on the impacts of trade
liberalization on the income distribution in developing countries are mixed. Most of them
use the Gini coefficients from Deininger and Squire (1996) as their dependent variable, a
few use quintile shares, and only one study analyses wage inequality. An unambiguously
negative impact of trade on inequality is found by only few studies (examples include
Bourguignon and Morrisson 1990, and Calderón and Chong 2001). Positive effects are
identified by Lundberg and Squire (2003), Cornia and Kiiski (2001), and Spilimbergo
et al. (1999). Barro (2000), Savvides (1998), and Milanovic and Squire (2007) all conclude
that the disequalizing effects are stronger or only present in developing countries. Studies
which find no effect at all include Edwards (1997), and Dollar and Kraay (2002, 2004)
who find that average incomes and incomes of the poor are affected equally by trade.
Several authors have acknowledged the difficulty of drawing conclusions about the re-
lationship between trade and income inequality from these studies because comparability
2Dollar and Kraay (2004) provide a list of developing countries they identify as ”post-1980 globalizers”
based on the increase in trade over GDP between 1980 and 2000 and backed by changes in tariff policies.
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is limited due to differences in the countries and time periods covered, the choice of the
inequality- and the openness variables, and the econometric specification and methodol-
ogy used (Milanovic and Squire 2007, Lundberg and Squire 2003). Consequently, other
approaches have been developed to explain the apparent lack of a clear-cut relationship
between trade and inequality in developing countries, of which the SBTC and technology
transfer arguments have received most attention. As for the South-South trade hypothesis,
only two studies, by Gourdon (2011) and Meschi and Vivarelli (2009), explicitly incorpo-
rate trade between different groups of developing countries into their empirical analyses.
4.2.3.1 The role of technology: SBTC and technology transfer
A large number of country case studies investigate the interrelationships between tech-
nology, trade, and inequality in developing countries. Most of them find evidence for
trade-induced technological change driving up skill premia and inequality - an exception
being Ferreira et al. (2007), who conclude that trade has led to a decrease in inequality
through sector reallocation effects of employment, as suggested by H-O theory. For a
review, see Robbins (1996) on early evidence and Gourdon (2011) for more recent studies.
The number of cross-country studies on the other hand is considerably lower. Zhu and
Trefler (2005) find that wage inequality in developing countries in terms of relative wages
of skilled to unskilled workers has increased due to trade-induced technological catch-up,
measured by labor productivity. Zhu (2005) puts her theoretical model of technology
transfer through product cycles to an empirical test in a panel of 28 US trading partners.
Results indicate that product cycle trade leads to skill upgrading in countries which have
a GDP per capita of at least 20 percent of the US GDP per capita, while no effect is
found in the lower income countries. Conte and Vivarelli (2007) estimate the impact of
”skill-enhancing technology import” from high income countries on the employment of
the skilled and unskilled in low and middle income countries. According to their results,
trade-induced technological upgrading entails not only a relative, but an absolute skill bias
also since it not only increases the absolute employment of skilled workers, but decreases
the number of unskilled workers as well. However, the analysis does not control for the
supply of skilled and unskilled labor. Robbins (1996), including various direct measures
of labor supply, finds that shifts in labor supply have large effects on relative wages, and
concludes that labor markets are to some degree insulated from factor price equalization.
López-Calva and Lustig (2010) argue that an educational expansion, lowering the gap
between skilled and unskilled labor, is one of the main factors responsible for the decrease
in labor income inequality observed in Latin America over the 2000s. This means that
Conte and Vivarelli’s (2007) results could suffer from omitted variable bias because the
supply of skilled labor is not controlled for. In addition, not only imports but also exports
can be a source of technology transfer. Finally, Jaumotte et al. (2013) measure techno-
logical change by the share of information and communications technology capital (ICT)
in the total capital stock in their analysis of both advanced and developing countries and
conclude that the main driver of inequality is technological change, above and beyond its
effect through trade. Trade is found to reduce inequality, though mainly through exports
of agricultural products, with no separate effect of manufactured goods.
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4.2.3.2 Incorporating South-South trade
One of the two studies explicitly testing the South-South trade hypothesis while also
taking SBTC into account is Gourdon (2011). To estimate trade-induced technological
change, relative total factor productivity between skill-intensive and non-skill intensive
sectors is regressed on North-South trade (between high-income and developing countries)
and South-South trade (between middle-income and low-income developing countries) in
a sample of 68 developing countries over 1976-2000. Inter-industry wage inequality is then
regressed on North-South and South-South trade as well as the respective previously iden-
tified effects of technology transfer. This procedure allows for separately identifying the
direct effect of North- and South-South trade on inequality and their respective indirect
effect via technological change. Once technology transfer is controlled for, North-South
trade has an equalizing effect on wage inequality while South-South trade increases in-
equality in both middle-income and low-income developing countries. While the effect in
middle-income countries is direct, it operates through technology transfer from middle-
to low-income developing countries in the latter. The analysis makes an interesting point
in that trade-induced technological change in developing countries can originate not only
from developed, but also from other developing countries.
Meschi and Vivarelli’s (2009) analysis combines both the technology transfer and the
South-South trade hypotheses in a sample of 65 developing countries from 1980 to 1999.
The analysis relies on the UTIP-EHII measure of income inequality, which combines the
Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset with the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality data. Trade
flows are decomposed by their origin and destination countries and it is found that trade
from and to developed countries worsen the income distribution, while trade with other de-
veloping countries has an equalizing effect. Further results confirm the technology transfer
hypothesis: trade with developed countries has a negative impact only in middle-income
developing countries, while the effect in low-income countries is insignificant. Trade be-
tween low- and middle-income developing countries increases inequality in both groups.
Meschi and Vivarelli interpret their finding as evidence for the introduction of SBTC from
developed to developing countries. However, no measure is included of the technologies
transferred or the transmission channels through which wages are affected, a concern which
has also been raised by Conte and Vivarelli. The present paper therefore differentiates
trade flows by technology, thereby measuring the inherent skill content of trade. This
enables the testing of whether it is indeed more skill-intensive technology which increases
wage inequality through technology transfer.
4.2.3.3 Summary and Hypotheses
The main innovation of this paper vis--vis the existing studies is the introduction of an
index of technological change, representing the most important control variable in the
empirical analysis. The paper furthermore expands on existing studies in three ways: i.)
it employs a comparative advantage-based rather than an income-based country classifi-
cation; ii.) it classifies trade flows according to their technology content - measured by
the degree of human capital necessary to produce the goods, which allows for the testing
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of which types of technology matter most for wage inequality in developing countries,
and whether it is indeed more skill-intensive technology which raises inequality the most;
and iii.) it uses a consistent version of the Theil index of inter-industry wage inequality,
based exclusively on the UNIDO industrial statistics, with comparable values over time
containing the same sectors every year (see chapter 3). The sectoral classification used for
the computation of the inequality index is the same as for the trade data as well as the
classification of industries into different skill levels, and is therefore able to capture the
effects of trade on between-sectoral inequality in manufacturing quite well.
A number of hypotheses regarding the effects of different types of traded goods, dif-
ferent groups of trading partners, and different receiving countries can be derived from
the literature. For aggregate trade flows, a simplistic view of developing countries would
hypothesize an equalizing impact of trade on wages. Technology transfer might have op-
posing effects, conflating the negative impact and rendering a prediction on the overall
impact difficult. Finally, trade could really be driven by domestic technological change,
and hence the effect might diminish with the inclusion of the control variable.
As for different levels of technology, once can expect a disequalizing (i.e., positive)
impact for trade in higher levels of technology, both due to technology transfer as well as
H-O effects. I expect low-technology trade to decrease inequality through exports, while
no effect should be present for imports if one believes the predictions of the specific factors
model.
The next set of hypotheses pertains to the differential impacts in countries of different
relative skill endowments. I use country group interactions to test whether the effects of
trade on wage inequality differ between particular groups of countries. South-South trade
theory suggests that medium-low technology exports have a particularly strong disequal-
izing impact in the medium-education countries, since this is where their comparative
advantage is located. The ”absorptive capacity” argument would furthermore suggest
that technology transfer effects of medium- and high-technology imports are stronger (in
absolute terms) in the more educated trading partners, i.e., UMECs and LMECs. Over-
all, I therefore expect to find strong disequalizing effects of medium-low technology in
the LMEC and UMEC groups. A structured summary of the hypotheses derived for the
different country groups is presented in table 4.1.








High technology exports + + + (in UMEC) +
Medium-low tech. exports + (in UMEC/LMEC) ++ + (in UMEC/LMEC) ++
Low technology exports - ? ? -
High technology imports ? – + (in UMEC) -
Medium-low tech. imports ? - + (in UMEC/LMEC) ?
Low technology imports ? ? ? ?
Notes. HEC=High-education country (highest quartile), UMEC=Upper-middle education country (third
quartile), LMEC= Medium-low education country (second quartile).
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4.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
4.3.1.1 Country classification
As has been derived from the literature on ”South-South” trade, it is important to distin-
guish between different types of developing countries to arrive at clear predictions about
the effects of trade on wages. Countries are typically classified into different levels of devel-
opment according to their income, as in the widely used World Bank classification based
on GNI. In the context of this analysis, a classification by relative endowments - i.e., the
skill-level of the labor force - is more appropriate. Relative human capital endowments
are the source of comparative advantage in trade and hence the relevant characteristic
from which to derive hypotheses about the impact of trade on wage inequality. Studies
supporting this approach are Gourdon et al. (2008), who test H-O theory by introducing
interactions with country endowments and find supporting evidence for its predictions,
and Forbes (2001), who directly tests different country classifications. She concludes that
any classification based on comparative advantage (years of education, wages, or a mix
of the two) performs superior to income-based classifications in that the presumed ef-
fects of trade are found with the former classification, whereas the latter one yields only
insignificant coefficients.
Human capital is proxied by average years of schooling of the population aged 25 years
and older, extracted from Barro and Lee (2013a) and extrapolated for the years missing
between the 5-year intervals in which the original data are reported.3 As it is relative en-
dowments that should matter for trade, countries are grouped into quartiles. In previous
analyses, developing countries were divided into two or three groups of low-, lower-middle
and/or upper-middle income countries according to their per capita incomes, following the
World Bank classification. Translating these groups into education, the resulting classi-
fication divides countries into low (LEC), lower-middle (LMEC), upper-middle (UMEC),
and high (HEC) education. The lower 3 quartiles are considered ”developing” and form
the estimation sample. Countries classified as HEC are used for classifying trade flows in
order to capture technology transfer from more developed countries, and then removed
from the sample. Of the 60 countries and total of 1151 country-year observations used
in the estimation sample, 20 percent are classified as LEC, 41 percent as LMEC and 39
percent as UMEC. For every developing country, all trade flows to and from countries
classified as HEC are summed up. The same is done for the other income categories,
so that the South-South hypothesis of trade between developing countries can be tested.
The disaggregated trade variables are denoted by affixes numbered 1 to 4 according the
trading partner’s relative education level from low to high education respectively. They
3As noted by Wößmann (2000), years of schooling are not a ideal measure for skills without taking
quality of schooling into account, which not only varies greatly between countries, but also over time. It is
even more contentious to equate formal schooling with human capital, which has many other components
besides education. However, alternative measures for human capital are scarce and those for schooling are
equally contested. While there have been attempts to measure educational outcomes directly via cognitive
tests (e.g. the ”Schooling Quality in a Cross-Section of Countries” dataset by Barro and Lee (2013b), the
resulting data are sparse and would virtually eliminate the present panel.
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are further decomposed into their technology content as explained in the following section.
4.3.1.2 Trade and technology
The data on trade consist of the total value (in billions of US dollars) of yearly bilateral
trade flows between country pairs, provided by the UN Comtrade database.4 Traded
products are coded according to their technology level. The technology classification is
taken from Loschky (2010), who calculates R&D intensities of product groups at the ISIC
Rev. 3 level.5 Three categories of technology intensity are employed: Low technology (LT),
medium-low technology (MT), and medium-high to high technology (HT). Aggregation is
again carried out by adding up the total value of yearly trade in each technology category,
separately for imports and exports.
The following graphs depict some basic trends in the trade data. Figure 4.1 shows the
rise in developing country trade (estimation sample average) in billions of USD over the
sample period. Trade has grown tremendously between 1970 and its peak value in 2010.
The share of trade with relatively more high-technology intensive goods has also risen over
time, as is apparent from figure 4.2.
4Because the trade data are not available in the ISIC scheme, they have to be converted from the
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) using correspondence tables. While a direct conversion
is possible for post-1987 data which is provided in the SITC Rev.3, data from 1970 are only available in
ISIC Rev.1, for which there is no direct correspondence table to ISIC Rev.3. The data therefore have to first
be converted into the SITC Rev.3, and then further into the ISIC classification. Correspondence tables are
taken from the EU RAMON database. Conversion is always based on the most detailed (5 digit) product
level, whereas the trade data is provided at all levels of aggregation. However, ”The values of the reported
detailed commodity data do not necessarily sum up to the total trade value for a given country dataset.
Due to confidentiality, countries may not report some of its detailed trade. This trade will, however, be
included at the higher commodity level and in the total trade value.” (Comtrade 2014). After conversion,
whenever a higher commodity level trade value deviates from the sum of its sublevel trade value and the
higher level contains different sub-level technology groups as per the official classification scheme, a precise
recording and grouping of all data is not possible. Hence, only data provided at the 5-digit level is retained
so that all the data can be coded into technology levels.
5Although Loschky (2010) differentiates between low-, medium low-, medium high-, and high-
technology, the upper two categories are pooled together. This is done for two reasons: (1) Retaining
consistency with the classification of industries used in the dependent variable, which is based on the 2-
digit level of ISIC Rev. 3. The distinction between medium-high technology and high technology is made
on a deeper level of product classification which often involves four digits, and pooling the top categories
together avoids the resulting overlaps of medium-high and high technology sectors in the wage inequal-
ity measure. (2) The trade share of the combined category is already relatively small (around 20% on
average), so separating between the categories would lead to more missings, thereby aggravating country
composition effects and further complicating the analysis with the introduction of a fourth category.
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Figure 4.1: Total trade (country average), in constant (2005) bn. USD
Notes. Nominal USD values from comtrade have been deflated using the US
GDP deflator from the WDI. Total trade is the sum of exports and imports.
Figure 4.2: Trade by technology levels (imports and exports)
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4.3.1.3 Inequality: a sectoral approach
This paper considers the effects of trade on wage inequality rather than income inequality,
which is more frequently analyzed in the literature. This more narrow focus has several
advantages for the purpose of this paper. It is closer to the theoretical argument that the
influence of trade and technology on inequality works via their impact on skill premia. Skill
premia directly affect the wage structure, but presumably have a weaker impact on overall
income, which has many more components besides wage income and where household
formation and composition plays an important role. One would have to identify the
impact of trade on the return to other production factors such as capital and land which
are both a source of comparative advantage in international trade and a component of
income. Also, wage data are more comparable across countries than the available income
data, which differ considerably in both quality and content both between countries and
over time.
A Theil index of between-sectoral wage inequality has been constructed to serve as the
dependent variable in the empirical analysis. The index is based on the UNIDO industrial
statistics on manufacturing, using data from 1970 to 2010. Although a similar index has
been built by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), it is not clear which data
enter their index, as the raw data require several choices as to which sectors to include in
order to retain consistency and ensure comparability over time. Hence, the index has been
re-calculated for the entire time period. Different versions of the index are employed to
test the robustness of the results to the choices made in obtaining a consistent inequality
measure. A discussion of the advantages and weaknesses of the sectoral approach using
the UNIDO data vis--vis Deininger and Squire’s (1996) more frequently used individual-
based dataset of Gini coefficients can be found in Conceição and Galbraith (2000). The
main results are robust to using the UTIP index rather than the newly calculated index,
as discussed in the robustness checks.
Similar to the technology classification, the UNIDO statistics are also based on the ISIC
sectoral classification and thus match the trade data perfectly. The entire analytical set-up
is based on a sectoral approach. It hence captures sector-biased (”asymmetric”) rather
than ”simple” factor-biased technological change which affects all sectors of the economy
to more or less the same extent (symmetric). There are two reasons for choosing the sector-
based approach. First, the technology content of trade flows is measured by the technology
content of the traded goods, which is based on the classification of the respective industry
from low- to high technology. This measure does not capture differences in the within-
industry composition of skills - it can therefore only explain changes in the distribution of
wages between industries, which is what the inequality index measures. Second, a sector
bias of skills is a much more reasonable assumption than simple factor bias, especially
if one drops the unrealistic assumption of the homogeneity of labor. A highly qualified
worker in the metal working industry is most likely to have different kinds of skills than a
highly qualified worker in, say, the apparel industry. Even though they may have the same
level of qualification, the wage premia of the two are likely to be driven up to a different
extent by factor-biased SBTC. Similar to the terminology used by Haskel and Slaughter
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(2002), the term sector-biased SBTC is used here to include not only the obvious sector-
specific SBTC, but also the pervasive, asymmetric factor-biased SBTC because it affects
some sectors more than others.6
One drawback of the sector-focused approach is that factor-biased SBTC which affects
sectors asymmetrically can be conflated in the computation of industry wage averages,
which the employed between-sector inequality measure relies on. The problem arises
because the skill-composition of the workforce varies between sectors. A numerical example
for the problem can be found in part B of appendix 4. However, there is little reason to
suspect that results will be distorted systematically, and the between-unit measure can be
interpreted as the lower bound to overall inequality (Conceição and Ferreira 2000)
The dataset resulting from the construction of the Theil index contains more than
3000 observations over the years 1970-2010, but the observations and countries covered
are reduced substantially in the course of the sample construction. The between-sector








with S denoting the different sectors, s=1, ..., S. ys represents the wage share of sector s,
defined as the sector average over the total average wage of all industries. ns represents
each sector’s population share, defined as the sector’s population Ns over total popula-
tion N (cf. Theil (1967): 95). The measure is not uniformly bounded upwards, which
makes intuitive interpretation of its values difficult. It therefore enters the regression in
log-specification to ease interpretation. The development of the (in-sample) Theil index
over the sample period (1970-2010) is displayed in figure 4.3.7 As with trade, there is a
clearly discernible upward trend over time.
4.3.1.4 Control variables
Technological change
The difficulty with including technological change in empirical analyses is measurement.
Even though efforts have been made to find appropriate proxies, technological change is
often simply defined as the unexplained residual of wage determination models. As argued
by Topel (1997: 60), this ”makes it nearly impossible for [the theory that technological
6While there are several theoretical analyses on the effects of factor- vs. sector-biased SBTC on wages
(see, e.g., the studies referred to by Haskel and Slaughter 2002. Stehrer (2010) points out that the results
depend on the specific assumptions of the theoretical models and there is no conclusive overall result.
Unfortunately, there are only few studies that empirically examine the importance of sector- vs. factor-
biased technical change and they are limited to developed countries. The results do, however, all indicate an
important role of sector-biased SBTC in explaining relative wages. Haskel and Slaughter (2002) conclude
that the sector bias of SBTC is the decisive factor in explaining changes in skill premia, but they also find
a smaller role for a factor bias. De Santis (2002) also finds in his analysis of a general equilibrium model
with H-O-trade applied to US and UK data that sector-biased technical change performs relatively better
than factor-biased technical change in explaining the data.
7Note that in line with the explanations in chapter 3, the ”dynamic” version of the index developed
there is used.
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Figure 4.3: Development of the Theil index of inter-industry wage inequality
Notes. The graph is based on the estimation sample of countries.
change, altering the demand for the two kinds of labor by changing their relative pro-
ductivities, is responsible for an increase in wage inequality] to fail.” An attempt to find
a measure of technological change has been made by Jaumotte et al. (2013), who use
the share of domestically produced information and communications technology capital
in the total capital stock. The variable turns out to significantly increase inequality in
both developed and developing countries while trade itself has an equalizing effect on
the income distribution. However, technological change in developing countries is likely
to start at much less sophisticated levels of technology, which this measure does not cap-
ture. Technological change would consequently be underestimated. Zhu and Trefler (2005)
use labor productivity to measure technological change and also find a positive relation-
ship with trade. Gourdon (2011) argues that total factor productivity (TFP) would be
more appropriate but also uses labor productivity in his analysis because of better data
availability. Lipsey and Carlaw (2004) challenge the interpretation of TFP as measuring
technological change. They argue that positive changes in TFP simply reflect the surplus
returns that emerge from investing in new technologies which are necessary to recoup the
investment. Consequently, if there are no surplus returns, technological change goes un-
measured. Nevertheless, although it may underestimate the true extent of technological
change, TFP-based measures are the best feasible option given the data available. As long
as the unmeasured components of TFP are not occurring systematically, this merely adds
noise to the data.
To arrive at a measure of technological change, I calculate a productivity index which
decomposes observed changes in the input-output ratio of production into different com-
ponents. Besides the different aspects of technical and scale efficiency, this also entails
a component of technical change, capturing movements in the production frontier. Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is employed to estimate the technological frontier, defined
as the maximum level of TFP observed in all the production units of the data. The DPIN
program (V.3), developed and provided by O’Donnell (2014), uses linear programs for
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estimation. Of the several available productivity indices, a Färe-Primont index is chosen
since it fulfills the transitivity criterion by which obtained values can be meaningfully
compared across time as well as production units.8 The UNIDO data, which have partly
already been used in the inequality index, are exploited again for the calculation of the
index. Besides wages, the dataset also contains information on capital, output, and value
added. In order to not get biased results due to unaccounted intermediate inputs, value
added rather than output is used as the output measure, and both wages and capital are
included as inputs. Unfortunately, the data on capital are scarce, and using the TFP
technological frontier reduces the sample by 40%, despite the imputation of missings as
described below. The index is therefore estimated again measuring only labor produc-
tivity. The same procedure as for the TFP index is applied, but using only labor as an
input. The correlation analysis between the total- and the labor-productivity indices for
those cases where both are available suggests that they capture the same movements of
the production frontier in all but a few countries. Hence, the labor productivity index is
used in the preferred specifications as it results in wider country coverage, and the TFP
index is employed as a robustness check, yielding similar results. As the data are reported
at the sectoral level, sectors are ”production units” in the estimation of productivity.9 The
technically most efficient sector determines the production frontier, which is then used as
the control variable for technological change in the regressions. Three different versions of
the index are constructed, which use different sectors and imputation methods for miss-
ing values: One wherein missing sectors are substituted for by other sectors (imputation
across sectors), one wherein the same procedure is applied but only those sectors which
have less than 50% missings are used, and one wherein all sectors are used and missings are
substituted for with values from the same sector in earlier years.10 The index relying on
cross-imputed values is used in the preferred estimations as it adds no ”new” information
from other years to the data in a given year. As a robustness check, the other two indices
are tested as well and the results show that they yield virtually the same estimates (see
table 4.7).
Labor supply
Value added in agriculture is included as a supply-side control variable in the spirit of
Lewis’ (1954) dual-sector model. The variable is supposed to measure the amount of un-
skilled surplus labor in an economy, which might prevent wages at the very bottom of the
distribution from rising despite increased demand through trade and/or technology. The
data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Value added in
agriculture is chosen over the share of employment in agriculture, which seems closer to
the labor supply it is supposed to capture, and has been used by, e.g., Jaumotte et al.
8The Färe-Primont index has been developed by O’Donnell (2014) and is based on the ratio of two
versions of the (more commonly known) Malmquist index developed by Färe and Primont (2012).
9Productivity is estimated separately across country, as the DPIN program does not allow a multi-level
equation system (country and sectoral level). Values can therefore only be meaningfully compared within
a country over time. Though the within-estimator is used in the empirical analysis, this does not represent
a problem here.
10Values from earlier years are used in order to not overestimate technological progress, which can
reasonably be assumed to evolve positively over time. Values from subsequent years are only used in the
exceptional cases where no values are available for previous years.
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(2013), due to a greater country coverage. In preliminary tests on the data, the two mea-
sures produce the same results.
Human capital
Although countries have already been grouped according to their relative human capital
endowments, education levels still matter as they constitute a (short-term) measure of the
supply of skilled labor, which can mitigate pressure on high-skilled wages, and reduce skill
premia. The same linearly interpolated Barro and Lee (2013a) data are used as for the
country classification.11
FDI
Inward FDI flows (taken from UNCTAD) are included (in Mio. USD) in order to control
for an alternative source of technology transfer likely to be correlated with trade. The
direction and form of the effect has not been established unambiguously in the literature
(on a review of recent results from empirical studies, see Figini and Gorg 2011). However,
since the assumption that FDI influences inequality via skill premia follows the same line
of argument as the hypotheses on the effects of trade, the variable has been frequently
included in analyses on the effects of trade on income inequality (e.g., Jaumotte et al.
2013, Gourdon 2011, and a number of country case studies) and has been often found to
significantly increase inequality.
GDP
GDP is included in order to control for ”size-effects”: All other things equal, richer
economies trade more in absolute terms and hence without taking economic size into
account, one might hypothesize that larger countries are always more (un-)equal, depend-
ing on the assumed effect of trade on inequality. On the other hand, larger economies
tend to trade less in relative terms due to a larger domestic market, so the overall ef-
fect remains unclear. Real expenditure-based GDP in (2005) PPP adjusted USD is taken
from the Penn World Tables, Version 8.0 (Feenstra et al. 2015), and the variable enters in
logarithms.
A list of the countries in the sample, as well as the in-sample means of the most
important variables can be found in appendix table 4.A.1.
4.3.2 Model specification





Indices t and i denote year and country, respectively. Trade covers the different specifica-
tions of the trade variable (e.g., interactions with country dummies, separate consideration
of imports and exports), which enters the model with a one-period lag to allow for a time
lag in the adoption of imported technology.12 X is the set of k control variables, all of
11The fact that the same measure is used does not affect the estimates, neither for the aggregated, nor
the disaggregated (education-based) country group data. In fact, the impact of the education variable on
the coefficients of interest is negligible. Results are available upon request.
12The inclusion of the trade variable with a lag of 1 period is chosen for several reasons. Descriptive
correlations between trade in different technology levels and the inequality measure suggest that the first
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which enter the regression in levels, and some of which are lagged by one (FDI) or two
(technological change) periods. Both country fixed effects (δi) and time dummies (yt) are
included. εi,t denotes the usual error term.
Even though the inter-industry Theil index exhibits less inertia than other measures of
income inequality such as the Gini index, misspecification tests in a static model indicate
the presence of autocorrelation. A dynamic specification is therefore appropriate. The
dynamic fixed effects OLS model delivers biased estimates (primarily of the lagged de-
pendent variable) in a finite sample due to the correlation between the lagged dependent
variable and the error term as described by Nickell (1981) and therefore referred to as
”Nickell bias,” or LSDV bias. Although alternative (IV-based) estimation techniques are
available for dynamic panel models, the most widely used being the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bond 1991), the preferred specification here is the sim-
ple FE model. Tentative faith is put in these estimates for two reasons: First, the LSDV
bias is a problem of small T, and although an average of 16-19 years is not yet ”large T”
(starting from around 20 years), it is not considered small either. Second, while the bias
is quite severe in the autoregressive (AR) term, it is much smaller for the ””-variables,
i.e., all other (”control-”) variables in the model. Results from several simulation studies
suggest that the bias amounts to less than one percent of the coefficient estimate given the
values of and T in the panel at hand (e.g., Judson and Owen 1999; Köhler et al. 2011). A
robustness check using GMM is nevertheless conducted, indicating that the LSDV bias is
not a problem in the present sample given that the more precisely estimated coefficients
change very little between fixed effects and the GMM specification and even increase in
several instances.
4.4 Results and Discussion
For testing hypotheses about the impact of trade on wage inequality in different country
groups, at different technology levels, and from different trading partners, many possible
specifications can be employed. At the most disaggregated level of the trade data and
with the introduction of the country dummies, the number of trade variables would rise
to 72, which is not operational given that the number of cross-sections is around 60. The
approach taken is to start from the most aggregated level and to move stepwise to more
disaggregated specifications. Total trade values are investigated first, before moving to
exports and imports separately. Each group is further disaggregated by technology, and
differential impacts in countries of different relative education levels are tested in the next
step.
The technological change variable is included with a two-year time lag in the preferred
specification. This is done because in its contemporary version, technological change is
likely to be influenced by trade itself, which also enters the model with a one period
lag. The impact of the variable is interpreted as follows: If the coefficients are affected
by the inclusion of the variable, this means that the observed effects on wage inequality
lag is the most relevant one. Furthermore, most of the literature has used one-period lagged trade variables.
Lastly, the inclusion of further lags would significantly reduce the estimation sample.
CHAPTER 4. THE IMPACT OF TRADE ON WAGE INEQUALITY 135
are possibly not due to trade, but rather that both variables are at least partly driven
by domestic technological change. The effect can of course also go the other way, i.e.,
technological change can be disequalizing and generate trade flows which have per se an
equalizing impact, in which case the two opposing effects may become apparent only after
technological change is controlled for. H-O theory does not yield any predictions about the
effect of imports on the distribution of factor rewards - they are merely the mirror image
of a country’s specialization according to its comparative advantage, which is reflected in
the export structure. The specific factors model on the other hand would suggest that
imports may have distributional effects. In particular, skill-intensive imports may lower
the gains from trade for those at the upper end of the wage distribution and thereby
mitigate disequalizing technology transfer effects which exert pressure on skill premia.13
4.4.1 Aggregate Trade
Table 4.2 shows the results for the most basic specification, where all trade flows (imports
and exports) have been added up.14 Trade is significantly negatively related to wage
inequality, but in terms of economic size, the effect is rather small. According to the
coefficient estimate, a 1 billion dollar increase in trade would reduce wage inequality by
little over 0.04 percent. The effect persists with the inclusion of the control variable for
technological change (column 2), but is reduced substantially and becomes insignificant.
This indicates that a major part of the effect on wage inequality attributed to trade
might indeed stem from technological change, which, in line with expectations, leads to
higher wage inequality and is significant at the five percent level. As for the remaining
insignificant control variables, FDI has the expected positive coefficient, but the sign on
the education variable is not in line with expectations: a higher (short-run) supply of
skilled labor, as captured by the ”years of education” control variable, does not seem to
lower the pressure on skill premia. Rather, even within the already more homogeneous
country groups, a better educated workforce is associated with more inequality. Although
insignificant, the fact that the variable is reduced substantially by the inclusion of the
technological change control variable suggests that this effect could have something to do
with its absorptive capacity, wherein a more educated workforce is more apt to adopt
(inequality-increasing) technology. A higher share of unskilled workers, proxied by the
share of value added from agriculture in GDP, does not seem to have any appreciable
impact on wage inequality given the small and volatile coefficient. Finally, a higher GDP
seems to be associated with lower inequality, which might have to do with the fact that
large economies trade relatively less, but the effect is not significant, either.
To check whether the effect is driven by trade of a particular technology intensity, trade
flows are decomposed into low-, medium-, and high technology in columns 3 and 4 of table
4.2. Although none of the coefficients are significant, it is interesting to again note the
substantial decrease in the coefficients on all three variables once the technological change
13Low-skill intensive imports on the other hand could theoretically increase wage inequality since they
compete with local industries employing labor from the lower end of the wage distribution. However,
low-skilled labor is arguably much less specific than skilled labor and hence less susceptible to such effects.
14Including imports and exports separately does not yield any new insights, with neither variable being
individually significant. Results are available upon request.
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Table 4.2: Results total trade
Dep. var.: ln(Theil) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Theil)(t-1) 0.789*** 0.781*** 0.788*** 0.781***











GDP -0.0662 -0.0280 -0.0692 -0.0258
(0.0716) (0.0865) (0.0759) (0.0910)
Edcuation 0.0189 0.00790 0.0199 0.00763
(0.0352) (0.0347) (0.0351) (0.0353)
ValAddAgri 0.00224 -0.000368 0.00213 -0.000188
(0.00414) (0.00429) (0.00427) (0.00463)
FDI(t-1) 0.00290 0.00290 0.00252 0.00299
(0.00414) (0.00322) (0.00415) (0.00338)
Quartile2(LMEC) 0.0919 0.0915 0.0926 0.0903
(0.0678) (0.0852) (0.0681) (0.0858)
Quartile3(UMEC) 0.119 0.115 0.120 0.114
(0.0819) (0.1000) (0.0825) (0.0999)
Observations 1,151 903 1,151 903
R2 0.689 0.679 0.689 0.679
# of countries 60 58 60 58
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
LMEC = lower middle education country, UMEC = upper middle education country.
control is included in column 4. The sign on the low- and medium-technology coefficients
even reverses. This again provides indication that the previously discussed problem of
omitted variable bias is present, and that controlling for technological change is important
in order not to falsely attribute technology effects to trade.15
4.4.2 Disaggregated Results: Technology
Next, imports and exports are considered separately, while at the same time retaining the
three different technology levels. Columns 1 and 2 of table 4.3 show the export regressions
and columns 3 and 4 the import ones. Total imports (exports) are included as a control
variable, and the first and second column of each panel contain the estimates with and
15For simplicity reasons, the coefficients will not be shown in the remaining tables. Instead, the top row
will indicate whether the technological change variable is included in the model.
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without the technological change control, respectively, as also indicated in the top row.
The full set of the previously discussed control variables is included, but omitted from the
table for simplicity.16
Table 4.3: Results imports and exports by technology levels
Dep. Var.: ln(Theil) Exports Imports
No tech Tech(-2) No tech Tech(-2)
Lt trade(t-1) -0.00462 -0.00119 0.00827 0.00206
(0.00306) (0.00352) (0.00801) (0.00864)
Mt trade(t-1) 0.00692** 0.00337 -0.00968 -0.00512
(0.00313) (0.00448) (0.00600) (0.00583)
Ht trade(t-1) -0.000422 -1.11e-05 -0.00122 -0.000582
(0.00143) (0.00147) (0.00148) (0.00199)
Totalimp/exp(t-1) -0.00187 -0.00158 0.000544 0.000712
(0.00132) (0.00147) (0.000853) (0.000498)
Observations 1,151 903 1,151 903
R2 0.690 0.679 0.690 0.679
Number of countries 60 58 60 58
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ht = high technology,
mt = medium-low technology, lt = low technology.
A few interesting results emerge. First, the coefficient on high-technology trade re-
mains negative, small, and insignificant for both exports and imports. Second, the signs
on both medium- and low-technology trade flows are opposite for imports and exports. The
negative coefficient of low-technology exports as well as the positive sign on medium tech-
nology exports are in line with expectations and the hypotheses derived from South-South
trade theory, but remain insignificant. Third, while it seems that medium-low technology
exports are significantly associated with increasing wage inequality, this effect disappears
with the inclusion of technological change in column 2. It would appear that technological
change is driving at least part of the positive coefficient of medium-low technology trade
- in fact, the coefficient estimates suggest that around half of the effect is due to tech-
nological change rather than trade. Finally, it is also worth noting that once the trade
flows are disaggregated a bit more, some of the coefficients are substantially larger than
those on the aggregate trade variable in table 4.2. For example, the coefficient estimate
of column 1 would imply that a billion dollar increase in medium-technology intensive
export is associated with approximately 0.7 percent lower wage inequality (although, as
just discussed, the effect actually attributable to trade is only around half of that).
16The estimates for the control variables for columns 2 and 4 can also be found in appendix table 4.A.4,
columns 1 and 3.
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4.4.3 Disaggregated Results: Country Groups
As summarized by the hypotheses in table 4.1, the next set of regressions uses country
interactions to test whether differential effects materialize in particular groups of countries.
The lack of results for high-technology trade, for example, could be due to opposing effects
in different country groups which offset each other, which can be disentangled in this more
differentiated set-up. I then test whether these can be attributed to imports and exports
separately. Estimation results are presented in table 4.4 and are ordered according to
technology, starting with high technology trade. Again, the control variables are included,
but not shown. Results for total trade, comprising both imports and exports, is shown in
the first panel, and exports and imports are separately accounted for in panels 2 and 3,
respectively.
In line with the results from the previous set of regressions, the effects of high-
technology exports are not only nowhere near significance, but also smaller than the
coefficients on other technology groups throughout all regressions. In particular, contrary
to what has been found in the previous literature, there is no evidence for a disequaliz-
ing technology transfer through imports in the more educated country groups, where the
coefficients are in fact negative.
The results from columns 1 and 2 indicate that the previously found positive coefficient
on medium-technology trade mainly occurs in the more educated country groups, which
is in line with the South-South trade logic and the adaptive capacity argument. Both
exports and imports have negative signs, but are not separately significant. Despite not
being significant, the results on medium-low tech exports confirm the previous patterns:
the coefficients are highly affected by the inclusion of the technological change control
variable, with the coefficient increasing substantially for LMECs, and turning positive for
UMECs. No such effects are found for imports, rendering credibility to the story of a third
variable bias through technological change, which works via exports.
For low technology trade, surprisingly, a significant disequalizing association emerges
in the least educated country groups. When consulting columns 3-6, it is clear that
this effect arises mainly through low-technology imports, where the coefficients are larger
and the positive coefficient in LECs is significant as long as technological change is not
included. One explanation for the negative sign could be import competition; another one
could be the introduction of labor-saving technology. The lack of results pertaining to low
technology imports once technological change is controlled for supports the hypotheses
derived from the H-O and the specific factors models, as they do not predict any effects
for low-skill (and hence unspecific) factor intensive imports. The negative coefficients in
the other country groups on the other hand are in line with H-O theory, with clearer
results for exports, which are significant for LMECs.
Another point worth mentioning is that again, coefficients increase compared to the
previous, more aggregate specification. It seems that the more detailed the specification,
the more it is able to capture the various heterogeneous effects of trade flows, which, at
the aggregate level, cancel each other out and lead to a very small overall coefficient.
To provide an example of the size of the effect, the significant coefficient in lower-middle
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Table 4.4: Results by technology level and country group
(1) (2) (3)
Dep.var.: ln(Theil) Total trade Exports Imports
No tech Tech(-2) No tech Tech(-2) No tech Tech(-2)
Ht trade(t-1) 0.0107 0.0121 -0.0232 -0.0132 0.0137 0.0166
(0.0175) (0.0154) (0.0287) (0.0296) (0.0195) (0.0203)
LMEC*ht trade(t-1) -0.0121 -0.0140 0.0205 0.00279 -0.0147 -0.0165
(0.0176) (0.0154) (0.0299) (0.0318) (0.0195) (0.0200)
UMEC *ht trade(t-1) -0.0104 -0.0120 0.0244 0.0127 -0.0137 -0.0166
(0.0177) (0.0158) (0.0292) (0.0300) (0.0196) (0.0205)
Mt trade(t-1) -0.0181 -0.0196 0.00300 -0.0124 -0.0371 -0.0338
(0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0178) (0.0232) (0.0252)
LMEC*mt trade(t-1) 0.0198 0.0263* 0.0105 0.0401 0.0227 0.0299
(0.0130) (0.0137) (0.0183) (0.0259) (0.0244) (0.0269)
UMEC*mt trade(t-1) 0.0174 0.0170 -0.00361 0.0101 0.0301 0.0253
(0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0178) (0.0247) (0.0269)
Lt trade(t-1) 0.0185* 0.0178* 0.0113 0.0181 0.0468* 0.0359
(0.00961) (0.00973) (0.00957) (0.0125) (0.0273) (0.0304)
LMEC*lt trade(t-1) -0.0193** -0.0229** -0.0195* -0.0310** -0.0363 -0.0387
(0.00944) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0153) (0.0278) (0.0328)
UMEC*lt trade(t-1) -0.0194* -0.0163 -0.00949 -0.0146 -0.0501 -0.0383
(0.0100) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0147) (0.0305) (0.0353)
Observations 1,151 903 1,151 928 1,151 903
R2 0.689 0.680 0.690 0.302 0.691 0.680
# of countries 60 58 60 58 60 58
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ht = high technology, mt =
medium-low technology, lt = low technology. LMEC = lower middle education country, UMEC = upper middle
education country.
education countries indicates that a billion dollar increase in low-technology exports is
associated with a decrease in wage inequality of around 3 percent. Given the yearly mean
of 5.7 billion for LMECs, this is a potentially rather powerful equalizer. It is also worth
noting that again, the import coefficients are affected much less than the export ones by
the inclusion of the technological change control variable, supporting the view that the
variable indeed captures what it is supposed to: domestic technological change, rather
than technological change through trade.
Summary of results
Summing up the insights obtained from the regressions, one can extract four main
findings from the many results. First, although the coefficients are mostly insignificant,
low-technology trade seems to be generally equalizing, as predicted by H-O theory.
Second, medium-low technology exports have positive coefficients and seem to be dis-
equalizing in all but the countries in the lowest education quartile. This finding fits with
the South-South trade story as well as the technology transfer hypotheses, in particular
the absorptive capacity argument. Third, there is evidence of technological change driv-
ing both exports and inequality in the export regressions, in particular in the medium-low
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technology sectors and in the more skill-abundant countries, underscoring the need to
control for the variable. As expected, the technological change control plays a lesser role
for imports, with a lot of coefficients remaining virtually unchanged with the inclusion
of the variable, which is in stark contrast to the export results and renders credibility to
both the measure and the supposition of omitted variable bias.
Lastly, in contrast to the findings of previous studies, no results emerge for high-
technology trade. While it may not be surprising that there are no findings pertaining
to exports since little domestic technological advancements in high-tech sectors can be
expected in the countries which are relatively less endowed with skilled labor, the fact that
there are also no results for imports is surprising. In fact, not only are there no significant
positive effects, but the coefficient on high-technology imports is negative throughout
all specifications, as well as in upper-middle education countries which arguably are the
most apt to introducing such technology. Rather, most technological advancements seems
to take place in medium-low technology sectors, both through domestic technological
change which also boosts exports, and through technology transfer through imports in the
relatively more educated country groups. The latter result should be taken with caution,
however, since none of the import coefficients are significant.
4.5 Robustness checks
Although the structure of the present dataset is not ideal for GMM estimation given the
comparatively long T of 16-19 years relative to the number of groups (58-60), the method is
employed in order to demonstrate that the effect of the LSDV bias on the estimates of the
”β”-variables, i.e., the variables of interest, does not change the results substantially. In
order to avoid the problem of ”too many instruments” (Roodman 2009), the instrument set
has been restricted in several ways. The results from difference GMM two-step estimation
are shown in columns 2 and 4 of table 4.5, and compared with those obtained using FE in
columns 1 and 3. Instruments are restricted to the first few valid lags, and are additionally
collapsed in order to keep the number of instruments down. Orthogonal deviations are used
in order to mitigate the unbalancedness of the panel. Since the concern here is exclusively
with the LSDV bias, only the lagged dependent variable is treated as endogenous.
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Table 4.5: GMM results, total trade
Dep. var.: ln(Theil) (1) (2) (3) (4)
FE GMM FE GMM
ln(Theil)(t-1) 0.781*** 0.856*** 0.781*** 0.811***
(0.0365) (0.192) (0.0368) (0.212)
Totaltrade(t-1) -0.000105 -0.000141
(0.000509) (0.000714)
Total lt(t-1) 0.000747 0.00243
(0.00328) (0.00483)
Total mt(t-1) -0.000814 -0.00214
(0.00320) (0.00476)
Total ht(t-1) -1.61e-05 0.000216
(0.000889) (0.00174)
GDP -0.0280 0.00243 -0.0258 -0.0183
(0.0865) (0.120) (0.0910) (0.155)
Education 0.00790 -0.000308 0.00763 0.000818
(0.0347) (0.0358) (0.0353) (0.0492)
ValAddAgri -0.000368 -0.000611 -0.000188 0.00127
(0.00429) (0.00509) (0.00463) (0.00558)
FDI(t-1) 0.00290 0.00290 0.00299 0.00302
(0.00322) (0.00349) (0.00338) (0.00344)
Tech(t-2) 0.244** 0.268*** 0.243** 0.265***
(0.0915) (0.0831) (0.0917) (0.0776)
Quartile2(LMEC) 0.0915 0.0806 0.0903 0.149
(0.085) (0.101) (0.0858) (0.124)
Quartile3(UMEC) 0.115 0.122 0.114 -0.0183
(0.100) (0.118) (0.0999) (0.155)
Observations 903 845 903 845
R2 0.679 0.679
Number of countries 58 58 58 58
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Number of instruments 56 57
Hansen Test 0.125 0.141
AR(1) 0.00560 0.0115
AR(2) 0.148 0.151
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lags have been restricted
to lengths 3-10 in column 2, and 5-13 in column 4. The depth of lag lengths has been guided by the
misspecification tests. Similar results emerge with varying lag lengths (results available upon request).
Ht = high technology, mt = medium-low technology, lt = low technology. LMEC = lower middle
education country, UMEC = upper middle education country.
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Results show that the negative impact of trade does not vanish when GMM is em-
ployed - only some of the coefficients are reduced slightly. Generally, the more precise
the coefficient estimate, the more stable it is across different specifications. Some of the
more precisely estimated coefficients (most notably, the technological change control vari-
able, but also trade) even slightly increase with the GMM estimator. The coefficient on
the lagged dependent variable does increase more substantially, which is in line with the
prediction that the LSDV bias entails a relatively larger downward bias on the AR-term.
Overall, the results do not provide indication that LSDV bias threatens the validity of the
FE estimates.17
Table 4.6 contains the estimates obtained when using different versions of the technol-
ogy index, as described in section 4.3.1.4. Only the results for the preferred specification
of the relatively aggregated trade variables are shown here (corresponding to columns 2
and 4 of table 4.2), and the original results using the cross-imputed index are displayed
in columns 1 and 4 for comparison. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and
the country group dummies are omitted. Both the coefficients and the standard errors
change very little when the alternative versions of the technology index are used, and the
technology indices themselves also yield similar results, although the one using only part
of the sectors (columns 3 and 6) is insignificant, which is in line with the fact that it
contains fewer sectors and consequently yields less clear results.
Robustness to the TFP technological change index is tested in the following. The
estimates in table 4.7 correspond to columns 2 and 4 of table 4.2, which are displayed
again here in columns 1 and 4 for comparison. One can see that the result on the aggregate
(total) trade variable does not change substantially. A few control variables change signs,
most notably the education variable. However, these are very likely to stem from the
smaller sample size rather than the difference in the technological change variable, as the
results in columns 4 and 5 as well as 7 and 8 suggest, which contain the estimates for
each index when executed on a (substantially smaller) common sample. The same can
be said about the observed change in the point estimate of the trade variables, which
predominantly stem from the difference in sample composition. In fact, the estimates
on the small, constant sample yield very similar coefficients on all variables, with the
exception of the technological change index itself. It appears that the TFP index is a
little more powerful in capturing movements in the technological frontier, as shown by the
larger, and more significant, point estimate in the constant sample and the larger effect
it has on the trade variables. The true extent of omitted variable bias might therefore be
even slightly larger than what was found in the above estimations.
Because results could be more volatile at disaggregated levels, the remaining speci-
fications are checked for robustness as well and displayed in the appendix. Table 4.A.4
contains the results for trade decomposed by the trading partner’s relative education clas-
sification, and the decomposition by the country group is displayed in table 4.A.5. The
original results are displayed in columns 1 and 3 in both tables. Again, the estimates are
qualitatively similar between the TFP and the labor productivity index, but are often less
significant with the latter. The overall results of testing the TFP-based versus the labor
17The GMM results for the remaining specifications can be found in appendix tables 4.A.3 and 4.A.4.
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Table 4.6: Robustness of FE results to different labor productivity indices























Totaltrade(t-1) -0.000105 -0.000107 -0.000114
(0.000509) (0.000509) (0.000507)
Total lt(t-1) 0.000747 0.000891 0.000845
(0.00328) (0.00327) (0.00328)
Total mt(t-1) -0.000814 -0.000919 -0.00103
(0.00320) (0.00316) (0.00318)
Total ht(t-1) -1.61e-05 -1.46e-05 5.36e-05
(0.000889) (0.000864) (0.000874)
GDP -0.0280 -0.0227 -0.0265 -0.0258 -0.0200 -0.0244
(0.0865) (0.0869) (0.0871) (0.0910) (0.0915) (0.0916)
Education 0.00790 0.00931 0.0100 0.00763 0.00903 0.00947
(0.0347) (0.0342) (0.0348) (0.0353) (0.0349) (0.0355)
ValAddAgri -0.000368 0.000105 -0.000139 -0.000188 0.000320 3.82e-05
(0.00429) (0.00435) (0.00436) (0.00463) (0.00471) (0.00472)
FDI(t-1) 0.00290 0.00293 0.00311 0.00299 0.00302 0.00326
(0.00322) (0.00320) (0.00323) (0.00338) (0.00337) (0.00341)
Tech(t-2) 0.244** 0.231** 0.266** 0.243** 0.232** 0.267**
(0.0915) (0.0997) (0.131) (0.0917) (0.0998) (0.132)
Observations 903 903 903 903 903 903
R2 0.679 0.679 0.678 0.679 0.679 0.678
# of countries 58 58 58 58 58 58
Year FE
& controls
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lags have been restricted
to lengths 3-10 in column 2, and 5-13 in column 4. The depth of lag lengths has been guided by the
misspecification tests. Similar results emerge with varying lag lengths (results available upon request). Ht =
high technology, mt = medium-low technology, lt = low technology. LMEC = lower middle education country,
UMEC = upper middle education country.
productivity index indicate that for both exports and imports, the coefficients are similar,
with occasional changes in significance as well as magnitude, and very few (insignificant)
sign changes, of which at least a fraction can be attributed to the smaller sample.
As another robustness check, the Theil index provided by UTIP is used as the depen-
dent variable. Estimation results can be found in appendix tables 4.A.6, 4.A.7, and 4.A.8,
with the original results displayed in columns 1 and 3 of each table. The UTIP index
provides shorter time coverage of little under 14 years and hence entails a larger dynamic
panel bias and less reliable FE estimates. Despite the fact that this would bias coefficients
upward, the point estimate for the aggregate (total) trade variable is smaller and less pre-
cisely estimated than with the newly constructed Theil index. Of the remaining variables,
however, all of those estimated with a certain degree of precision are similar to the original
results but slightly larger with the UTIP index. The lagged dependent variable shows a
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Table 4.7: Robustness to the TFP index of technological change, table 4.2 results















Tech(t-2) 0.244** 0.212** 0.449 0.861** 0.243** 0.212** 0.477 0.864**
(0.0915) (0.0974) (0.470) (0.353) (0.0917) (0.0982) (0.476) (0.357)
Totaltrade(t-1) -0.000105 -0.000741 0.000959 0.000872
(0.000509) (0.000947) (0.00155) (0.00154)
Total lt(t-1) 0.000747 -0.00310 -0.00302 -0.00273
(0.00328) (0.00361) (0.00484) (0.00453)
Total mt(t-1) -0.000814 -4.96e-05 0.00326 0.00316
(0.00320) (0.00393) (0.00562) (0.00579)
Total ht(t-1) -1.61e-05 -0.000604 0.000665 0.000508
(0.000889) (0.00119) (0.00150) (0.00143)
GDP -0.0280 -0.00645 -0.210 -0.223 -0.0258 -0.0106 -0.217 -0.229
(0.0865) (0.121) (0.216) (0.213) (0.0910) (0.123) (0.218) (0.216)
Education 0.00790 -0.0164 -0.0504 -0.0353 0.00763 -0.0169 -0.0488 -0.0333
(0.0347) (0.0439) (0.0508) (0.0508) (0.0353) (0.0436) (0.0555) (0.0551)
ValAddAgri -0.000368 -0.00312 0.000870 0.00100 -0.000188 -0.00420 -0.000800 -0.000394
(0.00429) (0.00547) (0.00749) (0.00722) (0.00463) (0.00631) (0.00927) (0.00891)
FDI(t-1) 0.00290 0.00647 0.00291 0.00357 0.00299 0.00670 0.00264 0.00317
(0.00322) (0.00629) (0.00700) (0.00711) (0.00338) (0.00691) (0.00774) (0.00776)
Observations 903 552 386 386 903 552 386 386
R2 0.679 0.666 0.629 0.638 0.679 0.667 0.630 0.639
# of countries 58 37 33 33 58 37 33 33
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The lagged dependent variable has
been included in the estimation, but is omitted from the output.
slightly higher degree of inertia, which can be expected to still be downward biased. No-
tably, the technological change control variable is still strongly associated with the UTIP
index, but is slightly smaller and less significant in some of the specifications. This fits
well with the fact that the UTIP also uses other data sources to arrive at their index,
which naturally cannot be expected to have any association with the technology measure
that is intimately connected to the underlying data. The fact that there are no major
changes in the results nevertheless lends support to the validity of the newly constructed
Theil index.18
Finally, an extensive outlier analysis has been conducted, wherein single influential
observations have been identified and deleted from the estimation sample. The overall
results remain qualitatively and quantitatively unaffected.19
18The remaining, more disaggregated specifications have also been tested on the UTIP index. Results
show no qualitative changes between the two measures apart from the already displayed loss in magnitude
and significance when using the UTIP index (available upon request).
19Added-variable and partial-leverage plots, values of Cook’s D, DFBETAs for the trade variables, and
regression results with influential observations excluded are available upon request.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to shed some light on the impact of trade on wage inequal-
ity in developing countries. It expands on the existing literature in four ways: First, by
introducing a newly constructed measure of technological change into the empirical anal-
ysis, it addresses concerns of omitted variable bias. Second, it employs a comparative
advantage-based country classification based on relative skill endowments, thereby incor-
porating previous findings in the literature which demonstrate the superiority of such a
classification over the previously used income-based country categories. Third, it classi-
fies trade flows according to their technology content, measured by the degree of human
capital necessary to produce the goods. Lastly, a consistent version of the Theil index of
inter-industry wage inequality is used which provides a longer and more consistent time
coverage than existing measures.
Estimation results show that the coefficients on the trade variable are rather heteroge-
neous once relative endowments are taken into account and technology effects are separated
from trade effects. Furthermore, their size increases substantially once this heterogeneity
is accounted for, but standard errors remain too large to reach significance.
Introducing a new control variable of technological change, empirical findings demon-
strate the need to control for this source of potential omitted variable bias, since in partic-
ular the export results change substantially with the inclusion of the variable. Some effects
appear only when the variable is included, or disappear with its inclusion. In line with the
previous findings in the literature on skill-biased technological change, the technological
change variable itself is found to significantly and substantially increase wage inequality
throughout all specifications. The fact that the medium technology export variables are
the most sensitive to the inclusion of the technological change variable suggests that this is
also where most of the technological progress seems to be taking place, in particular in the
relatively more skill-endowed developing countries. This is in line with the South-South
trade hypothesis, stating that this is where the medium-skill endowed country groups
should have their comparative advantage.
Regarding technology transfer, the proposition made in the previous literature that
trade to and from developed countries is disequalizing due to the introduction of skill-
biased technological change can only partly be confirmed. No such effects are found for
high-technology trade, neither through exports, nor through imports. In terms of medium
technology, exports have positive coefficients and seem to be disequalizing in all but the
countries in the lowest education quartile. This finding fits with the South-South trade
story as well as the technology transfer hypotheses, in particular the absorptive capacity
argument. It is difficult, however, to disentangle technology transfer from comparative-
advantage, ”trade”-based effects. As for the trade effects, results are generally in line with
Heckscher-Ohlin theory for low-technology trade, where equalizing impacts are mostly
found. Again, the disequalizing for medium-low technology trade is in line with the pre-
dictions of both the South-South trade and the technology transfer hypothesis and it is
difficult to isolate these effects in the current set-up. More research is needed to investigate








































Table 4.A.1: Sample means of main variables


















Argentina 37 0.053 10.86 10.08 3 8.2 6.35 5.82 299676
Bangladesh 29 0.04 1.87 0.89 1 2.8 29.39 0.09 124108
Bulgaria 16 0.068 8.15 0 3 9.6 10.8 3.54 70078
Bolivia 37 0.054 0.52 0.34 2.5 5.4 18.69 0.23 13899
Brazil 40 0.123 24.33 26.95 2 4.3 8.82 10.86 970292
Barbados 37 0.052 0.14 0.08 3 7.4 8.31 0.01 3362
Botswana 11 0.032 2.2 3.18 3 7.9 2.11 0.3 17000
Central African Rep. 28 0.051 0.04 0.03 1 0.9 39.49 0.01 1737
Chile 39 0.062 6.72 8.75 3 7.7 6.93 2.86 110627
China 20 0.091 242.3 320.19 2 6.6 14.78 59.1 5750470
Cte d’Ivoire 30 0.054 1.07 1.02 1 1.3 26.18 0.09 20154
Cameroon 31 0.097 0.58 0.35 1.3 2.9 27.58 0.09 19586
Congo 22 0.077 0.28 0.27 1.5 2.1 13.56 0.03 3303
Colombia 38 0.037 5.21 4.39 2 5.4 16 2.33 212890
Costa Rica 35 0.042 1.26 1.32 3 7.2 11.73 0.35 26220
Cyprus 40 0.026 1.74 0.53 3 8.4 6.61 0.56 10973
Dominican Rep. 29 0.072 0.34 0.21 2 3.8 19.15 0.05 21663
Ecuador 39 0.041 2.05 0.95 2.6 6.1 18.53 0.31 44533
Egypt 35 0.061 6.96 2.97 1.4 3.5 20.05 2.02 168531
Fiji 35 0.053 0.34 0.19 3 7.4 19.63 0.07 3147
Gabon 27 0.077 0.97 0.93 1.5 2.5 6.56 0.04 7098
Ghana 31 0.096 0.4 0.27 2 3.2 56.72 0.02 17474
Gambia 27 0.013 0.02 0.01 1 0.6 29.06 0 709
20Countries classified as ”high education” are in the 4th education quartile at some point in time and used in the aggregation of the trade data in that year. They are:
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belize, Barbados, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Estonia, Finland, Fiji, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hong Kong, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia,








































Honduras 35 0.061 0.18 0.11 2 3.1 25.15 0.02 9474
Indonesia 40 0.082 41.28 58.98 1.7 5.4 13.99 6.04 812897
India 33 0.085 32.24 25.83 1 3.1 26.52 5.57 1616655
Iran 19 0.043 9.67 3.37 1.5 4.1 13.07 1.03 343572
Jordan 39 0.083 2.65 1.41 2.2 5.5 5.8 0.56 13979
Kenya 33 0.078 2.02 1.55 2 4.8 31.05 0.06 38707
Kyrgyzstan 15 0.286 0.47 0.38 3 9.1 36.53 0.07 10466
Lesotho 7 0.247 0.74 0.18 2 5.3 9.34 0.04 2348
Latvia 17 0.044 1.77 0.93 3 9.1 5.91 0.36 18994
Moldova 17 0.017 0.95 0.5 3 9.2 22.47 0.18 9179
Mexico 40 0.055 39.85 12.03 2.1 6.9 5.61 14.14 1032215
Malta 39 0.013 1.35 0.98 3 7.8 3.94 0.24 4788
Mongolia 12 0.068 0.47 0.3 3 8.1 26.26 0.12 6652
Mozambique 16 0.252 0.24 0.05 1 0.8 32.22 0.08 6228
Mauritius 32 0.054 1.56 0.79 2 6.1 9.59 0.09 10669
Malawi 37 0.095 0.18 0.09 1 2.2 40.58 0.01 5945
Malaysia 41 0.033 31.43 32.69 2.7 6.5 16.99 2.8 157322
Pakistan 26 0.075 6.67 5.86 1 3 25.52 0.69 261666
Panama 26 0.052 0.59 0.17 3 7.8 7.85 0.47 19867
Peru 36 0.276 6.23 6.98 3 7.7 8.2 3.11 142417
Philippines 38 0.055 11.92 10.11 3 6.9 21.53 0.81 187871
Poland 21 0.033 97.19 88.6 3 9.8 4.11 16.4 582449
Senegal 28 0.05 0.89 0.39 1.1 3.3 19.84 0.07 13001
Singapore 40 0.055 52.41 56.26 2.4 6.3 0.63 9.25 96904
El Salvador 35 0.06 1.18 0.82 2 5 13.95 0.3 5447
Syria 25 0.13 3.77 2.4 1.3 4.5 22.62 0.51 44857
Thailand 41 0.055 21.73 20.56 2 4.5 16.2 2.17 260430
Trinidad & Tobago 38 0.189 0.92 0.79 3 8.1 1.89 0.55 14581
Tunisia 39 0.166 4.07 2.69 1.4 3.4 15.7 0.47 41407
Turkey 40 0.057 25.16 16.42 2 4.3 20.08 2.67 496604
Tanzania 22 0.114 1.47 0.76 1 4.6 34.96 0.37 28737
Uganda 18 0.189 0.67 0.39 1 3.6 41.07 0.14 18444
Uruguay 35 0.055 1.8 1.62 3 7.6 10.17 0.42 29256
Venezuela 39 0.042 4.65 4.03 2.3 4.6 5.32 0.54 131013
Yemen 10 0.073 1.95 0.22 1 1.7 11.73 0.21 38228
South Africa 11 0.061 27.8 31.65 2 7.8 3.12 3.76 340185
Zambia 27 0.043 1.15 1.06 2 3 14.97 0.03 11764
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Table 4.A.2: GMM estimates, table 4.4 (columns 2 and 4) results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exports Imports
Dep. var.: ln(Theil) No tech Tech(-2) No tech Tech(-2)
ln(Theil)(t-1) 0.780*** 0.811*** 0.781*** 0.838***
(0.0365) (0.236) (0.0362) (0.257)
Total lt(t-1) -0.00158 -0.00160 0.000712 0.000799
(0.00147) (0.00132) (0.000498) (0.000566)
Total mt(t-1) -0.00119 -0.000463 0.00206 0.00353
(0.00352) (0.00563) (0.00864) (0.00695)
Total ht(t-1) 0.00337 0.00245 -0.00512 -0.00622
(0.00448) (0.00864) (0.00583) (0.00490)
Totalimp/exp(t-1) -1.11e-05 0.000282 -0.000582 -0.000225
(0.00147) (0.00305) (0.00199) (0.00220)
GDP -0.0254 -0.00756 -0.0247 -0.00280
(0.0943) (0.126) (0.0903) (0.118)
Education 0.0110 0.00646 0.00824 0.00643
(0.0353) (0.0346) (0.0348) (0.0317)
ValAddAgri -0.00154 -0.00153 -0.00126 -0.00154
(0.00474) (0.00436) (0.00463) (0.00470)
FDI(t-1) 0.00365 0.00347 0.00435 0.00412
(0.00329) (0.00317) (0.00347) (0.00341)
Tech(t-2) 0.241** 0.246*** 0.243** 0.242***
(0.0916) (0.0869) (0.0914) (0.0882)
Quartile2(LMEC) 0.0903 0.0851 0.0893 0.0747
(0.0852) (0.106) (0.0844) (0.103)
Quartile3(UMEC) 0.116 0.111 0.110 0.0929
(0.0990) (0.115) (0.0989) (0.114)
Observations 903 845 903 845
R2 0.679 0.679
# of countries 58 58 58 58
Year FE YES YES YES YES
# of instruments 52 51
Hansen Test 0.856 0.716
Sargan Test 0.753 0.745
AR(1) 0.0168 0.0196
AR(2) 0.163 0.164
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses as indicated in the top column; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Lags have been restricted to lengths 6-8 in column 2, and 6-7 in column 4. The depth of lag lengths has
been guided by the misspecification tests, as well as achieving a realistic value for the lagged dependent
variable, which should be between the OLS-estimate of 0.904 (0-.893) and the FE estimate of column 1
(3) for column 2 (4). Similar results emerge with varying lag lengths (results available upon request).
LMEC = lower middle education country, UMEC = upper middle education country.
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Table 4.A.3: GMM estimates, table 4.4 (columns 2, 4, and 6) results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total trade Exports Imports
Dep. var.: ln(Theil) FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM
ln(Theil)(t-1) 0.778*** 0.803*** 0.778*** 0.844*** 0.778*** 0.819***
(0.0364) (0.263) (0.0360) (0.207) (0.0365) (0.272)
Total ht(t-1) 0.0121 0.0102 -0.0146 -0.0112 -0.0383 -0.0305
(0.0154) (0.0273) (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0353) (0.0571)
LMEC*ht(t-1) -0.0140 -0.0119 -0.0132 -0.0182 0.0166 0.0131
(0.0154) (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0352) (0.0203) (0.0284)
UMEC*ht(t-1) -0.0120 -0.00991 0.00279 0.00955 -0.0165 -0.0127
(0.0158) (0.0297) (0.0318) (0.0411) (0.0200) (0.0300)
Total mt(t-1) -0.0196 -0.0186 0.0127 0.0187 -0.0166 -0.0128
(0.0128) (0.0224) (0.0300) (0.0382) (0.0205) (0.0300)
LMEC*mt(t-1) 0.0263* 0.0245 -0.0124 -0.00919 -0.0338 -0.0287
(0.0137) (0.0274) (0.0178) (0.0208) (0.0252) (0.0382)
UMEC*mt(t-1) 0.0170 0.0150 0.0401 0.00955 0.0299 0.0243
(0.0130) (0.0302) (0.0259) (0.0411) (0.0269) (0.0419)
Total lt(t-1) 0.0178* 0.0177 0.0101 0.00435 0.0253 0.0187
(0.00973) (0.0128) (0.0178) (0.0272) (0.0269) (0.0482)
LMEC*lt(t-1) -0.0229** -0.0222 0.0181 0.0171 0.0359 0.0304
(0.0109) (0.0163) (0.0125) (0.0105) (0.0304) (0.0430)
UMEC*lt(t-1) -0.0163 -0.0150 -0.0310** -0.0283* -0.0387 -0.0329
(0.0111) (0.0199) (0.0153) (0.0147) (0.0328) (0.0458)
Totalimp/exp(t-1) -0.000270 -0.000460 0.000958 0.00106
(0.00169) (0.00147) (0.000785) (0.000984)
GDP -0.0219 -0.00783 -0.0209 0.00973 -0.0313 -0.0139
(0.0943) (0.133) (0.0967) (0.102) (0.0910) (0.136)
Education 0.00764 0.00440 0.0114 0.00454 0.0101 0.00780
(0.0364) (0.0348) (0.0361) (0.0286) (0.0373) (0.0348)
ValAddAgri -9.47e-06 7.53e-05 -0.000925 -0.00113 -0.000881 -0.00129
(0.00474) (0.00446) (0.00498) (0.00456) (0.00462) (0.00502)
FDI(t-1) 0.00322 0.00314 0.00354 0.00335 0.00430 0.00397
(0.00363) (0.00348) (0.00360) (0.00316) (0.00382) (0.00412)
Tech(t-2) 0.252*** 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.261*** 0.242** 0.243***
(0.0937) (0.0881) (0.0927) (0.0870) (0.0936) (0.0894)
Quartile2(LMEC) 0.129 0.124 0.0917 0.0745 0.122 0.106
(0.0908) (0.145) (0.0936) (0.102) (0.0872) (0.134)
Quartile3(UMEC) 0.141 0.132 0.0908 0.0728 0.156 0.136
(0.113) (0.170) (0.113) (0.117) (0.108) (0.166)
Observations 903 845 903 845 903 845
R2 0.68 0.681 0.68
# of countries 58 58 58 58 58 58
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control variables YES YES YES
# of instruments 57 57 56
Hansen Test 0.852 0.635 *
AR(1) 0.0267 0.00924 0.0253
AR(2) 0.171 0.152 0.169
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ht = high technology, mt =
medium-low technology, lt = low technology. LMEC = lower middle education country, UMEC = upper
middle education country. Lags have been restricted to lengths 6-8 in column 2, 7-8 in column 4, and 6 in
column 6. The depth of lag lengths has been guided by the misspecification tests, as well as achieving a
realistic value for the lagged dependent variable, which should be between the OLS- and the FE estimate.
Other lag lengths yield similar results (available upon request).
*The Hansen test of overidentification is omitted for this equation since the instrument lag length is restricted
to one lag, meaning that the model is exactly identified. No well-behaved model could be found with lag







































Table 4.A.4: Robustness to the TFP index, table 4.3 (columns 2 and 4) results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exports Imports









Ht exp(t-1) -1.11e-05 0.00128 0.00556 0.00520 -0.000582 -0.00240 -0.00733 -0.00713
(0.00147) (0.00337) (0.00447) (0.00435) (0.00199) (0.00349) (0.00600) (0.00574)
Mt exp(t-1) 0.00337 0.000352 0.00554 0.00464 -0.00512 0.00212 0.0120 0.0127
(0.00448) (0.00563) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00583) (0.00895) (0.0114) (0.0108)
Lt exp(t-1) -0.00119 0.00187 0.0130 0.0130 0.00206 -0.0126 -0.0280* -0.0282**
(0.00352) (0.00808) (0.0130) (0.0124) (0.00864) (0.0103) (0.0140) (0.0129)
Totalimp/exp(t-1) -0.00158 -0.00301 -0.00569 -0.00525 0.000712 0.000463 0.00527 0.00479
(0.00147) (0.00305) (0.00549) (0.00532) (0.000498) (0.00273) (0.00479) (0.00466)
GDP -0.0254 -0.0126 -0.224 -0.234 -0.0247 -0.00867 -0.216 -0.226
(0.0943) (0.124) (0.224) (0.221) (0.0903) (0.125) (0.224) (0.221)
Education 0.0110 -0.0163 -0.0489 -0.0347 0.00824 -0.0168 -0.0426 -0.0267
(0.0353) (0.0433) (0.0537) (0.0540) (0.0348) (0.0427) (0.0551) (0.0545)
ValAddAgri -0.00154 -0.00422 -0.00100 -0.000359 -0.00126 -0.00488 -0.00363 -0.00316
(0.00474) (0.00658) (0.00973) (0.00923) (0.00463) (0.00632) (0.00906) (0.00858)
FDI(t-1) 0.00365 0.00894 0.00848 0.00861 0.00435 0.00802 0.00487 0.00504
(0.00329) (0.00774) (0.00855) (0.00823) (0.00347) (0.00779) (0.00858) (0.00824)
Tech(t-2) 0.241** 0.210** 0.379 0.834** 0.243** 0.214** 0.529 0.874**
(0.0916) (0.0976) (0.460) (0.342) (0.0914) (0.0970) (0.475) (0.357)
Constant -0.576 -0.721 1.134 1.166 -0.574 -0.748 1.065 1.102
(0.864) (1.111) (2.032) (1.987) (0.827) (1.121) (2.013) (1.966)
Observations 903 552 386 386 903 552 386 386
R2 0.679 0.667 0.631 0.64 0.679 0.667 0.632 0.641
# of countries 58 37 33 33 58 37 33 33
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ht = high technology, mt = medium-low technology, lt = low technology.
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Table 4.A.5: Robustness to the TFP index, table 4.4 (columns 4 and 6) results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exports Imports














Tech(t-2) 0.255*** 0.226** 0.559 0.874** 0.242** 0.214** 0.626 0.891**
(0.0927) (0.0965) (0.488) (0.357) (0.0936) (0.0988) (0.454) (0.362)
Total ht(t-1) -0.0132 0.0193 -0.0141 -0.0164 0.0166 0.0329 0.0216 0.0205
(0.0296) (0.0560) (0.0655) (0.0584) (0.0203) (0.0247) (0.0239) (0.0216)
LMEC*ht(t-1) 0.00279 -0.0419 -0.0116 -0.0105 -0.0165 -0.0360 -0.0337 -0.0334
(0.0318) (0.0609) (0.0684) (0.0604) (0.0200) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0261)
UMEC*ht(t-1) 0.0127 -0.0170 0.0295 0.0297 -0.0166 -0.0380 -0.0354 -0.0346
(0.0300) (0.0566) (0.0689) (0.0602) (0.0205) (0.0262) (0.0268) (0.0246)
Total mt(t-1) -0.0124 -0.0231 0.0403 0.0390 -0.0338 -0.0471 -0.0462 -0.0400
(0.0178) (0.0323) (0.0434) (0.0370) (0.0252) (0.0305) (0.0304) (0.0258)
LMEC*mt(t-1) 0.0401 0.0988* 0.123** 0.119** 0.0299 0.0538 0.0707* 0.0655*
(0.0259) (0.0565) (0.0495) (0.0458) (0.0269) (0.0338) (0.0361) (0.0339)
UMEC*mt(t-1) 0.0101 0.0209 -0.0461 -0.0420 0.0253 0.0558* 0.0774* 0.0736*
(0.0178) (0.0346) (0.0496) (0.0412) (0.0269) (0.0320) (0.0412) (0.0386)
Total lt(t-1) 0.0181 0.0247 0.00804 0.00625 0.0359 0.0289 0.0296 0.0198
(0.0125) (0.0250) (0.0203) (0.0173) (0.0304) (0.0322) (0.0333) (0.0304)
LMEC*lt(t-1) -0.0310** -0.0473 -0.0362 -0.0318 -0.0387 -0.0482 -0.0739 -0.0603
(0.0153) (0.0300) (0.0243) (0.0208) (0.0328) (0.0364) (0.0445) (0.0414)
UMEC*lt(t-1) -0.0146 -0.0241 0.0229 0.0228 -0.0383 -0.0648 -0.113* -0.101*
(0.0147) (0.0245) (0.0301) (0.0272) (0.0353) (0.0398) (0.0586) (0.0534)
Totalimp/exp(t-1) -0.000270 -0.00340 -0.0146* -0.0137* 0.000958 0.00220 0.00875 0.00812
(0.00169) (0.00351) (0.00831) (0.00778) (0.000785) (0.00294) (0.00629) (0.00594)
GDP -0.0209 0.0102 -0.157 -0.162 -0.0313 -0.0227 -0.204 -0.202
(0.0967) (0.127) (0.225) (0.223) (0.0910) (0.120) (0.227) (0.221)
Education 0.0114 -0.00929 -0.0397 -0.0268 0.0101 -0.0223 -0.0370 -0.0240
(0.0361) (0.0494) (0.0571) (0.0568) (0.0373) (0.0481) (0.0608) (0.0600)
ValAddAgri -0.000925 -0.00383 -0.000461 6.14e-05 -0.000881 -0.00444 -0.00296 -0.00248
(0.00498) (0.00658) (0.00963) (0.00904) (0.00462) (0.00616) (0.00898) (0.00837)
FDI(t-1) 0.00354 0.00525 0.0112 0.0119 0.00430 0.00982 0.00882 0.00922
(0.00360) (0.00917) (0.0119) (0.0113) (0.00382) (0.00848) (0.0100) (0.00951)
Observations 903 552 386 386 903 552 386 386
R2 0.681 0.67 0.641 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.639 0.648
# of countries 58 37 33 33 58 37 33 33
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The lagged dependent variable as well as the
country group dummies have been included in the estimation, but omitted from the output to save space. Ht = high
technology, mt = medium-low technology, lt = low technology. LMEC = lower middle education country, UMEC =
upper middle education country.
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Table 4.A.6: Robustness to the UTIP measure, table 4.2 (columns 2 and 4) results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: Theil UTIP Theil UTIP
Lagged dep. var. 0.781*** 0.787*** 0.781*** 0.784***
(0.0365) (0.0533) (0.0368) (0.0543)
Tech(t-2) 0.244** 0.199** 0.243** 0.199**
(0.0915) (0.0927) (0.0917) (0.0928)
Totaltrade(t-1) -0.000105 -0.000742
(0.000509) (0.000493)
Total lt(t-1) 0.000747 -0.00324
(0.00328) (0.00285)
Total mt(t-1) -0.000814 0.00269
(0.00320) (0.00335)
Total ht(t-1) -1.61e-05 -0.00154
(0.000889) (0.00106)
GDP -0.0280 -0.0219 -0.0258 -0.0238
(0.0865) (0.0863) (0.0910) (0.0886)
Education 0.00790 -0.0227 0.00763 -0.0205
(0.0347) (0.0393) (0.0353) (0.0397)
FDI(t-1) -0.000368 0.00115 -0.000188 0.00112
(0.00429) (0.00383) (0.00463) (0.00395)
ValAddAgri 0.00290 0.00559* 0.00299 0.00438
(0.00322) (0.00304) (0.00338) (0.00272)
Constant -0.563 -0.571 -0.587 -0.568
(0.780) (0.817) (0.837) (0.841)
Observations 903 805 903 805
R2 0.679 0.7 0.679 0.7
# of countries 58 58 58 58
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.A.7: Robustness to the UTIP measure of inter-industry wage inequality, table 4.3
(columns 2 and 4) results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: Theil UTIP Theil UTIP
Lagged dep. var 0.780*** 0.784*** 0.781*** 0.783***
(0.0365) (0.0545) (0.0362) (0.0550)
Ht exp(t-1) -0.00119 -0.00255 0.00206 -0.00540
(0.00352) (0.00393) (0.00864) (0.00562)
Mt exp(t-1) 0.00337 0.00350 -0.00512 0.00332
(0.00448) (0.00603) (0.00583) (0.00585)
Lt exp(t-1) -1.11e-05 -0.000972 -0.000582 -0.00235
(0.00147) (0.00199) (0.00199) (0.00209)
Totalimp(t-1) -0.00158 -0.00162 0.000712 -0.000380
(0.00147) (0.00188) (0.000498) (0.000755)
Tech(t-2) 0.241** 0.198** 0.243** 0.199**
(0.0916) (0.0927) (0.0914) (0.0925)
GDP -0.0254 -0.0240 -0.0247 -0.0173
(0.0943) (0.0915) (0.0903) (0.0885)
Education 0.0110 -0.0201 0.00824 -0.0223
(0.0353) (0.0403) (0.0348) (0.0394)
FDI(t-1) 0.00365 0.00514* 0.00435 0.00510*
(0.00329) (0.00282) (0.00347) (0.00286)
ValAddAgri -0.00154 0.000493 -0.00126 0.00135
(0.00474) (0.00404) (0.00463) (0.00404)
Quartile2(LMEC) 0.0903 0.0710 0.0893 0.0711
(0.0852) (0.117) (0.0844) (0.118)
Quartile3(UMEC) 0.116 0.107 0.110 0.110
(0.0990) (0.131) (0.0989) (0.132)
Observations 903 805 903 805
R2 0.679 0.7 0.679 0.7
# of countries 58 58 58 58
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ht = high technology, mt =
medium-low technology, lt = low technology. LMEC = lower middle education country, UMEC = upper
middle education country.
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Table 4.A.8: Robustness to the UTIP measure of inter-industry wage inequality, table 4.4
(columns 2 and 4) results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Exports Imports
Dep. var.: Theil UTIP Theil UTIP Theil UTIP
Lagged dep. var. 0.778*** 0.778*** 0.778*** 0.784*** 0.778*** 0.778***
(0.0364) (0.0562) (0.0360) (0.0555) (0.0365) (0.0564)
Total ht(t-1) 0.0121 0.0200 -0.0132 0.0456 0.0166 0.0252
(0.0154) (0.0223) (0.0296) (0.0377) (0.0203) (0.0432)
LMEC*ht(t-1) -0.0140 -0.0239 0.00279 -0.0537 -0.0165 -0.0288
(0.0154) (0.0224) (0.0318) (0.0393) (0.0200) (0.0430)
UMEC*ht(t-1) -0.0120 -0.0223 0.0127 -0.0470 -0.0166 -0.0303
(0.0158) (0.0228) (0.0300) (0.0391) (0.0205) (0.0443)
Total mt(t-1) -0.0196 -0.0326 -0.0124 -0.0402* -0.0338 -0.0474
(0.0128) (0.0197) (0.0178) (0.0224) (0.0252) (0.0414)
LMEC*mt(t-1) 0.0263* 0.0435** 0.0401 0.0626** 0.0299 0.0551
(0.0137) (0.0202) (0.0259) (0.0301) (0.0269) (0.0416)
UMEC*mt(t-1) 0.0170 0.0367* 0.0101 0.0417 0.0253 0.0590
(0.0130) (0.0208) (0.0178) (0.0257) (0.0269) (0.0441)
Total lt(t-1) 0.0178* 0.0304** 0.0181 0.0299* 0.0359 0.0507
(0.00973) (0.0146) (0.0125) (0.0163) (0.0304) (0.0388)
LMEC*lt(t-1) -0.0229** -0.0404*** -0.0310** -0.0421** -0.0387 -0.0663
(0.0109) (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0190) (0.0328) (0.0404)
UMEC*lt(t-1) -0.0163 -0.0333** -0.0146 -0.0306 -0.0383 -0.0583
(0.0111) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0186) (0.0353) (0.0396)
Totalimp/exp(t-1) -0.000270 -0.00127 0.000958 -0.000162
(0.00169) (0.00255) (0.000785) (0.00126)
Tech(t-2) 0.252*** 0.206** 0.255*** 0.205** 0.242** 0.200**
(0.0937) (0.0971) (0.0927) (0.0964) (0.0936) (0.0965)
GDP -0.0219 -0.0316 -0.0209 -0.0274 -0.0313 -0.0292
(0.0943) (0.0934) (0.0967) (0.0938) (0.0910) (0.0939)
Education 0.00764 -0.0191 0.0114 -0.0164 0.0101 -0.0215
(0.0364) (0.0422) (0.0361) (0.0410) (0.0373) (0.0428)
ValAddAgri -9.47e-06 0.00122 -0.000925 0.000765 -0.000881 0.00150
(0.00474) (0.00417) (0.00498) (0.00425) (0.00462) (0.00424)
FDI(t-1) 0.00322 0.00398 0.00354 0.00522* 0.00430 0.00429
(0.00363) (0.00290) (0.00360) (0.00309) (0.00382) (0.00282)
Observations 903 805 903 805 903 805
R2 0.68 0.703 0.681 0.702 0.68 0.702
# of countries 58 58 58 58 58 58
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ht = high technology, mt = medium-low
technology, lt = low technology. LMEC = lower middle education country, UMEC = upper middle education country.
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4.B Appendix
Potential caveats of the sector-based approach for the measure of wage inequality
The following numerical example of three sectors, A, B, and C, demonstrates the
potential caveats of the sector-based approach for the measure of wage inequality in the
context of this paper. For reasons of simplicity, it is assumed that all sectors employ the
same number of workers, which is stable over time. Furthermore, in the initial state before
SBTC, skilled and unskilled workers earn the same wage, which is normalized to one and
equal across sectors.
Table 4.B.1: Factor-biased SBTC, sector composition and average wage
Sector A Sector B Sector C
Wage growth of




Skilled 100 120 50 60 70 25 30 45
Unskilled 100 100 150 150 150 175 175 175
Average wage 1 1.1 1 1.05 1.1 1 1.025 1.1
The first column in each sector then describes both the composition of the workforce
and each group’s total wage. SBTC raises the skill premium, leading to higher wages for
the skilled. The second and third columns in each sector describe the resulting total wage
for each skill group for different wage growth rates. With factor-biased SBTC only, the
effect on the average wage depends on the composition of the workforce in each sector.
The higher the share of skilled workers, the larger increase in the average wage. However,
if factor-biased SBTC is asymmetrical (and thus also sector-biased), a larger increase in
wages in one sector (e.g., 40 percent in sector B) can be partly or completely offset by
the smaller share of skilled workers in that sector - which cannot be observed in the data
at hand. One can see that in order to assess the overall effect of SBTC of wages, it is
necessary to also take the distribution of wages within each sector into account. In the
illustrated case, a between-sector measure would understate the effect of SBTC on the
distribution of wages in the economy.
One might argue that the above reasoning also holds true for the opposite effect, namely
trade-induced increase in the demand for unskilled labor. However, it is reasonable to
assume that unskilled labor is more homogenous and exchangeable between sectors than
skilled labor. Factor-biased SBTC favoring the unskilled therefore is therefore likely to
affect unskilled wages rather symmetrically throughout the sectors of the economy. In
sum, while there are a few caveats associated with employing a sector-based rather than
a factor-based analysis, there is little reason to suspect that results will be distorted
systematically. On the question of the importance of the within-group component of wage
inequality, Conceição and Galbraith (2000: 71) argue that
”when the underlying data set is drawn from industrial classification schemes, the
answer will generally be ”not very important.” Industrial classification schemes, after all,
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are designed to group together entities that are comprised of firms engaged in similar
lines of work, and firms, like all bureaucracies, tend to maintain their internal relative pay
structures comparatively stable from one period to the next.”
When unskilled labor also (at least partly) profits from an increase in the wages of
skilled labor within a sector, this mitigates the abovementioned problem of asymmetrical
factor bias conflating the true extent of SBTC.
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